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“[I]t will be far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous
amendments to the Constitution . . . [E]very amendment to the
Constitution, if once established, would be a single proposition, and might
be brought forward singly. There would then be no necessity for
management or compromise, in relation to any other point, no giving nor
taking. The will of the requisite number would at once bring the matter to
a decisive issue.”
—Alexander Hamilton, 17881
“The States are now so numerous that I despair of ever seeing another
amendment to the Constitution, although the innovations of time will
certainly call, and now already call, for some.”
—Thomas Jefferson, 18232
“[N]o impulse short of the impulse of self-preservation, no force less
than the force of revolution, can nowadays be expected to move the
cumbrous machinery of formal amendment erected in Article Five.”
—Woodrow Wilson, 18853
INTRODUCTION
4

“Easy.” “Difficult.”

1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton).
2. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (1823), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 265 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1892-99) [hereinafter Letter to George Hay],
available at http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/foley. That view contrasts
starkly with Jefferson’s convention era thinking: “We must be content to accept [the
Constitution’s] good and to cure what is evil in it hereafter.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to John Brown (1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 19 (Paul L. Ford ed.,
1892-99)
[hereinafter
Letter
to
John
Brown],
available
at
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/foley.
3. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 163 (Meridian Books 1956)
(1885).
4. The ultimate inquiry in which I engage goes deeper than the simple conclusion that
our constitution is “difficult” to amend because it has been amended far less frequently than
most others. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM.
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Explicit commentary on how amendable—through the Article V
process—the American Constitution has been rarely exceeds such
unsophisticated labels.5 Even the recent flurry of Article V-centered
literature reaches only sweeping generalizations about the level of
difficulty in the formal process. Most authors recite such simple glosses as
mere prelude to histories of, or normative speculation about, non-formal or
extra-Article V amendment.6
This Article addresses the varying level of difficulty of formal
constitutional change, focusing primarily on pre-“modern” times. As
developed in this Article, the pre-modern age runs through the first century
and a half of the Constitution of 1788 and it is little understood. Today, by
contrast and regardless of the descriptive terms we use, we share at least a
general understanding of the impediments to, and likelihood of success of,
contemporary constitutional amendments. Some say amendment is hard to
achieve, others that it is easy, depending on normative perspectives; but all
speak of the same generally-known conditions. This Article also explores
the amendability question in earlier eras, where those contemporary
commonplaces cannot reach.
The full historical record dwarfs the limited range of materials
considered by almost all prior studies that have touched on the
amendability question.7 The relevant record includes not just the vast,
elusive set of indicia of some sort of historically-varying “amendment
need” and the ratification process surrounding the few proposals Congress
actually has put to the states for consideration, but also includes the history
surrounding each of the over eleven thousand amendment proposals that
have been introduced in Congress.8 Admittedly, then, the relevant
historical record is too far-flung to engage in a single article through a
direct historical analysis.
POL. SCI. REV. 355, 365 (1994) (citing comparative data that the U.S. Constitution is the
second most-difficult to amend). Rather, I consider the degree to which our amendability
has matched our expectations or normative views as a varying matter across our history.
Moreover, since, as detailed below, it is the congressional gate-keeping stage of the process,
and not the states’ ratification stage, where the history of amendment difficulty most resides,
I do not focus on ratification difficulty. Other writers have addressed the historicallyincreasing, theoretical difficulty for popular supermajorities to ratify amendments and ease
for miniscule minorities to block them, due to the addition of states and accompanying
demographic shifts. See, e.g., Peter Suber, Population Changes and Constitutional
Amendments: Federalism Versus Democracy, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 409 (1986-87)
(arguing, based on a rich empirical study, that the delicate balance between federalism and
democracy interests embodied in Article V has been sharply skewed towards federalism by
demographic patterns the framers did not anticipate).
5. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (presenting the history of the implementation of
amendments and discussing literature pertaining to the amendment process).
6. Id.
7. See discussion infra Parts II.A, II.B (reviewing major works on the amendability
question and analyzing prior studies on this issue).
8. See infra Part II.B.2 (providing a historical background of the amendment process).
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But I propose we can quickly distill at least a useful overview of the full
amendability history using indirect means. To do so, I capitalize on one
particular benefit of the record’s large size: that significant patterns
sometimes can be drawn from large data aggregations with quantifiable
characteristics, using numerical methods. Here, I first seize on the
particularly-accessible tallies of amendments proposed in each Congress.
Using that data as a beginning framework, I then speculate on the macrolevel historical evolution of the “difficulty” of amendment.
The methodological lynchpin of this experiment in glimpsing the big
picture of amendability is my attempt to explain a simple but surprising
empirical observation. On first looking at the congressional side of the
amendability question, I was struck by the number of amendment proposals
that had been formally introduced, over eleven thousand, compared to the
very few of those proposals that had passed both houses with the requisite
two-thirds majority, thirty-three.9 What is more, the total numbers of
amendments proposed in each Congress did not merely increase over
congressional history with the size of Congress; there was wide fluctuation
in numbers from term to term—with a low of just one in the 4th Congress
(1795-97) and historical high of 773 in the 91st Congress (1969-70).
Those preliminary empirical observations led immediately to two further
empirical questions: Did the total numbers of general bills introduced also
fluctuate from Congress to Congress so unpredictably? And if so, were
there overlapping causes of the erratic patterns of numbers of proposed
amendments and bills such that their totals, over time, in fact correlated (in
a statistically significant way)?
Surprisingly, yes. Bills, also erratic in frequency, had totals indeed
related to those for proposed amendments. That led me to speculations on
the causes of that phenomenon that, in turn, produced a preliminary theory:
seven discrete eras of “amendability,” or at least of the history of Congress
9. The contrast is even starker if we exclude the Bill of Rights and the two initially
unratified amendments Congress proposed to the states with it (the now Twenty-Seventh
Amendment and a proposal on the size of the House), since several states had made their
ratifications of the original Constitution contingent on the immediate adoption of a bill of
rights. On that view, the Congress has produced only twenty-three amendments by the
formal process. By contrast, the states have exhibited a comparatively-high rate of
ratification. Of the thirty-three amendments Congress proposed, the states ratified twentyseven. The six left on the table were proposals to control the growth of the size of the House
of Representatives in a manner more detailed than the Constitution provides (1789), to strip
citizenship from those receiving foreign titles of nobility (1810), to effectively
constitutionalize the institution of slavery (the “Corwin Amendment,” 1861), to give
Congress explicit power to ban child labor (1924), to explicitly extend equal rights to
women (ERA, 1972), and to confer on the District of Columbia attributes of statehood,
including representation in the House (1978). 3 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 1787-2001, 1718-19 (John R. Vile ed., 2003) [hereinafter PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS]. For convenience, I have appended a table detailing the dates and subjects of
the thirty-three amendments proposed by Congress. See infra App. A.
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in its amendment gate-keeping capacity.
For convenience (and roughly related to contemporary political events) I
call the seven eras the Founding (1791-1812), Antebellum (1813–1858),
Civil War–Early Reconstruction (1859-1868), Latter Reconstruction–
Gilded Age (1869-1886), Populist–Progressive (1887-1916), Suffrage–
Prohibition (1917-1930), and Modern (1931-2004).
An idealized graphic may clarify what I have just described. That is, the
empirical core of this article explores how one should interpret an
observation like the following:

FIGURE 1:
Simplified Correlation Illustration
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Again, the above graph is idealized to make clear the basic point. In
fact, the real variation in the intensities of bill proposing and amendment
proposing activity from Congress to Congress is not as precisely matched
as this illustration. But the real numbers do tend to a close, statistically
significant match over the entire history of Congress. What is more, the
match is strikingly close in particular historical eras and distinctly nonexistent or negative in others.
My question is why this correlation?
Why, when (1) general
congressional legislation and proposed amendments are introduced by
different procedural vehicles (bills and joint resolutions, respectively);10 (2)
the ranges of topics addressed by bills and proposed amendments overlap
only partially;11 (3) the general likelihood of success of the two historically
has varied significantly (if for no other reason than the majority versus twothirds vote requirements); and (4) though perceptions of each have changed
substantially, bills and proposed amendments have always been regarded as
distinctly different from each other?12 Given all those factors suggesting
independence between those two spheres of congressional activity, what
drives the wide variations in total quantities of bills and proposed
amendments from Congress to Congress to be in sync with each other
much of the time, but abruptly not so in distinct eras?
10. See infra Part II.C (discussing the historical evolution of bill introduction
procedures and the process of joint resolution as the means for proposing amendments).
11. See infra Part III.B (characterizing congressional attitude towards the amendment
process).
12. See infra Parts II.A, II.B (presenting the available literature and modern theoretical
work discussing the amendment process).
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There had to be some common motivation that could drive members of
Congress both to introduce bills and to propose amendments, independent
of their substantive topics, and that when present to a higher degree among
a significant number of members, unrestrained by prudence or procedure,
would result in a higher number of bills or proposed amendments and vice
versa. I believe the motivation is “grandstanding,” “credit-seeking,” or, in
the terminology of the political scientist, “careerism.” And the impact of
careerism on the relationship between bill and amendment proposing
appears to vary across the seven eras I identify.13
True, it is suspect to construct this speculation around aggregate
characteristics, the mere rates at which amendments have been proposed
from historical Congress to historical Congress. I do not deny that it is the
substantive content, legislative history, social goals, and political
motivations of particular proposals that ultimately will yield a sophisticated
understanding of the history of attempted formal constitutional change.
But any manageable study first demands some principled means by which
researchers can select particular subsets of the proposed amendment data
for investigating those underlying characteristics.
That is, the apparent evolution in amendment-proposing history this
Article infers from a macrospective view may offer points of departure for
more-particularized future studies. Here, I (i) examine amendmentproposing rates over time in comparison with the corresponding rates of
introduction of general legislation; from which I (ii) distinguish the seven
distinct historical eras of congressional amendment proposing; and then
(iii) engage and survey a range of empirical and theoretical sources, in
history, political science, and legal scholarship that contextualize the
analysis. Though my seven-era framework will likely be proved too
precocious in a later, more-thorough analysis, it is a first vehicle for
speculation about the empirical evidence. In essence, this Article is primer
for the legal scholar on the interdisciplinary and empirical landscape
framing the amendability analysis. It knits together relevant but diverse
sources of data and fields of research.
Part I briefly overviews (A) the broader theoretical motivations and
potential implications of the amendability analysis and (B) the numerical
analysis through which I distinguish seven historical eras of amendment
proposing. Part II, on existing literature, then reviews the present
background of interdisciplinary scholarship from which the analysis
proceeds. Part III next develops a theory of the cause of the bill
introduction–amendment proposing correlation, and Part IV reports the raw
numerical analysis that “tests” that theory. That sets the stage for the heart
13. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing careerism and its effect on congressional behavior).
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of the article, Part V’s contextual analysis of the seven-era structure yielded
by that raw numerical analysis. Alongside the speculations on what the
numerical analysis says about the evolving character of amendment
proposing in relation to normal legislation, I include even less grounded
speculations about a general, mass-psychological congressional attitude
towards the amendment process in each of the seven congressional eras—
the evolving “Zeitgeist of amendability in Congress.” Finally, after some
tentative inferences from that analysis in Part VI, the Article concludes
with recommendations for future researchers including on operationalizing
“amendment need” and micro-analysis of congressional activity to
determine and assess responsiveness to that need, or “amendability.”
I.

A FRAMEWORK FOR AMENDABILITY ANALYSIS

A. Overview of the Broad Theoretical Problematic: Operationalizing
“Amendability,” Partially, in Terms of Congressional Gate-Keeping
This numerical analysis of amendment proposing offers the project of
constitutional scholarship a framework for exploring a historical question
most theoretical stances seem to ask, even if only implicitly.14 That is,
using the patterns and transition points identified here, we can begin to
evaluate Congress’s fulfillment of the formal gate- keeping role assigned to
it (in co-tenancy with the inchoate convention process of Article V) by the
Constitution.
Congressional gate-keeping, with its two-thirds supermajority threshold,
was one component of the 1788 adopters’ attempt to temper their own and
future generations’ immediate popular will. Itself an “unconstitutional” yet
necessary act, the Constitution of 1788 sought to remedy the virtual
immutability of the Articles of Confederation that proceeded it.15 The
primary mechanism for constitutional change divided the process into two
stages: first, congressional approval of a proposed change; then, states’
ratification.16 Accordingly, the adopters must have expected the change
14. See infra Part II.B.3 (providing the arguments made by modern theorists on the role
of Congress in the amendment-proposal process).
15. The Articles of Confederation required unanimity of the states for change.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (1777) (“[No] alteration at any time hereafter [shall]
be made in any of [the Articles of Confederation]; unless such alteration be agreed to in a
Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of every
State.”).
16. U.S. CONST. art. V states:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one

LATHAM OFFTOPRINTER

154

2/24/2006 1:32:14 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:145

mechanism’s first stage, the congressional gate keeping function, to allow
change proposals to pass to the second stage, decision by the states when
actually needed.17
At the same time, the adopters expected that Congress as gatekeeper
would be responsive to something. I call that thing “amendment need.”
Amendment need probably should signify some significant aggregate level
of desire for change by “the people,” perhaps filtered by congressional
judgment.18 And it is the level of responsiveness to amendment need, both
through congressional gate keeping and post-Congress ratification that I
define here to be the Constitution’s “amendability.”
Hence, the whole “amendability” question is much broader in scope than
the focus of this Article. Not only do I give short shrift to the eleven
thousand proposed amendments (with each of their full legislative
histories) as individual entities, only considering their tallies and mostcommon subjects; but I also defer theorizing and assessing amendment
need.19 Ultimately, even amendability is only a part of and draws its
relevance from a broader theoretical question: How closely, over history,
has the amendability quotient matched expectations or demands deemed
relevant by political theory (and which political theory is important)?
A few quick assumptions, easily discredited for their simplicity,
nonetheless illustrate the relationship among the components raised by that
broadest question: Suppose (i) amendment need is determined by the
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that
no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred
and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived
of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
I focus on the first alternative for proposing amendments—Congress—since the convention
method has never been invoked. The convention method was, however, close to invocation
in the 1960s in response to Supreme Court reapportionment decisions and more recently to
call for a national balanced budget amendment. John R. Vile, American Views of the
Constitutional Amending Process: An Intellectual History of Article V, 35 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 44, 63 (1991). But a fear of a potentially unwieldy and unlimited process has inspired
writers to argue against the convention method throughout our history. See id. at 54, 56-57,
63-65 (presenting arguments made by different writers, including judges, senators, and law
professors, pertaining to the failure to adopt constitutional changes through conventions).
17. See infra Part II.B.1 (arguing that there was no expectation that congressional gate
keeping would be a significant impediment to constitutional change).
18. In one sense, the supermajority rules of the gate keeping role suggest that Congress
was not intended to be a simple conduit of raw popular will. However, the parallel
provision for an amending convention to arise from the call of two thirds of the states
suggests that the intent may have been just that.
19. The era-by-era, contextual historical analysis of Part V infra does, however,
acknowledge at least the most obvious arguable indicia of amendment need, those very few
instances that gave rise to amendment proposals that succeeded in Congress. More difficult
to theorize are criteria to identify amendment need in other circumstances. Probably the
most popular candidate for a particular instance of that is the Supreme Court’s initial
resistance to New Deal legislation, discussed in the Modern era analysis. See infra Part
V.G.
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understanding of it by the adopters,20 whose thinking was uniform with the
thinking of, say, Alexander Hamilton; (ii) Hamilton thought that any time a
majority of the voting citizenry in each of three-fourths of the states
supported a constitutional change,21 Congress would present them with a
proposed amendment;22 (iii) throughout our history, there had been several
hundred instances rising to that level of popular support for constitutional
change on discrete topics; and (iv) Congress had, nonetheless, proposed
only thirty-three amendments. Then Congress would have been not very
responsive to amendment need, hence making amendability low, which
would be contrary to the adopters’ expectations of high amendability.
Again, the extent to which that hypothetical represents the best theory of
amendment need, the actual understanding and expectations of the ratifiers,
the actual subsequent history of popular support for change, and, perhaps
most importantly, the relevance of ratifiers’ expectations compared to those
of subsequent political entities defines areas for deeper research and
theory.23
B. Overview of the Numerical Analysis:
Seven Eras of Amendment Proposing Distinguished
The justification for my methodology in this initial look towards
amendability is this: having first concluded that any reckoning of the
difficultly of formal amendment must compare the hard-to-operationalize
quality of amendment need with the corresponding response under Article
V, I next assume that some initial analysis of Article V activity in general
will likely provide insights into what that activity is responding to, and
hence, how to later operationalize amendment need itself.
The
congressional role, rather than the chronologically, and causally-precedent
circumstances to which these proposals in Congress respond, is the more
empirically-accessible at the outset.24
While the more than eleven thousand amendments proposed to the
United States Constitution have evaded comprehensive analysis at any
level, I conclude that a macrospective view of them can yield the type of
useful insights that often inhere in large data aggregations. What emerges
here are discernible patterns in the history of congressional attitudes on the

20. Alone, this is a controversial and originalist assumption.
21. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
22. Article V, in turn, on this view then provided some wiggle room: only two-thirds,
not three-fourths, of each house of Congress had to pass the proposed amendment.
23. I also do not take a position here on the relevance of such a determination to
constitutional theory, if any.
24. The focus here is primarily on congressional activity because that is where almost
all the Article V action lies, since there have been no amendment proposals through the
Article V alternative convention proposing mechanism that bypasses Congress.
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practice of amendment-proposing.
As detailed in Part III, I posit that responsiveness to amendment need
can be operationalized in terms of congressional use of the amendment
process as a political or policy tool; that, in turn, can be evidenced in part
by the relationship between the aggregate character of normal legislative
bill proposing, on the one hand, and the aggregate character of amendment
proposing activity (via “joint resolutions” similar to bills), on the other.
Then, using the number of amendment attempts for each Congress, I
outline an evolution of the independence of the aggregate level of
enthusiasm for amendment proposing from Congress’s level of enthusiasm
for more-general legislative activity. I call that concept “motivation
independence,” for now.25 Its converse, which emerges in the Latter
Reconstruction–Gilded Age era and dominates in the Modern era, I call
“promiscuous careerism.” Finally, I examine how patterns and variability
in motivation independence versus promiscuous careerism relate to
contextual historical data that will likely bear most on the amendability
question.
Again, the way I explore motivation independence in these data may
seem far too superficial. I merely compare trends in quantity of
amendments proposed from Congress to Congress numerically with trends
in quantity of general legislative bills proposed during those Congresses.
Any congressional fool can (now26) toss a bill in the hopper, some might
say, so why should these aggregate numbers matter?
But the value of bill sponsorship quantities as an indicator of the
character of legislative motivation already has currency in political science.
For instance, Wendy Schiller argued the relevance of these data in a 1995
study of the Senate:
Because so few bills actually become law, one might question the worth
of any study of bill sponsorship. In contrast to the vast amount of
knowledge that exists about legislators and roll-call voting . . ., few
works seek to explain the choices legislators make when building their
agendas. Unlike roll-call voting, where senators face a predetermined
set of alternatives they had no part in shaping, bill sponsorship is under
the control of the individual legislator. As such, a study of bill
sponsorship provides a rich source of information about how legislators
interact with their institutions when there appears to be few rules to limit
their behavior.27

25. In this Article, I use loose, tentative definitions for discussion. Later in the
development of this theory, the definitions will become more analytic.
26. But see infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the difficulty of member bill introduction in
earlier historical eras).
27. Wendy J. Schiller, Senators as Political Entrepreneurs: Using Bill Sponsorship to
Shape Legislative Agendas, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 186, 186-87 (1995) (omitting Schillers’s
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And the value of my much broader—that is, collective (aggregate),
longitudinal, bicameral, and comparative,28 use of quantitative sponsorship
data is the identification of what seem to be seven qualitatively distinct eras
of amendment proposing activity spanning the history of Congress (at least
for purpose of discussing a problematic).
Artificial as it may seem on its own, this empirical analysis may provide
an important counterbalance to our current, generally non-empirical
(though sometimes narratively and theoretically rich) understandings. For
the period following the Founding and through the early twentieth century,
we generally have only sparse sources of information about several
important variables in the amendability equation. Those variables include,
for instance, (i) the general motivations and decision calculus of
congresspersons in the sponsorship of and voting on proposed
amendments, (ii) their perceptions of amendment need and likelihood of
amendment success, and (iii) their views of constitutional meaning and the
role of the amendment process.29 Our understanding is limited to
(i) statements by individual congresspersons of either their own
perspectives or their assessments of the views of their colleagues and (ii)
limited, contemporary assessments by historians or political partisans.30
Those sources are problematic not only in the potential that they are not
sufficiently representative, but also because human beings, even experts
drawing conclusions in their specific fields of study, are notoriously bad in
assessing patterns and relationships and making appropriate inferences.
Studies since the 1960s have empirically verified a pervasive tendency of
the human mind both to fail to recognize existing associative relationships
in data sets and to believe in the existence of relationships that do not, in
fact, exist.31 (This is not indictment of the sophisticated, systematic
footnote one: “In the 99th Congress, only 236 of 2,638 public bills became law. In the 100th
Congress, only 300 of 2,772 public bills became law.”).
28. By contrast, Schiller’s study looks at individual member bill totals, over just two
Congresses, for just the Senate, and not compared to sponsorship of legislative devices other
than bills. Id. at 187 n.2.
29. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
30. See infra Parts II.A, II.B (describing the limited works produced in this area).
31. See generally RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 97 (1980) (providing, in more technical terms, the
findings of several empirical psychological studies where “reported covariation was shown
to reflect true covariation far less than it reflected theories or preconceptions of the nature of
the associations that ‘ought’ to exist. Unexpected, true covariations can sometimes be
detected, but they will be underestimated and are likely to be noticed only when the
covariation is very strong, and the relevant data set excludes ‘decoy features’ that bring into
play popular but incorrect theories.”). Nisbett and Ross explain that those phenomena owe
to a variety of limitations in the human observational and inferential faculties: “Objects or
events are judged as frequent, probable, or casually efficacious to the extent that they are
readily ‘available’ in memory . . . . By default, more vivid information is more likely to
enter inferential processes than is less vivid information . . . [ which is] dangerous because
the vividness of information is normally related only obliquely at best to its true value as
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techniques of modern historians and political scientists but, rather, a
recognition of the potential unreliability of some of the sources upon which
they must rely.) Hence, the potential value of examining the amendability
data systematically: it may either reveal the existence of large-scale
patterns that have gone unobserved or unreported or debunk as false some
general perceptions and claims about what was going on at various points
in our history.
In brief, from that empirical analysis I preliminarily conclude that if the
oscillation between motivation independence and promiscuous careerism
over the seven eras hints at any broad trend, it is that amendment proposing
activity has gone from a generally “seriousminded,” policy-oriented
approach in the Founding era to a norm of grandstanding in the present
Modern era (beginning around 1931), through a series of distinct
intervening historical stages with anomalies that independently merit
further study.
Moreover, combining additional numerical data with historians’
assessments of typical or aggregate psychological attitudes in Congress,
concerning the likelihood of success of proposed amendments or prudential
reverence towards the Constitution and the process itself, I am able to
speculate about the evolution of the Zeitgeist of amendability32 in
Congress.
It seems the Founding and Modern eras represent opposite extremes in
the Zeitgeist of amendability; but the path between them was not a steady
descent. In the Founding era (1791-1812), there was a high degree of
optimism about the likelihood of success of amendments combined with a
strong prudential reverence for the amendment process that suppressed the
evidence.” Id. at 7-8. Moreover, “[p]reexisting knowledge structures influence unduly, and
often without the individual’s awareness, the characterization of the event. [And] [i]n
characterizing samples, the lay scientist usually is at the mercy of the sample of events that
can be retrieved from memory.” Id. at 9. Finally, in attempting to generalize from
observations in the sample to the population as a whole, individuals often have little
understanding of the importance of the sample size and its freedom from bias. Id.; see also
Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and The Law of Torts: The
Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 627 (1988) (“More than two
decades of research establishes that people making decisions—whether laymen or
scientists—consistently make gross errors in evaluating objective information.”). The
general defects in human inference documented by those modern studies have long been
observed anecdotally: “It is evident that when the instances on one side of a question are
more likely to be remembered and recorded than those on the other, especially if there be
any strong motive to preserve the memory of the first, but not of the latter, these last are
likely to be over-looked, and escape the observations of the mass of mankind.” JOHN
STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC: RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE 585 (People’s ed.,
Longmans, Green, & Co. 1896) (1843). “[P]opular induction depends upon the emotional
interest of the instances, not upon their number.” BERTRAND RUSSELL, PHILOSOPHY 269
(1927).
32. See infra Part III.B (setting forth the theory of the Zeitgeist of amendability in
Congress).
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pace of amendment proposing.33 There is little evidence of abuse of the
amendment process for purely credit-seeking purposes at that time.34
Moving into the Antebellum era (1813-1858), both the perceived likelihood
of success and the reverence for the process diminish, to some degree,
though they persist at moderate levels relative to the entire congressional
history.35 The path of diminution then continues through and beyond the
(sui generis) Civil War era into the Latter Reconstruction–Gilded Age era
(1869-1886).36 Aided by the great easing of procedural constraints on
individual bill proposing, that era, like the Modern era, is marked by both a
dim assessment of the likelihood of success of amendments and a low
degree of reverence for the amendment process. Here as well, an easing of
constraints on individual bill sponsorship allows credit seeking to first
emerge in full form, creating a prominent culture of “promiscuous
careerism” in Congress.37
But the dual decline in assessment of success and reverence for the
process abates for a time. On the one hand, due to the century-long gap in
amendments by the normal (non-Civil-War) means, the view of likelihood
of success does continue its own decline and reach a historical low in the
next, Populist–Progressive era (1887-1916). However, reverence for the
amendment process substantially revives in that era. Moreover, credit
seeking remits, so that bill and amendment proposing return to more
independent and serious-minded endeavors.
Then, with the rapid
congressional-passage and ratification successes of a number of
amendments, the Suffrage-Prohibition era (1917-1930) sees a peak in the
assessment of likelihood of success of amendments, though the reverence
for the process begins to decline again.38
Ultimately, though, with the Modern era (1931-present), the pessimistic
irreverence first seen in the Latter Reconstruction, Gilded Age era
reemerges in full force and congeals into what appears to be the current,
seemingly-permanent, static Zeitgeist of amendability, of which I presume
most readers have a general sense.

33. See infra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
34. See infra Part V.A (discussing the likelihood of careerist motivations in the
amendment process during the Founding and Modern eras).
35. See infra Part V.B (examining court decisions that serve as evidence of the lack of
promiscuous careerism).
36. See discussion infra Part V.C (explaining that the short duration of this era
contributed to motivation independence in the amendment process).
37. See infra Part V.D (asserting that promiscuous careerism appeared in this era
mainly due to the lesser impediments in bill introduction and the topic overlap in
amendment proposals).
38. See infra Part V.F (concluding that this era demonstrates that motivation
independence may dominate a congressional era even after the historical emergence of
promiscuous careerism).
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II. THE SPARSE EXISTING LITERATURE RELATED TO AMENDABILITY
My analysis places the numerical findings into the context of our current
multi-disciplinary understanding of the amendability of the Constitution.
Amendability has not comprehensively been addressed by any single
discipline or line of analysis, but, rather, has been touched on in different
ways from several scholarly perspectives. Two categories of scholarship
directly implicate amendability: (1) proposed amendment scholarship and (2)
constitutional theory. A third category, the analysis of Congress done by
political scientists, explains the character of and identifies trends in the
general congressional data that this Article compares with amendmentproposing activity. Though law, history, and political science in the
aggregate have already produced a substantial body of work on amendment
proposing activity that implicates amendability, scholars in those
disciplines have not considered the macro-level analysis derived from the
variations in the frequency of attempts to amend the Constitution over time
I present here.
While I draw from proposed amendment scholarship, congressional
analysis, and legal theory separately, all three are critical to the
amendability question. Each provides unique insights as well as defects
remedied by the others. For instance, the dispersion of expertise finds that
the two most prominent modern proposed amendment scholars are a
political scientist, John Vile, and a historian, David Kyvig.39 By contrast,
while there has been a recent flurry of activity in legal commentary
regarding the amending process, legal scholars virtually ignore the
proposed amendment history. They focus, rather, on the successful
amendments and alternatives to the formal amendment process, Bruce
Ackerman and Akhil Amar being representative of the alternative-formsof-amendment camp.40
To assess amendability in its full scope, however, the three disciplines
(and perhaps more) must be codependent. Legal scholarship, to the extent
it has touched on the area, lacks several analytical components: (i) a
historical narrative of the type Kyvig provides, (ii) understanding of
Congress as a sophisticated institution and of the primary sources of
proposed amendments, general congressional activity, and the non-judicial
indicia of amendment need, and (iii) savvy with the numerical methods
routinely employed by political scientists. And while this inquiry is
39. See infra Part II.A (presenting in detail the work of these two scholars).
40. See Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: Theories of Constitutional Change, 65
TENN. L. REV. 155 (1996-97) (providing an extensive comparative summary and critique of
Ackerman’s, Amar’s, and others’ non-formal amendment theories through the mid-1990s).
In opposing the lack of reverence for the formal amending process espoused by those
current legal theorists, Vile and Kyvig are monolithic in their conservatism. In this Article,
I attempt to be more agnostic.
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historical at its core, history also tends to lack the understanding of the
behavior of Congress as a political institution on the micro and macro level
and sophistication of inquiry into the quantitative data known to the
political scientist. Finally, completing the circle, political science and
history often seem less suited to framing the inquiry into amendability
demanded by constitutional theory as deftly as the legal scholar.41
A. Proposed Amendment Scholarship
Proposed amendment scholarship is comprised mostly by the work of
just three scholars: two historians and a political scientist. At least until
David Kyvig’s 1996 treatise on the history of attempted amendment,42
modern proposed amendment scholarship was sparse and eclectic at best.
The limited nature of the canon in this area has probably derived from the
limitations of the data sources for proposed amendments themselves.43 As
law librarian Thomas E. Heard lamented in 1992, except for some rare
exceptions where scholars have compiled proposed amendments in a small
subject area, “[a]s long as proposed amendments remain scattered through
the vast and unwieldy compilations of House and Senate bills and are
accessible only through relatively obscure indexes of varying quality, it
will be difficult to determine accurately their utility as tools in legal,
historical, and social sciences research.”44 The analysis of this Article
provides some structure for determining which portions of that difficult
data set most merit further examination.
Prior to Kyvig, Ohio State University Professor Herman V. Ames’s
Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, 1789188945 had been the standard in proposed amendment scholarship, and
several scholars had attempted to extend his project into contemporary
times.46 In addition to cataloguing the approximately 1700 proposed
amendments introduced in Congress during its first 100 years, amendment

41. For example, in his review of Kyvig’s 1996 book, DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND
AUTHENTIC ACTS:
AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995 (1996), Professor
Chemerinsky uses the deep insights and historical knowledge he acknowledges Kyvig
provides to more-directly frame the type of theoretical questions that motivate this article.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Amending the Constitution, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1561 (1998) (book
review). See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
42. KYVIG, supra note 41.
43. See Thomas E. Heard, Proposed Constitutional Amendments as a Research Tool:
The Example of Prohibition, 84 LAW LIBR. J. 499 (1992) (discussing the format and
availability of proposed amendments and using the national prohibition as an example).
44. Id. at 508.
45. HERMAN V. AMES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1889 (1897) (originally published as 2 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION,
ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1896, having been awarded the best monograph prize by the
association in 1895).
46. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
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by amendment, Ames wrote about the broader trends and eras he observed.
Specifically, he determined that amendment proposals in the first 100 years
of the Constitution naturally fell into four distinct periods: (1) 1789-1803:
perfecting the details;47 (2) 1803-1860: general alterations;48 (3) 1860general
1870:
slavery and reconstruction;49 and (4) 1870-1889:
emendations.50
Reviewing the full span of the first 100 years, Ames observed: “The
prospect of almost certain failure does not seem to have diminished the
number of amendments offered. In recent years there has been a gradual
increase in the number presented.”51 Specifically, “[d]uring the fourth
period there were over four hundred distinct propositions introduced, and in
the 50th Congress forty-eight resolutions, proposing amendments on
twenty different subjects, were presented.”52 Ames charged future
generations of scholars with the study of proposed amendments as a
window to contemporary popular feeling and political theory that will
enhance our understanding of constitutional history.53
47. Ames described the Bill of Rights as a response to “the spirit of dissatisfaction”
expressed by the 124 amendments proposed immediately following ratification and general
demand to further limit the power of federal government over the states. The other thrust of
proposals focused on correcting minor problems regarding the judiciary and electoral
system, exemplified by the 11th and 12th amendments. AMES, supra note 45, at 19.
48. In the next period, General Alterations (1804-1860), spanning more than half the
100 years he studied, Ames identified the most numerous propositions to be changes in the
election, term, removal, compensation, and duties of members of the legislative, executive,
and judicial departments. Id. at 19-22.
Other common amendment topics during this time were presidential election, term and
veto power and abolition of slavery. But other than the slavery issue, there were very few
amendments dealing with relationship between federal government and individuals; Ames
attributes that to dissatisfaction in this area having been allayed by Bill of Rights. Id. at 1022.
49. The third period of Slavery and Reconstruction (1860) saw a reversal: after the
war, “amendments relating to the legal status of individuals, which had previously been of
the least, now became of the greatest importance.” Id. at 23.
50. In the last two decades of the first century, Ames notes that proposed amendment
activity lapsed back into the generality of the beginning of our constitutional government.
Two significant classes of proposals dominated: changes in the form of government and
government powers. Changes in the form of government included the choice, term,
composition, and duties of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Powers of
government proposals in Ames’s mind evinced a drift toward paternalism, limiting powers
of Congress, protecting the civil and political rights of the individual, and correcting social
and political abuses. Id. at 24.
51. Id. at 25.
52. Id.
53.
The detailed examination of the proposed amendments which follows shows that
the importance of these propositions does not lie in their influence in effecting
actual changes within the Constitution merely, but that they are indices of the
movements to effect a change, and to a large degree show the waves of popular
feeling and reflect the political theories of the time. It is believed that a study of
the efforts to amend the Constitution will contribute to a fuller and clearer
understanding of our history, both constitutional and political.
Id. at 25 .
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But no one since Ames had matched his model with all its
comprehensiveness, depth, and detail. Rather, a series of scholars
continued the counting and cataloguing, to some degree, for the period after
the Constitution of 1788’s first hundred years.54
In recent years, political scientist John Vile had been the most pure
chronicler, in the Ames model, of proposed amendments. His Encyclopedia
of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed Amendment, and Amending Issues,
1789-200255 contains a great deal of data tabulated in the appendices, upon
which, along with his article on intellectual history56 and other writings, I
have relied substantially for this Article.
Kyvig’s subsequent work, however, provided a powerful historical
narrative beyond all that preceded it. As legal historian Kermit Hall has
observed,
[i]t covers the sweep of the American constitutional experience, treating
not only the history of the twenty-seven amendments made to the
nation’s organic law but the most important of the more than 10,000
proposed amendments. Kyvig is sensitive to the politics of constitutional
amendment without reducing its history to a simple narrative of political
wrangling. The result is a study that fits the Article V amending process
to issues of federalism, popular sovereignty, and, to a lessor extent,
separation of powers.57

A primary weakness of Kyvig’s work for my purposes, however, is found
in the emphasized portion of Hall’s critique above: Kyvig is selective,
focusing “only on those unratified amending proposals that he thinks had
widespread congressional support.”58 And despite (or perhaps because of)
my extensive reliance on Kyvig for this Article, I add two criticisms.
First, he seems to blur the distinction between gate keeping and
ratification in his assessments of how easy or hard it was to attain
amendments at various points in our history. He often skips past the gate

54. For instance, M.A. Mussmano expressly stated he was furthering Ames’s work, but
does not attempt the scope of Ames’s general observations or narrative. M.A. MUSMANNO,
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1889-1928 (1929)
(subtitled “A Monograph on the Resolutions Introduced in Congress Proposing
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America”). Other compilation
contributions covering 1889 through 2001—published as House, Senate, or Congressional
Research Service documents and at most providing a few words of topical description but
not a narrative in the vein of Ames—are reprinted in the three volume compendium edited
by Professor Vile. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 9.
55. JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789-2002 (2003).
56. Vile, supra note 16.
57. Kermit L. Hall & David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S.
Constitution, 1776-1995, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 487, 487 (1997) (book review) (emphasis
added).
58. John Vile, Explicit and Authentic Acts, By David Kyvig, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 416,
419 (1997) (book review).
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keeping issue and discusses the difficulty of ratification. But with only
thirty-three proposals coming out of Congress, it is very difficult to say
what would not have been ratifiable. Only six in over two hundred years
have failed to be ratified, for a 27/33 ratification rate, which seems fairly
high compared to, for instance the 33/11,000 passage rate of Congress.
Moreover, even the few proposals approved by Congress have yielded
some real ratification surprises, such as the quick ratification of the
Sixteenth Amendment authorizing the income tax and the failure of the
Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”).
Second, it is not clear by what standard Kyvig operationalizes
amendment need. Kyvig’s historical narrative may be the key and perhaps
even the core to understanding the need for amendments at various points
in our history, but it is certainly not the end of the story. For instance, what
is the popular will component of amendment need? While not addressing it
comprehensively, Kyvig does periodically refer to it. For example, he
observes that in the 1960s, “direct election [e.g., abolition of the electoral
college], according to public opinion surveys, was the most widely
approved amendment proposal of the era.”59
I discuss the operationalization of amendment need further at the end of
the Article.
B. Constitutional Theory
A thorough exposition of original understandings, the intellectual history
of Article V, and modern constitutional theory both exceed the constraints
of a single article and are well covered elsewhere in comparison to the core
of my analysis here. Accordingly, I make only brief observations about the
high amendability expectations of the adopters, examples of evolving
perspectives in the intervening intellectual history, and the scant direct
attention to the issues I raise in modern theoretical works.
1. Adopters
The amending process was not much discussed in the Convention itself,
and Article V embodies compromise on the central debate concerning it;
whether the Congress or the states were best to propose amendments.60
A major selling point to the ratifying conventions, in order to forestall
the opponents’ attempts to invoke changes to the plan of the convention
59. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 393.
60. See Vile, supra note 16, at 48 (affirming that the topic of amending the Constitution
was not discussed extensively at the Constitutional Convention); see also U.S. CONST. art. V
(providing that “[t]he Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments . . . .”).

LATHAM OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

2/24/2006 1:32:14 PM

HISTORICAL AMENDABILITY

165

prior to ratification (or previous amendments), was that subsequent
amendments could easily be attained under Article V if particular aspects
of the scheme proved unworkable or undesirable. For example, in
attempting to convince the New York delegation, Hamilton wrote:
“whenever . . . ten states [i.e., three-fourths of the original thirteen] were
united in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must
infallibly take place.”61 That suggests (i) there was no expectation that
congressional gate keeping would be a significant impediment to
constitutional change; (ii) at least in the Constitution’s early years,
proposed amendments would frequently issue from Congress for states’
ratification; and (iii) a requisite three-fourths of states frequently would
ratify amendments proposed by Congress. That congressional gate keeping
was not expected to be an impediment is seen in the Anti-Federalist
argument that the process would be too difficult, focusing on the difficulty
in getting three-fourths of the states to ratify.62
It would then seem that history has disappointed the expectations of the
adopters with regard to congressional gate keeping at least in the early
years. On the other hand, the states have indeed frequently ratified the
proposals they have received from Congress.63
To be clear, to suggest that Congress’s gate keeping role has been far
more stringent than expected is not to conclude the adopters also expected
reckless constitutional mutation. Certainly Madison’s goal in offering the
structure of Article V was to achieve a process with some restraint.64 But
an assessment of the degree to which the ratifiers shared that view of the
meaning of the language used is, again, complicated by the fact that some
were selling the new Constitution as acceptable because it was easy to
amend.

61. FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton). Similarly, a delegate to the Connecticut
convention assuaged concerns about particular problems in the Constitution by noting that
Article V “proves a remedy for whatever defects it may have . . . . This is an easy and
peaceable way of amending any parts of the Constitution which may be found inconvenient
in practice.” DEBATES OF THE CONNECTICUT CONVENTION (Jan. 9, 1788) (statement of
Delegate Richard Law), in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 200 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836-1845).
62. See Vile, supra note 16, at 49 (citing a speech by Patrick Henry to the Virginia
ratifying convention).
63. See Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of
Constitutional Entrenchment, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251, 262 (1996) (contrasting
the over seventy percent ratification rate for amendments sent from Congress to the states
with the arguably much more difficult, preceding stage in the process—“getting the
amendment off Capitol Hill”).
64. See, e.g., Denning, supra note 40, at 158 (arguing that “efficiency, if it means ‘easy’
change, was not a goal of Article V’s principle architect, James Madison. Rather, this
formal amending process was meant [by Madison] to ensure that constitutional changes are
imbued with stability and legitimacy”).
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2. Intervening intellectual history
Professor Vile’s article on intellectual history65 discusses evolving
historical views on a variety of Article V topics. He chronicles writings
and statements from the colonial to modern periods on normative aspects of
amendability, the efficacy of Article V, constitutional interpretation as an
alternative to formal change, revision of Article V itself, proposed
amendment topics and movements, proposals to rewrite the entire
Constitution, and most prominently, the convention alternative for
proposing amendments.66 Drawing from Vile and other sources, I focus
here on evolving views of amendment difficulty in particular and the
degree to which the discourse has divided that question into separate
consideration of its components: amendment need, congressional gate
keeping, and ratification. In sum, after the Founding era and through the
Modern era, the sparse commentary relevant to amendability seems to track
the generally declining path of the perceived likelihood of success of
proposed amendments. From a high point in the Founding Era (described
above), perceptions of likelihood of success declined to a low point in the
Populist-Progressive era, briefly and dramatically reversed following the
success of amendments in the Suffrage-Prohibition era, and then declined
again to the present pessimism.67
As early as 1803, Justice Marshall seems to have viewed amendment as
particularly difficult, but appropriately so and justification for broad
judicial construction.68 And his view of amendment difficulty had perhaps
deepened thirty years later when he would describe the “unwieldy and
cumbrous machinery of procuring a recommendation from two-thirds of
congress, and the assent of three-fourths of [the] states . . . .”69
That Marshallian sense of amendment difficulty became increasingly
widespread as the nineteenth century wore on with no amendment
production from Congress or invocation of the convention method.
Following the ratification of the Twelfth Amendment in 180470 and the
passage of the Titles of Nobility amendment by Congress in 1810,71 no
amendments were proposed by Congress or ratified by the states until the
Corwin Amendment was proposed in 1861.72 And already in 1823,
65. Vile, supra note 16.
66. Id.
67. See infra Part V (discussing the relevant congressional eras).
68. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (“The exercise of this original right [of
the people to establish principles of government that ‘conduce to their happiness’] is a very
great exertion, nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated.”).
69. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833).
70. See App. A (providing a table of all the amendments provided by Congress for
ratification).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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Jefferson would lament that “[t]he States are now so numerous that I
despair of ever seeing another amendment to the Constitution, although
innovations of time will certainly call and already call, for some.”73
Perhaps owing both to the fifty-year drought of amendment proposals
and the single-issue polarization of congressional politics, by the time of
the Civil War a preference for trying the convention over the congressional
method was expressed in diverse corners. It was preferred by as divergent
parties as Lincoln, who argued for it in his first inaugural address, and the
Confederacy, whose constitution called for state conventions to propose
amendments.74 Reflecting the apparent view that Article V posed too high
a bar for amendment proposing, the Confederate Constitution required only
three states to require its Congress to call a convention for proposing
amendments (which would become effective upon ratification by only twothirds of the states).75 But following the reconstitution of the political
dynamics in Congress and the success of the Civil War Amendments—by
the congressional method, favor for the convention method gave way to the
more prevalent fear of its open-ended nature.
The Civil War Amendments, however, were generally viewed as sui
generis and did not rehabilitate the perceived unlikelihood of success of
other formal constitutional reforms.76
A more potent intellectual phenomenon, however, arose at that time: the
intensification of popular and scholarly interest in constitutionalism in
general surrounding the centennials, in the 1870s and 1880s, of American
independence and the Constitution of 1788.77 That, coupled with the
successful and serious experience with amendment proposals in the Civil
War Amendments, fed a revival of reverence for the Constitution and
amendment process.78
But even as the glow of constitutional reverence peaked towards its
centennial, attention turned toward the extreme difficulty of amendment79
and remained there through the early twentieth century. This sense
73. Letter to George Hay, supra note 2.
74. Vile, supra note 16, at 54-55.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 55 (asserting that the existing constitutional structure at the time of the Civil
War could not have effected the needed constitutional changes).
77. See KYVIG, supra note 41, at 188 (“Americans referred to the Constitution as ‘the
Ark of the Covenant,’ Independence Hall as ‘the holiest spot of American earth,’ and
visitors to it as ‘pilgrims’ . . . .”).
78. See id. (“Reconstruction left many Americans believing that all major constitutional
problems had been solved. Moreover, the emergency worshipful attitude toward the
Constitution fostered resistance to any notion that it might deserve further reform.”).
79. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 3, at 242 (“It would seem that no impulse short of
self-preservation; no force less than the force of revolution, can nowadays be expected to
move the cumbrous machinery of formal amendment erected in Article V. That must be a
tremendous movement which can sway two-thirds of each house of Congress and the people
of three-fourths the states.”).
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prompted academic discussion of the propriety of constitutional change by
judicial interpretation, such as Christopher Tiedman’s 1890 The Unwritten
Constitution of the United States, though Tiedman’s more particular goal
seems to have been to ensure “judges do their best to read laissez-faire
economic doctrines into the Constitution and to assure the protection of
capitalistic rights under the broad rubric of substantive due process.”80
Along with advocacy of expansive judicial interpretation came calls to
formally amend Article V itself. Typical81 was Herbert Croly’s advocacy,
in a 1914 book, for the adoption of a plan by Senator La Follete where
amendments proposed only by a majority of both houses of Congress, or by
one-fourth of the states, would be adopted by ratification of only a majority
of the states.82
Fighting such calls to alter Article V, a 1915 article by Joseph Long83
exhibits the still-high intellectual reverence for the process at a major
transition point in the congressional dynamic, when optimism about
success is about to make its upswing.84 Long’s acknowledged target in the
article was the movement to amend Article V to make the amendment
process easier. His main argument was that the recent success of the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth amendments had overcome the longstanding
opinion that amendments had become “practically impossible under
ordinary circumstances . . . .”85 But why, if the Constitution in fact was
relatively easy to amend, had there been no amendment through the normal
(non-Civil War) process in a century? Long suggests that amendment need
was low and amendment proposing consisted mainly of imprudent creditseeking: many of the proposals introduced in Congress were merely
repetitious of other topics; many of those topics were not serious and of a
trivial character better left to general legislation; and for those reasons, very
few of the proposals had sufficient merit to reach a vote in Congress.86
80. Vile, supra note 16, at 58 (citing CHRISTOPHER TIEDMAN, A TREATISE ON THE
LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES (1971 reprint of 1886 ed.)).
81. Id. at 59.
82. HERBERT CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 231 (The Macmillan Co. 1914) (1909).
83. Joseph R. Long, Tinkering with the Constitution, 24 YALE L.J. 573 (1915).
84. See id. at 578 (concluding that the Constitution can be peaceably amended in the
constitutional process).
85. Id. at 576 (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 62
(1912)). Also noting Woodrow Wilson’s 1885 lament about Article V, Long observes that
“[t]hese expressions are fairly representative of the opinion of students of constitutional
history a few years ago.” Id.
86. Id. at 578-79. Writing at the end of the Populist–Progressive era when the
frequency of general legislation introduced in Congress reached its historical peak, see infra
tbl.5, Long notes surprise at the comparatively low number of amendments being proposed
at that time. Long, supra note 83, at 574. As set forth in Part V.E, infra, I conclude that
may have been due to the relatively-high degree of “prudential reverence” in the
congressional Zeitgeist of amendability at that time, which Long may not have been able to
see from his perspective.
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While there had been periods of unrest suggesting apparent amendment
need, after those “temporary conditions” disappeared the Constitution was
found “adequate as it stood.”87
As a normative matter for Long, the relative stability of the federal
Constitution was a happy contrast to the mutability and increasing prolixity
of state constitutions, which had “long since ceased to be constitutions in a
true sense.”88 Long gushed his reverence for the federal constitution,
“justly regarded as the greatest government ever ordained by man,” and set
a high threshold of amendment need: absolute necessity, meaning the end
could not be accomplished by other means.89 Amendments were especially
unnecessary if they could be accomplished by state action or if they dealt in
code-like, legislative details, in contrast to the Constitution, which spoke in
“generals.”90 Among the ends better suited to state action were two
contemporarily-prominent proposed amendment topics (that perhaps were
the secondary target of Long’s article):
women’s suffrage and
prohibition.91 Perhaps because he considered the degree of difficulty of
constitutional amendment to be appropriate, nothing in Long’s work
suggests the existence or legitimacy of non-formal constitutional change.
Long’s analysis of amendability suffers from the same failing I have
noted in the work of some modern scholars: it does not sufficiently
scrutinize Congress’s gatekeeping role. In judging responsiveness to
amendment need, Long notes that both the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Amendments had been ratified very quickly after passing Congress, within
four years and twelve months, respectively.92 By contrast, it had taken
Congress fourteen years to propose the Sixteenth Amendment to the states,
following the Supreme Court’s decision invalidating the income tax in
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,93 and eighty-seven years for the
Seventeenth amendment since direct election of Senators was first
proposed in Congress.94 But Long is dismissive of those delays: “time is
inevitably required to develop a sentiment in favor of a proposed change.”95
As I conclude in Part V, though optimism about likelihood of success of
amendments peaked during the next era, Suffrage-Prohibition (1917-1930),
87. Long, supra note 83, at 579.
88. Id. at 580.
89. Id. at 581.
90. See id. (conjecturing that a constitution’s permanence is indispensable to garner
respect as fundamental law).
91. See id. at 581-82 (finding such amendments objectionable when they result in a loss
of state sovereignty without any proportionate benefit).
92. See id. at 578 (noting that proposed amendments seldom represent the public will
and, instead, embody the individual opinion of the proposing congressman).
93. 158 U.S. 601 (1895), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend.
XVI.
94. Long, supra note 83, at 587-88.
95. Id. at 587.
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with the adoption of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments,
reverence for the process takes its final plunge at this time and optimism
ultimately follows. It seems likely the Prohibition debacle at least partially
caused this.96 As chronicled by Kyvig, the damage began even before
Prohibition went into effect. For instance, anti-prohibition forces in Ohio,
fearing the state legislature to be too much under the influence of
prohibition lobbyists, succeeded in persuading the citizens to pass (by a
wide margin) a change of the state constitution to allow referendums on
federal amendments.97 Then, following ratification of the Eighteenth
Amendment by the Ohio General Assembly, the new referendum process
was invoked and led to a vote by Ohio citizens that rejected the
amendment.98 However, in the Hawke v. Smith decisions,99 the Supreme
Court upheld the Ohio General Assembly’s ratifications of not only the
Eighteenth Amendment, but also the Nineteenth Amendment.100 The Court
rejected Ohio’s attempt, though a state constitutional amendment, to allow
popular referendums to undo the effect of a positive vote for ratification of
a proposed federal amendment by the body selected by Congress for that
purpose, the state legislature.101 As Kyvig observes,
[r]egardless of logic and legal soundness, Hawke v. Smith left a large and
lasting impression that the Article V amending process denied
democratic choice in the case of national prohibition . . . . [And] [t]he
New York Times, no enthusiast for referendums, called the Hawke v.
Smith decision a ‘shocking’ failure to represent the will of the people of
Ohio.102

The quick ratifications of the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and
Nineteenth amendments and the imbroglio over the Eighteenth seem to
have led to a temporary shift in congressional views of Article V. In a
1926 article, Amendment of the Constitution: Should It Be Made More
Difficult?, Professor Justin Miller observes that prior to the 1925
Wadsworth-Garrett Resolution in Congress, most of the proposals to
change Article V were introduced to simplify the amendment process.103
96. See KYVIG, supra note 41, at 225 (describing Congress’s adoption of the Volstead
Act, a strict interpretation of the Eighteenth Amendment that sweepingly defined
“intoxicating beverages” as those that contained more than one-half percent of alcohol,
contrary to popular anticipation).
97. See id. at 242 (adding that voters utilized the referendum to address woman
suffrage).
98. Id.
99. (Hawke I), 253 U.S. 221 (1920); (Hawke II), 253 U.S. 231 (1920).
100. Hawke I, 253 U.S. at 231 (upholding ratification of Eighteenth Amendment);
Hawke II, 253 U.S. at 232 (upholding ratification of Nineteenth Amendment).
101. Hawke I, 253 U.S. at 231.
102. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 245-46.
103. Justin Miller, Amendment of the Federal Constitution: Should It Be Made More
Difficult?, 10 MINN. L. REV. 185, 196 (1926); see Wadsworth-Garrett Resolution, S.J. Res.
4, 68th Cong. (1925) (seeking to endow States with more power over ratification).
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The Wadsworth-Garrett Resolution of 1925, however, sought to make
amendment more difficult in three ways: it would have (1) required the
members of at least one house of the legislature of any ratifying state to
have been elected after the amendment had been proposed, (2) allowed any
state to require that ratification by its legislature be subjected to
confirmation by popular vote, and (3) allowed any state to change its vote
on ratification until either three-fourths the states had ratified or one-fourth
had rejected the proposed amendment.104
That the Wadsworth-Garrett Resolution would have left unchanged the
congressional gatekeeping stage of the Article V process while making
ratification substantially more difficult shows recognition of the
comparatively high threshold of congressional gatekeeping. Miller
answered no to the question posed by the title of his article.105 Even after
the recent amendment successes, he agreed with those who characterized
“the process of amending the Constitution [as] already so difficult that
people must be practically in a state of revolution before they can secure an
amendment.”106
“Putting additional handicaps in the way of
amendment . . . in a crisis would constitute an invitation to impatient
people to adopt violence as a method instead of the slow, quiet processes of
today.”107 Any greater hardships in the process might jeopardize the outlet
it provides for “groups of people [brought] to the explosion point” by the
continuing limits of “outlets for such accumulation of human energy”
brought by urbanization and industrialization.108
By the 1933 repeal of Prohibition, it seems that the ratification
rollercoaster of 1913 to 1920 had derailed and widespread enthusiasm for
amendments as a policy tool evaporated. As set forth in Part V of this
Article, this is the point in history where I conclude that the character of the
congressional gatekeeping component of the amendment process moves
into the current Modern era. The country had been chastened both by the
increasingly obvious failure of Prohibition and by the process questions
that had arisen during the recent ratification experiences.109 So in 1932,
Professor Hugh Willis wrote The Doctrine of the Amendability of the
United States Constitution,110 but focused on process issues such as the
104. Wadsworth-Garrett Resolution, S.J. Res. 4, 68th Cong. (1925).
105. See Miller, supra note 103, at 205-06 (concluding that making the amendments
process more difficult, coupled with the increasing density of population and general
education, will result in an “explosion point”).
106. Id. at 205.
107. Id. at 205-06.
108. Id. at 206.
109. See KYVIG, supra note 41, at 240 (asserting that the adoption of the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Amendments occurred during tumultuous World War I years, which cultivated a
sense of abandonment of traditional constitutional boundaries).
110. Hugh Evander Willis, The Doctrine of the Amendability of the United States
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ratification questions, the convention method alternative, and arguments for
implied limits on amendment subjects.111 The growing sense of resignation
to low-amendability is particularly stark in Roosevelt’s decision not to
pursue the amendment process to validate his New Deal programs.112 The
Supreme Court’s acquiescence to the constitutionality of those programs
beginning, in earnest, in 1937, only furthered the decline in interest in
amendments, and a lull in intellectual attention to the subject, which
continued until the Brown v. Board decision in 1954.113
While Brown showed the potential substantial social impact of an
amendment, touched off much scholarly discourse on constitutional
interpretation, and inspired a new round of reactionary amendment
proposals in Congress, the basic conception of amendability under Article
V does not seem to change. Though the quasi-revolutionary conditions of
the Civil Rights Movement and the anti-Vietnam War protests did produce
proposals from Congress on D.C. electors for president, the poll tax ban,
voting rights for eighteen-year-olds, equal rights for women, and D.C.
representation in Congress, the three of those that were ratified were of
relatively-limited consequence.114 And while Congress’s purported threeyear extension of time for ratification of the ERA, as well as a strong
movement of state petitions for invoking the convention method for
proposing amendments (to introduce a balanced-budget amendment), did
induce waves of scholarly attention in the late 1970s and 1980s, that
discourse is primarily limited to those particular nuances.115 The other
amendments ratified in this last stage, the Twenty-Fifth (presidential
succession) and Twenty-Seventh (banning pay raises applicable to the then
sitting Congress) have no direct significance for the amendability
discourse, though the two-hundred year delay between congressional
passage and final ratification for the Twenty-Seventh Amendment did
spark increased scholarly interest in amendments in general and the
Constitution, 7 IND. L.J. 457 (1932).
111. See id. at 460-64 (discussing the argument for a repeal of Article V and its
implications on States’ equal representation).
112. See KYVIG, supra note 41, at 289-323 (noting some evidence that Roosevelt viewed
the amending process as a politically-difficult, in addition to unwise or unnecessary, means
of resolving his clash with the Supreme Court over congressional power).
113. See id. at 347-48 (recalling the Supreme Court’s announcement that constitutional
amendments have consequences that the states must recognize (citing Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954))).
114. See Peter M. Shane, Voting Rights and the “Statutory Constitution,” 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 254-55 (1993) (comparing the anticipation of amendments in
response to crises with the actual result). For example, since 1939, every Congress had
proposed a poll tax ban, and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment that proscribed poll taxes came
into effect in the 1960s. Id. By 1964, however, only five states still had active poll taxes,
thus rendering the Twenty-Fourth Amendment largely inconsequential. Id.
115. See infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text (discussing Walter Dellinger’s work
in those areas).
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delayed-ratification issue in particular.116
In the final stage of intellectual history leading to contemporary thought,
it seems that the pessimism and irreverence that characterize the Modern
era sow the seeds of theories of non-formal constitutional change which
abound today.
3. Modern theorists
The following section attempts to engage the modern scholarship that
most-directly touches on the historical amendability questions with which
this article is concerned. But the works that more tangentially or implicitly
address amendability are too many to comprehensively canvas here.
Hence, I discuss only a representative sampling of them.
Of all the modern legal scholars, Walter Dellinger probably has the most
substantial amendment-process oeuvre. But it is his focus on process that
makes the majority of Dellinger’s work not directly relevant here. In
general, his writings respond to two political phenomena contemporary
with them: (1) the question of using the Article V convention alternative to
call a constitutional convention limited to just one particular topic, in this
case a balanced budget amendment117 and (2) the debates surrounding the
ERA, which raised the validity of states’ purported rescissions of earlier
ratifications, on the one hand, and the legitimacy of Congress’s extension
of the original seven-year ratification period for the ERA by three years, on
the other.118 On those questions, Dellinger argues, for instance, that (1)
constitutional conventions under Article V cannot constitutionally be
limited to single issues or be controlled by Congress or prior mandates of
state legislatures once convened119 and (2) the Court should resolve ERA
116. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The
Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 682 (1993)
(endorsing the concurrent legislation model, whereby a proposed amendment is treated like
a statute that must be enacted by Congress in concurrence with States’ ratification); Richard
B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 497 (1992) (examining the controversies over
congressional compensation in American history).
117. See Walter E. Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the “Limited” Constitutional
Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623, 1624 (1979) [hereinafter Dellinger, Recurring Question]
(arguing that a constitutional convention must have authority to consider and propose to the
states whatever amendments it deems fit); Walter E. Dellinger, Who Controls a
Constitutional Convention?—A Response, 28 DUKE L.J. 999, 999 (1979) [hereinafter
Dellinger, Who Controls] (dispelling the notion that state legislatures control the text of
proposed amendments at constitutional conventions).
118. See Walter E. Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the
Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 386 (1983) [hereinafter Dellinger, Legitimacy]
(developing a model of judicial review of amendment process issues); Walter E. Dellinger,
Constitutional Politics: A Rejoinder, 97 HARV. L. REV. 446, 446-47 (1983) [hereinafter
Dellinger, Constitutional Politics] (criticizing the view that Congress should have the final
word in constitutional issues pertaining to amendment adoption).
119. Dellinger, Recurring Question, supra note 117, at 1630.
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issues by following the Article V formula more faithfully. That is,
Dellinger argued the Court should discard its Coleman v. Miller120
precedent and return to the business of determining amendment-ratification
issues itself, rather than viewing them as nonjusticiable and giving
Congress discretion to decide as “promulgator” of ratified amendments.121
Despite his primary focus on those process issues, Dellinger does engage
the amendment difficultly question.122 He notes that implicit in the stance
of those arguing for states’ authority to rescind ratifications and preclude
congressional extension of time for ratification (or long periods under the
“contemporaneous consensus” doctrine) is the suggestion that the
expressly-stated requirements of Article V make the amendment process
“too easy.”123 His response notes that there are a very large number of
proposed amendments compared to adopted amendments over our entire
history, that the several then recently-adopted amendments addressed only
minor matters, and that the decision of Roosevelt and his advisors not to
pursue the amendment option for validating his New Deal programs was a
particularly strong example of at least a perception of amendment
difficulty.124 Ultimately, though, Dellinger’s assessment of historical
difficulty is general, and he concludes that “[w]hether amending the
Constitution is too easy remains a question for individual judgment.”125
Most of the other modern theorists assess the historical degree of the
difficulty of formal Article V amendment in even more general terms.126
120. 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (denying writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of Senate
of the State of Kansas to erase an endorsement on the Kansas Senate’s resolution ratifying
the Child Labor Amendment—holding the question nonjusticiable and, by implication, to be
finally determined by Congress’s decision whether to promulgate the amendment as
ratified).
121. Dellinger, Legitimacy, supra note 118, at 389-405.
122. Id. at 427.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 427-29.
125. Id. at 430. Two additional articles round out Dellinger’s amendment process
oeuvre. See Walter E. Dellinger, Amending Process, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 72-75 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2000) (noting that all the
amendments but three have fallen into four historical clusters: 1789-1804; 1866-1870;
1913-1933; and 1961-1978); Walter E. Dellinger, The Amending Process in Canada and the
United States: A Comparative Perspective, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 283 (1982)
(describing, for instance, how other than the provision for Senate representation, the delicate
federal-state balance of authority to propose and ratify amendments in Article V is the most
pronounced exhibition of the federal character of the Constitution).
126. Unelaborated assertions of the present “difficulty” of amendment are common. See,
e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 987 (2002)
(“Given the difficulty of the constitutional amendment process, the People will typically
only resort to it in addressing questions of value on which there is an unusual degree of
consensus.”); Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, The Relevance of Constitutional
Amendments: A Response to David Strauss, 77 TUL. L. REV. 247, 274 (2002) (“[T]he
requirements of Article V that make formal amendments difficult ensure that changes to the
fundamental law are legitimate.”); Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee is . . . Article V, 12
CONST. COMMENT. 171, 172 (1995) (“By making it difficult to change the Constitution, the
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Those generalizations appear in three categories of works, which vary by
their degree of directness in engaging the amendability question: (a)
discussions of the normative attractiveness of our Constitution’s current
“obduracy”;127 (b) normative critiques of the difficulty of obtaining a
particular class of amendments relative to obtaining amendments in
general;128 and (c) the implied descriptive assessments of the Constitution’s
general difficulty of amendment, across all categories of topics, that can be
inferred from various general theories of interpretation.129
Though a gross oversimplification as applied to any particular
interpretative theory, the implied descriptive assessments might be thought
to range from a strict originalist presumption of relative amendment ease to
a highly non-documentarian assumption of the great difficulty of formal
amendment. Chemerinsky has described the necessary “balance between
entrenchment and flexibility” that creates that theoretical continuum: “If a
constitution makes change too difficult, it will obstruct necessary and
desirable social reforms. Revolution will become the only way of altering
the government. But if change is too easy, then a constitution fails to
achieve its objective of protecting society’s most cherished values from
majoritarian control.”130
After discussing the three general categories of tangentially-relevant
constitutional scholarship, I conclude this overview by demonstrating how
David Strauss’s recent “irrelevance” thesis131 is itself irrelevant for the
particular question addressed in this Article.

Framers forced a significant amount of constitutional change off the books and thus limited
the ability of the Constitution to structure political outcomes. To the extent that we believe
that constitutionalism should play this role, we should favor making change through Article
V easier.”).
127. See infra notes 132-147 and accompanying text (comparing works by John
Ferejohn and Lawrence Sager and by William Forbath regarding the general normative
debate).
128. See infra notes 135-166 and accompanying text (analyzing commentators’
criticisms of Congress’s institutional self-interests).
129. See infra notes 167-170 and accompanying text (focusing on the assumptions
behind constitutional amendment).
130. Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 1563-64; see also Elai Katz, On Amending
Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional Entrenchment, 29 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251, 254-55 (1996) (“The amending process helps maintain the delicate
balance between democracy and limited government . . . . If it is too difficult to change the
constitution, the people may become frustrated and resort to extra-legal behavior . . . . Thus,
the particulars of the amending clause of any given constitution affect the stability and
durability of that constitution and of constitutionalism in that society.”) .
131. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1457, 1459-60 (2001) (concluding that a formal amendment process was
inconsequential to the establishment of America’s constitutional order).
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a. Direct normative perspectives on the general degree of difficulty of
amendment under Article V
A recent exchange between John Ferejohn and Lawrence Sager, on the
one hand,132 and William Forbath, on the other133 illustrates the general
normative debate. Ferejohn and Sager argue that the Constitution’s
obduracy to Article V change “conduces to the realization of the
Constitution’s liberty-bearing provisions.”134
First, because the
supermajoritarian rules demand “broad popular support,” a “diversity of
perspective” and “generality of consensus” to pass an amendment,135
drafters and ratifiers gravitate towards “propositions of general or abstract
value” that account for the potential interests of future generations.136
Next, the fact that “the internal commitments represented by the libertybearing provisions of the Constitution” are “set forth in abstract moral
terms” requires that the Supreme Court provide the normative detail.137
But the difficulty of amendment under Article V discourages “anything like
close popular oversight of the process of constitutional enforcement,”
which insulates the Court from popular review138 and the process from
“blatant majoritarian expropriation.”139
But Forbath laments that “obduracy on the order of the U.S.
Constitution may actually erode and thwart a nation’s capacity for realizing
many of its deepest constitutional commitments.”140 Rather than seeing
“popular oversight” as a threat to the constitutional interpretation and
enforcement, he concludes that “popular constitutional politics have been
the central source of the judicial interpretations Ferejohn and Sager most
prize.”141 Moreover, “[m]ovements to amend . . . are a central, generative
form of such politics, and a constitution too obdurate often stifles them.”142
Focusing more on political theory, Ferejohn and Sager’s generalizations
on amendment difficultly do not purport to describe any particular era of
our history; but Forbath, focusing on the twentieth century, touches on
something like the declining “Zeitgeist of amendability in Congress” I
articulate in Part V. In particular, he notes that the Progressive Era in the

132. John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1929 (2003).
133. William E. Forbath, The Politics of Constitutional Design: Obduracy and
Amendability—A Comment on Ferejohn and Sager, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1965 (2003).
134. Id. at 1968.
135. Ferejohn & Sager, supra note 132, at 1957.
136. Id. at 1958-59.
137. Id. at 1960.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1930.
140. Forbath, supra note 133, at 1965.
141. Id. at 1966.
142. Id.
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first part of the twentieth century “saw the only serious efforts in U.S.
history to amend Article V.”143 The extreme obduracy of the Constitution
was widely recognized, and the most influential lawmakers and politicians,
including Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, supported
liberalizing the amendment rules.144 “But the era ended before [the
forbearers of the New Deal in the Progressive Era] turned their
considerable constitutional-political energies to that task.”145 Hence, two
decades later, “[t]he overbearing obduracy of the unamended Article V
diminished the jurisgenerative politics of the New Deal moment, and
deprived us of new constitutional texts- texts on which citizens and courts
could have rested claims to extend and deepen our constitutional
commitments in ways we would prize.”146
b. Normative perspectives on the relative difficulty of amendment for
particular constitutional subjects
While normative views of scholars like Ferejohn, Sager, and Forbath
lament or praise a degree of amendment difficulty that is uniform across all
categories of amendment topics, some writers have decried a practical nonuniformity when it comes to amendment topics that negatively impact the
self-interest of members of Congress: namely, that as a practical matter
Congress already makes obtaining amendments in that category more
difficult than in others.147 Those commentators criticize Article V’s grant
of authority to block amendments to the extent that it enables Congress to
impose a de facto higher barrier for, and defeat, measures that threaten its
own institutional interests and power.148 That critique is the more
sophisticated and relevant to my analysis, since it addresses the
congressional gatekeeping role, though the commentary on undue
uniformity carries some threads of amendability-thinking meriting brief
mention here as well.
One critic of the higher barrier to change erected by Congress’s
institutional self-interest focuses on the Progressive Era’s pragmatic
remedy for the intransigence of congressional stakeholders.149 Kris Kobach
143. Id. at 1976.
144. Id.; see KYVIG, supra note 41, at 473 (viewing the difficulty of the amendment
process as a tool for “antidemocratic motivations of an economic elite that had designed the
Constitution”).
145. Forbath, supra note 133, at 1982.
146. Id. at 1979-80.
147. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and the Seventeenth
and Nineteenth Amendments, 103 YALE L.J. 1971, 1974 (1994) (asserting that the
amendment process exposes Congress’s “inherent structural interest in prolonging the tenure
of its sitting members”).
148. See id. at 1973 (proposing that the primary motivation that drives Congress in
adopting the amendment process stems from hostility at the idea of term limits).
149. Id. at 1974.
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observes an alternative, incremental path to Article V amendment that
“emerged to overcome an overwhelming structural barrier to amending the
Constitution in a way that conflicts with the inherent self-interest of
members of Congress.”150 That is, state-level activity in the years
preceding the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments showed how
states can one by one adopt changes that alter the political structure of
Congress until it is induced to act.151
Donald Boudreaux and A.C. Pritchard arrive at a similar criticism of
congressional self interest under an economic analysis.152 They argue that
“Congressional control over the agenda of constitutional amendment
restricts the ability of the people to control Congress effectively through the
Constitution.”153 They suggest amending Article V to provide for direct
petition by the people to propose amendments, but pessimistically argue
that such an Amendment will likely fail anyway because it would threaten
the interests of Congress.154 They contend that the only successful
amendments to limit the power of the federal government, the Bill of
Rights, were able to pass merely because the federal government had not
yet effectively organized itself as an interest group to protect its own
power.155
And Mark Tushnet focuses on how that government entrenchment has
become a particular impediment to structural representation changes.156 He
argues that a less difficult Article V amendment process might ease the
weight of existing constitutional structure and allow creative thinking to
remedy the inherent defects of the constitutionally sanctioned two-party
system.157 Greater ease of amendment could then lead to a parliamentary
150. Id. at 1999.
151. Id. at 1977-84. The popular election of senators was brought about by individual
states one by one allowing citizens to influence the state legislature’s choice of senator. Id.
at 1977. Only after the composition of the Senate was significantly weighted with
representatives chosen under this system was the Seventeenth Amendment able to overcome
the Senate’s resistance to its own change. Id. at 1977-78. Similarly, the Nineteenth
Amendment’s massive electorate shift was resisted as a threat to sitting congressmen until
state by state extension of the franchise to women incrementally transformed the structure of
Congress and eventually compelled the federal system to follow suit. Id. at 1978-79.
Koback argues congressional term limit amendment may be following a similar path. Id. at
1979.
152. See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An
Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amending Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111
(1993) (constructing a model to predict when interest groups choose between the
amendment process and statutory change).
153. Id. at 160.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 140 (“Today, because of the presence of a strong federal government, the
Bill of Rights could not have been enacted via Article V.”).
156. Mark Tushnet, The Whole Thing, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 223 (1995).
157. Id. at 225 (“There may be room . . . between the desire to avoid creating an
amendment process that is too easy to use, and sticking with the present strong supermajority requirements of Article V.”).
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system of representation.158
While Kobach, Boudreaux, Pritchard, and Tushnet lament that
amendment difficulty in practice varies with the degree of congressional
self-interest, a second group of normative critiques also decries the textual
uniformity of Article V amendment difficulty across varying classes of
amendment topics. But they posit that changes in fundamental rights
should be more difficult to achieve than other types of amendments.159
That group, however, divides on whether the trouble with present
uniformity is that it makes amending in the current undifferentiated regime
too easy, and hence open to unwise fundamental change, or too hard, and
therefore too resistant to needed non-fundamental alterations.160
For example, Sanford Levinson believes that fundamental rights
amendment should be more difficult than other forms of amendment, but
suggests that ordinary amendment is too difficult in general.161 He
advocates changing Article V to make amendment easier by lessening the
ability of small states to block amendments, at least for amendments
involving term limits and other structural features of the Constitution.162
At least one scholar goes the other way, however, and argues that the
congressional method of Article V amendment may be too easy in certain
circumstances.163 Noting that over seventy percent of the amendments sent
from Congress to the states have been ratified, Elai Katz posits that a
“maverick Congress could propose an unwise amendment, which the states
are likely to ratify.”164 He suggests that the more difficult convention
method of Article V is superior to the easier congressional method because
it is likely to be a more publicized and deliberative process.165 He argues

158. See id. at 224 (observing that arguments for proportional representation are more
prevalent than constitutionalists believe).
159. See Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of Amending Clauses, 13 CONST.
COMMENT. 107, 107-09 (1996) (considering two types of written constitutions: one that sets
out political structures and governmental authority and limitations that can be changed by
ordinary legislation and the second that is impervious to change); Katz, supra note 130, at
254 (lauding the amendment process, which characterizes certain rights as inalienable while
allowing for constitutional evolution alongside changes in political values).
160. Compare Levinson, supra note 159, at 199 (declining to adopt the view that states
have the right to change their minds regarding ratification), with Katz, supra note 130, at
287 (opining that the framers rightly rejected an amending clause containing numerous
unalterable provisions).
161. Levinson, supra note 159, at 120-23 (“I can think of no good reasons to support the
formal stasis engendered by Article V . . . . I can think of no defense for the present rules of
this particular game unless one is committed simply to making it extremely difficult to
engage in formal amendment.”) (emphasis in original).
162. Id. at 120 (“How can anyone seriously defend, in 1995, the present system that in
essence allows one house of 13 states to block the desires of the remaining public?”).
163. Katz, supra note 130, at 262.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 287 (noting that public awareness of a proposed issue may arise only after
the legislature has already been elected).
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that the more difficult route should be required when attempting to alter
fundamental rights such as First Amendment freedoms.166
These normative critiques all share a specificity in framing the ultimate
question not present in the problematic outlined in this Article: they all
assert the amendment process is too hard or too easy in reference to some
specific normative goal. My project is not to put forward any normative
goal against which the effectiveness of Article V can be judged, but rather
it is to inform that assessment of effectiveness in any relevant theoretical
context. While that may test the assumptions of some normative critiques
of Article V, it more directly applies to the following descriptive
assumptions contained within general interpretive theories.
c. Descriptive assumptions about amendability in general, implicit in
interpretive theories
Implicit in articulations of general theories of constitutional
interpretation are descriptive assumptions or assessments that amending the
Constitution is either easy, seen in some strong originalist theories, or
difficult, seen in nondocumentarian or evolutionary theories.
Appeals to original intent often imply a belief that amendment is easy
enough and need not be supplemented by dubious judicial activism.167
Moreover, arguments against non-Article V change imply a belief that
Article V is adequate to keep the Constitution up to date.168 For instance,
Henry Paul Monaghan argues that Article V amendment is only as difficult
as it needs to be.169 In defending Article V as the exclusive mode of
amendment he cautions against the potential of unrestrained
majoritarianism to be exclusionary170 and warns that easier amendment will
likely weaken the Constitution by allowing ideologized amendments.171
166. See id. at 288-90 (approaching the issue of amending the First Amendment in a
prudential way rather than considering the legal necessity).
167. See, e.g., ROBERT F. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 171 (1990) (“We remain
entirely free to create all the additional freedoms we want by constitutional amendment or
by simple legislation, and the nation has done so frequently.”); Raoul Berger, Lawrence
Church on the Scope of Judicial Review and Original Intention, 70 N.C. L. REV. 113, 13233 (1991) (“‘Cumbersomeness’ affords no dispensation to the judiciary to ignore the Article
V reservation of amendment to the people.”).
168. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 167, at 122 (“To be sure, the capacity to adapt to
changing substantive policy needs is . . . a basic goal; but where does the Constitution make
the courts the instrument of change?”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
169. See Henry Paul Monaghan, We the Peoples, Original Understanding, and
Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 144 (1996) (“Nothing is ‘easy’ about
the processes described by Article V. This was the constitutional design.”).
170. Id. at 175 (“Whereas in the past, popular sovereignty became a battle cry for those
expressing yearnings for inclusion into the political and social order, in the hands of current
powerholders ‘We the People’ seems likely to justify exclusion, defining what ‘Real
Americans’ stand for.”) (internal citations omitted).
171. See id. (admonishing that a move from normal politics to politics of constitutional
amendment would compromise safeguards for individual liberty and minority rights).
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The undemocratic nature of Article V that troubles Bruce Ackerman and
Akhil Amar poses no problem for him.172
Proponents of a non-interpretivist approach, on the other hand, proceed
on the premise that the formal amendment process is too difficult and
unresponsive to the changing needs of democracy.173 Most of these
scholars do not advocate an easier amendment process, but rather justify
the creative interpretation that has arisen to supplement an imperfect
Article V.174 Bruce Ackerman, however, does make the normative
argument for easing the amendment process for all types of amendment
proposals because of the pernicious results of such robust interpretive
theories.175 He proposes amending Article V to allow a second-term
president to propose amendments of any type176 in response to the
emerging trend of attempting to transform the constitution through
presidential appointments to the Supreme Court.177 Implicit in his belief
that transformative appointments may be too easy because they can be
abused by Presidents without substantial mandates for fundamental
change,178 is the descriptive assessment that congressional gatekeeping, in
172. See id. at 144-45 (claiming that in the debate over congressional authority, Article
V was viewed as the exclusive mode of amendment).
173. See, e.g., Lawrence Church, History and the Constitutional Role of Courts, 1990
WIS. L. REV. 1071, 1078 (1990) (commenting that Article V “process is too cumbersome
and erratic to serve as the sole vehicle for constitutional development in a complex and
rapidly changing society”). But see Dellinger, Legitimacy, supra note 118, at 386 (urging
that Article V should not be made any more difficult by unclear rules, while not explicitly
stating that Article V is too difficult). Dellinger takes issue with the Political Question
doctrine and the policy goal of “contemporary consensus” espoused in Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433 (1939) (determining timeliness of ratification requires determination of
contemporaneous consensus and that Congress is better suited than the Court to answer
political questions). He believes leaving amendment issues in Congress’s hands invites
uncertainty. Dellinger, Legitimacy, supra note 118, at 427-30. Furthermore, Dellinger
argues that prior rejection, subsequent rescission, and passage of time should not nullify
state ratification of amendments. Id. at 419. Such requirements reflect an assumption that
amendment is too easy and “additional hurdles should supplement the expressly stated
requirements of article V.” Id. at 427. He recommends that Article V be interpreted as a
series of formalities with which strict compliance ensures legitimacy; nothing more should
be read into it. Id. at 419. “Attention to these formalities is more likely to provide clear
answers than is a search for the result that best advances an imputed ‘policy’ of
‘contemporaneous consensus.’“ Id. at 418.
174. See Church, supra note 173, at 1073-74 (calling for the rejection of extreme
positions, namely the complete adherence to or abandonment of the founders’ view of the
courts’ roles in the amendment process).
175. See generally Bruce Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1164 (1988) (assessing strengths and weaknesses of alternative modes of constitutional
transformation).
176. See id. at 1182 (adding that proposed amendments must be approved by two-thirds
of both houses of Congress and three-fifths of voters in two successive presidential
elections).
177. See id. (comparing presidentially-led proposals to the Founders’ assembly-led
systems).
178. Id. at 1181 (arguing that Roosevelt’s New Deal was a result of such transformative
appointments and that Reagan attempted another such transformation through the rejected
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practice, has been too unresponsive.
Finally, some writers appear to fall in the middle of the spectrum.
Stephen Presser, for instance, has argued that amendment should not be
made more difficult or limited in his criticism of the Guidelines for
Constitutional Amendments.179 In 1999, a group called Citizens for
Constitutional Change published a report entitled “‘Great and
Extraordinary Occasions’: Developing Guidelines for Constitutional
Change,” which sets forth eight “Guidelines for Constitutional
Amendment.”180 The Guidelines propose a set of abstract principles for
determining whether amendment is appropriate. These abstract principles
were intended to curb the recent proclivity to constitutionalize policies the
authors see as less than Constitution-worthy. Presser argues that Article
V’s supermajority requirements already provide the necessary restraint.181
Therefore, he concludes that amendments “are not some dangerous threat
to our democratic Republic,” and that while amendment is a “solemn”
exercise of democracy, “it is not one that should be discouraged in the
manner that the authors of Great and Extraordinary Occasions seek to
do.”182 Presser, however, is in the distinct minority183 in arguing that the
historical degree of amendability under Article V has been just right.
d. The general irrelevance of Strauss’s “irrelevance” thesis
In his 2001 article, David Strauss argues that “our constitutional order
would look little different if a formal amendment process did not exist,”
because “[a]t least since the first few decades of the Republic,
constitutional amendments have not been an important means by which the
Constitution, in practice, has changed.”184 As evidence for this thesis,
appointment of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court).
179. See Stephen B. Presser, Constitutional Amendments: Dangerous Threat or
Democracy in Action?, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 209, 217 (2000) (proposing that the Founders
intended for constitutional change to be a tool for democratic action).
180. CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, GREAT AND EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS:
DEVELOPING GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 7 (1999), available at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/cai/guidelines/index.html (considering whether: (1) the
proposed amendment addresses matters that are of lasting concern; (2) the proposed
amendment makes the system more politically responsive; (3) there are obstacles to the
achievement of the proposed amendment’s objectives by other means; (4) the proposed
amendment is consistent with related constitutional doctrine; (5) the proposed amendment
embodies enforceable standards; (6) the proponents of the proposed amendment
contemplated the consequences of their proposal; (7) there has been debate on the proposed
amendment’s merits; and (8) Congress has provided for a set States-ratification deadline to
ensure a concurrent consensus by Congress and the states).
181. Presser, supra note 179, at 217.
182. Id. at 224-25.
183. See Denning & Vile, supra note 126, at 251-52 (distinguishing Presser’s thesis from
the more generally accepted sentiment that provisions for formal amendment to the
Constitution are indeed relevant).
184. Strauss, supra note 131, at 1457.
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Strauss cites four phenomena: (1) many constitutional changes have
occurred without formal amendment; (2) despite the rejection of some
particular amendments, the constitution has changed; (3) several
amendments initially thought important had little effect until society later
changed by other means; and (4) some amendments merely ratified
changes that had already occurred through other means.185 Strauss provides
two qualifications to his general thesis. First, he limits the claim about
irrelevance to the context of a “mature democratic society.”186
Amendments in “fledging constitutional order,” by contrast, may play a
significant role in the initial establishment of the constitutional regime.187
Second, amendments have served the two ancillary functions of
establishing the rules of the road on uncontroversial issues that must be
settled (such as presidential disability through the Twenty-fifth
Amendment) and suppressing outliers by turning “all-but-unanimity into
unanimity” on a particular issue (such as the abolishing of poll taxes
through the Twenty-fourth Amendment).188
The validity of Strauss’s thesis aside,189 it does not claim that the factual
degree of difficulty of formal constitutional amendment is irrelevant.
Rather, Strauss at least implicitly suggests that low amendability may
legitimate informal means of constitutional change.190 And, by extension,
the degree of amendability may determine the degree of legitimacy of the
practice.191
But, as my primary purpose is to provide an unbiased account of the very
interesting empirical data on large-scale patterns in amendment-proposing
history, I will remain neutral on the theoretical implications of that
empirical evidence. I will, however, return to Strauss in my speculations
on operationalizing amendment need in Part VII.B.
C. Scholarship on Congress
Political scientists rarely address proposed amendments directly. Rather,
185. Id. at 1459.
186. Id. at 1460.
187. Id. at 1460-61. Strauss notes that though the first twelve amendments to the
American constitution may have played a significant role in establishing the American
constitutional regime, more likely they did not.
188. Id. at 1461.
189. See, e.g., Denning & Vile, supra note 126, at 252 (critiquing Strauss for his general
historical characterizations); Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L.
REV. 951, 987 (2002) (contesting the general theoretical implications of Strauss’s
argument); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social
Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 299 (2001) (using the examples of the
Nineteenth Amendment and the failed ERA to demonstrate the relevance of amendments
and proposed amendments).
190. Strauss, supra note 131, at 1457.
191. Id. at 1467.
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they focus on the process and motivations for introducing normal
legislation in Congress. My analysis relies directly on their work for the
theory of bill introductions and expands on their theories for my paradigm
of amendment proposing.
The analyses in Parts III through V focuses more on the introduction of
bills by individual congresspersons than on introduction by committees.
By the end of the nineteenth century, over ninety percent of public bills
were introduced by individual members,192 and that dominance continues to
present Congresses.193 And while at the beginning of Congress the
opposite was true, with virtually all public bills in the House introduced by
committees and well over half introduced by committees in the Senate,194
joint resolutions that are used to introduce proposed amendments have been
almost exclusively introduced by individuals from the inception of
Congress.
The following sets forth (1) the historical evolution of bill introduction
procedure; (2) the less-storied process of the joint resolution, the vehicle
for proposing amendments; and (3) research on the general motivations for
bill sponsorship over the history of Congress. These understandings of
current and historical congressional dynamics provide the foundations for
my theorizing the potential cause of the bill–proposed amendment totals
correlation.
1. Evolution of bill introduction procedure: From difficulty to trivial ease
By the beginning of the twentieth century, bill introduction in both
houses had largely evolved to the current form of relatively free
introduction by individual members. Political science studies of the
incremental historical development of procedures that led to this modern
form explain that the House and Senate did not arrive at free introduction in
the same way, nor do they have similar legislative environments even
today. Rather, the speed and character of the change differed in the two
chambers. The House not only took longer to reach the norm of
introduction by individual members, but came to it only through ceding
control to standing committees and rules and sacrificing floor introduction;
192. See Joseph Cooper & Elizabeth Rybicki, Analyzing Institutional Change: Bill
Introduction In the Nineteenth-Century Senate, in U.S. SENATE EXCEPTIONALISM 182, 199
(Bruce Oppenheimer ed., 2002) (demonstrating that the majority of bills are now introduced
by individuals whereas before the mid-eighteen-hundreds, the majority of bills were
introduced by committees).
193. See id. at 193 (describing that the growth of member bills introduced on the floor
continues to this day due to changes in congressional rules regarding standing committees,
access to the floor, and debate and amendment on the floor, though the changes in the House
and the Senate have been different).
194. See id. (noting that historically, House committees introduced virtually all public
bills, and Senate committees introduced well over half of public bills).
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the Senate, by contrast, to this day retains much more autonomy and floor
access for its members.195
Joseph Cooper and Elizabeth Rybicki designate three stages in the
nineteenth-century evolution of bill introduction procedure focusing
primarily on the Senate.196 They distinguish:197 (1) 1789 to 1825, which
saw the right of individual by individual members arise in the Senate, but
not the House;198 (2) 1825 to 1861, which saw the frequency of individual
bill sponsorship in the House slowly develop, equaling that in the Senate by
end of this era;199 and (3) 1861 to 1897, which saw the emergence of the
modern regime of free individual introduction in both houses, though a
stark split in member access to the floor and procedural control between the
two chambers.200

195. See id. (distinguishing the Senate from the House for changing more rapidly by
taking pains to “limit the monopoly power of committees, to preserve the access of
members to the floor, and to protect freedom of debate and amendment on the floor,”
resulting in Senators being able to introduce bills on the floor without loss of power to
standing committees); see also Joseph Cooper & Cheryl D. Young, Bill Introduction in the
Nineteenth Century: A Study of Institutional Change, 14 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 67, 68 (1989)
(focusing an analysis on bill introduction in the House and excluding discussion of the
Senate to understand better institutional change in a more detailed, but older, study).
Though relying on these two studies produces two over-generalizations, neither undermines
the general understanding of the legislative process necessary for my analysis: (1) Both
studies focus on public bills. Thus, even though the bill totals I use include both public and
private bills, the similarities in the evolution of their introduction process are sufficient for
my exploratory purposes; (2) I rely more on the House than the Senate for characterizing the
evolution of bill introduction procedure for my analysis. This is because though
amendments have been proposed in both houses, the House has generally carried
significantly greater proposal numbers and has almost always introduced substantially more
bills. Since the only proposed amendment totals presently tabulated for many Congresses
do not distinguish between the bodies, I generally default to the assumption that House
procedure dominates the process I examine.
196. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 183.
197. Id. at 183; see also Cooper & Young, supra note 195, at 71-98 (focusing on the
House alone). In his earlier study, Cooper, with Young, divides the approximately 100 year
period over which the present system of free and unrestricted bill introduction by individual
members evolved into two distinct stages and subdivides the second stage into four phases.
In the first stage (1789 to 1821), the House as a whole exercised stricter and more detailed
control over decision making on subjects and introduction of bills. In the second stage
(1821-1891), the House moved away from that strictness to the present openness though
four phases: Phase 1 (1821-1837) characterized by confusion in the introduction process,
Phase 2 (1837-1861) where member bills where permitted but chaos reigned in the
procedure by the late 1850s, Phase 3 (1861-1881) where the clarity of the procedure
improved, and Phase 4 (1881-1891) where member bills achieved their present domination.
198. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 183. This first stage includes the growth and
decline of the first political party system and the emergence of standing committee systems
in both bodies.
199. Id. at 186. This second stage includes the rise and fall of the second party system
and the period in which the Senate replaced the House as the premier legislative institution.
200. Id. at 188. This final stage is the era of our third party system which resulted in
party leaders in both houses of Congress having an unprecedented degree of control.
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a. Stage I: Early Decades, 1789-1825
While the House did not begin accepting bills from individual members
until the 1830s,201 a qualified right of individual introduction existed in the
Senate from 1789 and strengthened quickly.202 The qualification stemmed
from an initial two-part conception of bill introduction: (1) general
principles of policy should be settled by the legislative body as a whole
(legislative body of either the House or Senate) “before the business was
sent to smaller committees” and (2) bills should be introduced only with
permission of the whole.203 Accordingly, subjects were introduced in the
form of resolutions, petitions, and messages; important areas of policy were
first discussed on the floor or in a Committee of the Whole before being
referred to committee; and both houses required permission of the whole
body for a bill to be introduced.204 But even at the outset, the House rules
on introduction were stricter, requiring that even when a member’s motion
for leave to bring in a bill was approved, the issue “be sent to a smaller
committee to frame and bring in the actual bill.”205
The whole body’s control over initial consideration eroded, however, as
initial floor consideration became a mere mechanism for committee
reference. In each body, though, the decline of the role of the whole and
the development of standing committees occurred at different rates.206
While by 1820, both houses gave standing committees power to propose
bills on subjects referred to them, and committee bills were the dominant
vehicle for advancing public legislation, House members continued to rely
exclusively on resolution of inquiry to refer public bills to committees.207

201. See Cooper & Young, supra note 195, at 70 (explaining that a bill was permitted
only when the House approved its introduction, and any bill so approved was not to be
introduced by an individual member, but was referred to a committee for drafting and
introduction). Cooper and Young conclude that “the legislative process was seen as one
which began with the consideration of subjects that might or might not lead to actual bills.”
Id. at 70.
202. See Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 184 (clarifying that though the rules
allowed an individual member to introduce a bill, “bills were seen as ‘inchoate law’ and
therefore not properly introducible solely on the authority of an individual member or
committee”).
203. Id. at 183-84; see also Lauros G. McConachie, Congressional Committees, in 15
LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 127 (Richard T. Ely ed., 1973) (1898) (explaining
that the small committees have existed since the first House which has always retained the
power to choose the size and number of committees).
204. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 184.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 183-84 (expounding that by 1809, small committees in both houses
functioned far more as advisors to the whole than as its instructed agents and by 1817,
standing committees dominated select committees in receipt of business from the floor); see
also JOSEPH COOPER, CONGRESS AND ITS COMMITTEES 51 (1988) (describing the change in
attitude towards committees becoming more positive as the number of standing committees
increased).
207. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 185.
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In the Senate, by contrast, member public bills were present from the start,
attained sizeable proportions even before the advent of the standing
committee system, and rose to even greater proportions once the standing
committee system had emerged and been given bill power.208
Member autonomy as the primary distinction between the House and
Senate in their procedural evolution is also seen in the much greater
strictness of the House in the level of control of business and debate on the
floor.209 Beginning in 1811 the House started turning the previous question
into an effective method of cloture, adopted a general germaneness rule in
place of the limited germaneness provision in its original rules, and began
to define an order of business in its rules.210 “In contrast, the Senate
eliminated its previous-question rule, did not adopt a general germaneness
rule, and declined to write the rudimentary order of business it followed in
practice into its rules.”211
b. Stage II: The Growth of Member Bills, 1825-1861
Member bills became the primary mode of introduction in the Senate
and, more slowly, the House in the next phase (while the disparity in
member control over introduced legislation widened).212 Beginning in the
mid-1820s, member bills quickly rose to prominence in the Senate, with the
House lagging behind for several decades and not matching Senate
procedure until the Civil War.213 In the Senate, the percentage of bills
introduced by individual members at first increased steadily from 1820s
levels, fell back briefly in mid-1840s, but then resumed an upward climb.214
“[B]y the mid-1850s, seventy percent of public legislation was introduced
by members, not committees.”215
In the House, interest in member bills began intensifying in the late
1820s and 1830s and led to two important rule changes: (1) The 1837
House reformulated its original bill introduction rule to clarify authority of
members to introduce bills they drafted “once the permission of the House
had been secured and to protect the authority of standing committees to
208. See id. (noting that even in this Senate there were restrictions on individual bill
introduction of permission and a day’s notice to introduce a bill, and members were
occasionally challenged when attempting to circumvent those requirements).
209. Id. at 186.
210. Id.; see also McConachie, supra note 203, at 124 (explaining that at least 350 select
committees existed in the 3rd Congress for every petty claim, but that the number of
committees fell to ten by 1810, but increased back to fifty by 1893).
211. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 186; see McConachie, supra note 203, at 260
(describing the Senate as “tortoise-like” with respect to changing its rules and lagging far
behind the House).
212. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 186.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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receive such bills” once introduced216 and (2) “[i]n 1838 a second rules
change provided additional time in the order of business for members to
introduce bills.”217 Following those changes, the percentage of member
bills accelerated, so that by 1861 House member bills matched the Senate
at seventy-one percent.218
But the houses diverged further on options and procedure once a bill was
introduced. “The House continued to outpace the Senate in elaborating its
rules regarding the conduct of business.”219 The Senate neither addressed
the filibuster, which became a problem for the first time, nor the problem of
germaneness.220 The Senate finally did incorporate an order of business,
though a less rigorous one than that of the House.221 Cooper and Rybicki
note that “[a]s a consequence [of such resistance to change], the power of
individual members remained strong in the Senate.”222
c. Stage III: The Triumph of Member Bills, 1861-1897
The final period of evolution in legislative process cemented not only
member bill introduction as the norm, but also the disparity between strong
control of activity on and access to the floor by individual members in the
House and the stark relative freedoms for Senators.223 By the 1880s,
virtually all public bills were member bills in both the House and Senate.224
“In the House the 1880 rules changes removed the historic requirements for
permission and one day’s notice [which had long been mere formalities]
but also totally barred debate on referral of bills.”225 Then, with the 1890
rules changes, introduction and reference were taken off the floor (so there
was no chance to challenge reference) and the basic framework of modern
practice was established.226
Senate procedural change did not go nearly so far. The Senate resisted
the House model for standing committees, which defined their jurisdictions
in the rules from the beginning and in 1880 made reference of legislation to
them in line with these jurisdictions mandatory.227 In the Senate, rather,
216. Id.
217. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 186 (citing Cooper & Young, supra note 195,
at 70).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 187. Accord McConachie, supra note 203, at 37 (describing the growth of the
House’s rules from a “small series of simple resolutions” to “an intricate, logically arranged
code . . .”).
220. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 187; see also McConachie, supra note 203, at
115 (attributing the use of filibuster by the minority group as a source of power).
221. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 187.
222. Id. at 187-88.
223. Id. at 188-89.
224. Id. at 188.
225. Id. at 189.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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jurisdictions continued not to be formally defined but entirely controlled by
precedent and reference to committees remained subject to the discretion of
the Senate as a whole.228 Senators could still (1) “object to the reference of
bills and place them directly on the calendar,” (2) “debate and add
instructions to referral motions,” (3) “propose reference to a select
committee,” and (4) influence which of the more than forty standing
committees existing in the early 1890s received a bill.229
In sum, House changes reflected centralization of power in the Speaker
that occurred after 1870 and especially after 1880.230 The Senate, by
contrast, “resisted rules changes that would alter its fundamental character
as a body that worked on the basis of mutual consent and forbearance, even
as the strength of the party began to rise in the 1880s and 1890s.”231
d. Conclusions
During the nineteenth century, both houses transformed the introduction
of public legislation from a committee-dominated process to one in which
introduction was “a hallmark of member prerogative and activity.”232 But
the pace of change varied substantially, with the Senate far ahead of House
until the 1850s.233 And while transition to member bills climaxes in the
House in 1890 by taking introduction and reference off the floor, that floor
limitation does not occur in the Senate.234
2. The comparatively-free introduction procedure, in historical
congresses, for joint resolutions: The vehicle for amendment proposing
Early on, the joint resolution was established as the means of introducing
proposed amendments in both houses.235 Though functionally equivalent to
228. Id.
229. Id. at 189-90; see also FLOYD M. RIDDICK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE 315 (1941)
(explaining the ability of Senators to refer bills to standing committees, for which for the
76th Congress totaled thirty).
230. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 190.
231. Id. at 191.
232. Id. at 193.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See ASHER C. HINDS, 5 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE UNITED STATES § 7029 n.3 (1907). Accord Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
378 (1798) (holding that notwithstanding Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 of the Constitution, a
joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution passed by two-thirds majorities
of the House and Senate did not need to be presented to the President and rejecting a
challenge to the Eleventh Amendment on the grounds that it had not been presented to the
President). Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 of the Constitution provides,
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment)
shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall
take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be
repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the
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the bill in most respects, the joint resolution did not impose the same severe
restrictions on individual member introduction as bills did for much of the
nineteenth century. I selected the House for my brief exploration of joint
resolution history because House Members have proposed significantly
more amendments than have Senators, and the procedure for introducing
bills in the House has undergone substantially more change.
While the time available for introducing resolutions in the House was
sparse in early years, members’ personal privilege to introduce resolutions
was not otherwise restricted. And though in the rules of the first session of
the first Congress there was no explicit rule on the order of business,236
today joint resolutions are codified in House procedure. They may
originate in either the House or Senate, not, as is sometimes incorrectly
assumed, jointly in both Houses.237 But as they differ little in practice from
a bill, the two forms are often used interchangeably.238 The principle
differences from bills are that joint resolutions may include a preamble
preceding the resolving clause and that when a joint resolution is used to
propose an amendment to the Constitution, it is not then presented to the
President for approval.239 And, in general, joint resolutions “are used for
what may be called incidental, unusual, or inferior purposes of
legislating . . . .”240
Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. Counsel for Hollingsworth et al., arguing the invalidity of the
amendment, framed the argument in support of the amendment as follows: “[A]s two thirds
of both Houses are required to originate the proposition, it would be nugatory to return it
with the President’s negative, to be repassed by the same number . . . .” Hollingsworth, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) at 379. To that, they replied, “the reasons assigned for his disapprobation
might be so satisfactory as to reduce the majority below the constitutional proportion. The
concurrence of the President is required in matters of infinitely less importance . . . .” Id.
Attorney General Lee responded “[b]ut has not the same course been pursued relative to all
the other amendments, that have been adopted?” Id. at 381. The Court upheld the validity
of the Eleventh Amendment despite its not having been presented to the President. Justice
Chase asserts “[t]here can, surely, be no necessity to answer [Hollingsworth’s argument].
The negative of the President applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation: He has
nothing to do with the proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the Constitution.” Id.
236. See ASHER C. HINDS, 4 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE UNITED STATES § 3056 (1907) (describing how the current House rules relating to the
order of business are a substantial change from the rules of the first House).
237. CHARLES W. JOHNSON, HOW OUR LAWS ARE MADE, S. DOC. NO. 108-93, at 7 (1st
Sess. 2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/lawsmade.toc.html; see also Forms of
Congressional Action, http://www.house.gov/rules/lphforms.htm#jointres
ol (setting forth the standard form for presenting a joint resolution).
238. JOHNSON, supra note 237.
239. Id.
240. RULES AND MANUAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE ONE HUNDREDTH
CONGRESS § 397 (annotation on JEFFERSON’S MANUAL portion of the House Manual)
[hereinafter HOUSE RULES], printed in H.R. DOC. NO. 99-279, at 183 (1987). Examples of
the incidental, unusual, or inferior forms of legislation subject to joint resolutions include
extending the national thanks to individuals, the invitation to La Fayette to visit America,
notice to a foreign government of the abrogation of a treaty, declaration of intervention in
Cuba, correction of an error in an existing act of legislation, enlargement of the scope of
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3. General motivations for sponsorship of legislation over the history of
Congress: Careerism vs. policy orientation
For working assumptions about the psychology of legislative process
since the 1st Congress, I marry detailed studies of twentieth century bill
sponsorship with the more sparse historical scholarship available on earlier
congressional behavior. The actions of modern congresspersons are
viewed as serving one or more of three broad aims—power within the
legislature, reelection, and policy goals.241
In variance of that paradigm developed for modern Congresses,
however, my model of sponsorship activity across the entire congressional
history focuses on just two opposing categories of motivations: (1)
careerism and (2) policy orientation. Careerism subsumes the modern
category of reelection but defines a broader concept, as explained below.
And by policy orientation, I mean a general propensity to pursue policy
goals, as opposed to other ends, in proposing legislation. Both are
questions of degree.
This careerism–policy orientation dichotomy (and continuum) supplants
the modern triad: power within the legislature, reelection, and policy goals
in this study in order to conform to the historical studies of bill and joint
resolution sponsorship and the preliminary nature of this analysis. Power
within the legislature fades to the background for now because it is
comparatively more difficult to track and it appears less relevant as we
move the focus from all congressional activity to motivations for the
introduction of legislation.242 And I have expanded the reelection factor to
the broader notion of “careerism” to fully account for the characteristics of
older, nineteenth century Congresses in a historical analysis.
While even the extreme cynic would not deny an enduring contribution
of some sort of “policy orientation,” the proposition that legislation has at
times been proposed to achieve policy goals, the historical incarnations of
careerism may not be so familiar. That and the related complication raised
by the distinction between constituency-topic and national-topic legislation
bear some elaboration.
a. Nineteenth century versus twentieth century careerism
The main motivation behind the typical modern congressperson’s
inquiries provided by law, special appropriations for minor and incidental purposes,
establishing the date for convening of Congress, and extending the termination date for a
law. Id.
241. See Cooper & Rydicki, supra note 192, at 196 (attributing the source of the
formulation to RICHARD FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES (1973)).
242. See Cooper & Rydicki, supra note 192, at 197-98 (“The authority to introduce bills
at one’s own discretion is not a preeminent source of personal power within a legislative
body in a separation-of-powers framework . . . .”).
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proposing legislation is political recognition as a path to reelection.243
Modern examples of this “reelectioneering” focus of careerism include
gaining political notoriety by taking a distinct position on an existing issue,
bringing attention to an issue in the political forum to influence the agenda,
or improving one’s political reputation as an expert or advocate by prolific
activity in a particular area.244 Self-interested congresspersons in the
nineteenth century, by contrast, appear to have had ambitions broader than
reelection.
Cooper and Rybicki argue that framing careerism as based only on a
desire for reelection is insufficient because “members in the House and
Senate [in the 1800s] did not desire or expect to spend most of their careers
in Congress.”245 In fact, “[i]n the House, members often chose not to run
for reelection, and in the Senate, resignations before the end of one’s term
were common.”246 Future career interests of sitting members of Congress
were instead broader than continued congressional service: “They sought
to use service in Congress as a pathway to state and national offices of a
variety of types. If, then, we define careerism in terms of the pursuit of a
political career, not merely a legislative career, the external form of
careerist explanation remains applicable.”247
Cooper and Rybicki tie their findings to the longstanding view that the
historical “increase in the number of member bills was tied to the desire of
members to publicize themselves for their own personal and political
gain.”248 They conclude that “the [most] substantial argument for the

243. See Schiller, supra note 27, at 188 (identifying congresspersons as calculating
individuals who weigh the political cost of their decisions).
244. See id. at 189-91 (elaborating that legislator as a rational political actor is cautious
of the effect bill sponsorship will have on his reputation, influence, and chance of
reelection).
245. Id. at 198.
246. Id. (citing David Brady et al., The Roots of Careerism in the U.S. House of
Representatives, in 24 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 489, 489 (1999); Douglass Price, Careers and
Committees in the American Congress: The Problem of Structural Change, in THE HISTORY
OF PARLIAMENTARY BEHAVIOR (William Ayderlotte ed., 1977); RANDALL RIPLEY, POWER IN
THE SENATE (1969)). Brady distinguishes between electoral safety and desire to serve for
long periods to conclude that they result from different factors, and thus careerism was
present earlier in history than previously thought. Brady, supra, at 507.
247. Cooper & Rydicki, supra note 192, at 198. The reelectionist focus of careerism in
the Modern Era is thought to embody an emphasis on the delivery of particularistic benefits
to constituents as the primary means of winning re-election. Id. at 197 (citing MORRIS P.
FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977); DAVID R.
MAYHEW, THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974)). And “credit seeking, advertising, and
position taking were identified as the three prime strategies for members to follow to win
reelection.” Id. Cooper and Rybicki note, however, that position taking suggests that
something beyond the delivery of particularistic benefits is important in winning reelection.
Id. Moreover, Mayhew argues that, in the case of the Senate, position taking is the most
important of the three. MAYHEW, supra, at 73.
248. Cooper & Rydicki, supra note 192, at 198 (citing DE ALVA S. ALEXANDER, HISTORY
AND PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1916)).
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power of self interest in explaining the evolution of bill introduction [is] the
desire of members to advance their careers by using member bills to
publicize themselves.”249
Of course, that acquisition of member freedom to introduce bills has also
proved invaluable to narrower twentieth-century schemes to self-promote
for retaining a particular office. But legislation suited to broad careerist
goals often differs in substantive focus from that suited to narrow
careerism. The “national-topic” versus “constituency-topic” distinction in
legislative type reflects that difference.
b. A complication for the theory of cause for the bill–amendment
proposing correlation: Constituency-topic vs. national-topic bills
From the evidence that, to some degree, members of Congress used bill
introduction to advance their careers from early in the nineteenth century to
modern times, I assume that careerism has played a role in amendment
proposing as well. The analysis of this Article now shifts to the more
difficult question of the extent to which the same careerist interests that
motivated general bill sponsorship have also motivated constitutional
legislation. This analysis, however, is complicated by the distinction
between sponsorship of “constituency topic” bills and sponsorship of
“national topic” bills. Cooper and Rybicki define constituency topic bills
in the Senate as those that “confer a highly disproportionate benefit on a
particular state.”250 I expand that definition to include bills that confer a
highly disproportionate benefit to a particular congressional district for
House legislation.
In the nineteenth century, as members gained the ability to individually
sponsor legislation, they focused much more on constituency-topic bills
than did the committees. For example, looking at member-sponsored bills
only in a sample of nine Senates from the 12th (1811-13) to the 34th (185557) Congress, there was a roughly equal split between constituency topic
and national topic bills.251 That contrasts with committee and members
bills taken together, where constituency-topic bills comprise far less than
half of all congressional legislation during the same period.252 In fact,
249. Id. at 198-99.
250. Id. at 198. Cooper and Rybicki note that constituent topic bills include “road and
harbor repair or construction, railroad construction, incorporation, establishment of
collection and judicial districts, compensation of judges and other public officials, the time
and place for holding district court, Indian removal, restoration of civil liberties, settlement
of private land claims, and grants of land or the right-of-way through public lands.” Id. at
199 tbl.10.4.
251. Id. at 199 (noting that an average of 50.3% of member bills were a constituency
topic during this period and thus concluding that the member bills were equally divided
between constituency and national topic bills).
252. See id. at 199 (noting the trend from percentage Member-Introduced Public Bills
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members introduced approximately sixty-two percent of the constituency
topic bills during the nine-Senate span.253 As Cooper and Rybicki note, “it
is clear that members, not committees, were the driving force in the growth
of constituency topic bills to a far greater degree than with respect to
national topic bills.”254
The authors note further that the House data makes an even stronger case
for the role of constituency pleasing in propelling member bills: “In the
House . . . the percentage of member bills that were constituency topic rose
from 42 percent in the 27th Congress (1841-43), shortly after the rules
changes of 1837-38, to 70 percent in the 31st Congress (1849-51) and 73
percent in the 32nd Congress (1851-53),” as member bills in the House
exploded.255 This finding, however, need not suggest greater careerism in
the House. Rather, to the extent national-topic bills are more suited for
credit claiming in pursuit of national office (e.g., the presidency) than
reelection to Congress, a stronger percentage of national-topic bills were
introduced by Senators than by members of the House.256 This is
consistent with the contemporary understanding of the broader political
goals of Senators to pursue national offices.
Figure 2 illustrates the dramatic change in the magnitude, sources, and
composition of bill introduction that accompanied the easing of procedural
constraints over a forty-year span in the nineteenth century:

with Constituency Topic column in Table 10.4).
253. Id. (averaging the percentage of constituency-topic bills introduced by members
from Table 10.4).
254. Id. at 199.
255. Id. at 200-01.
256. Id. at 201.

LATHAM OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

2/24/2006 1:32:14 PM

HISTORICAL AMENDABILITY

195

FIGURE 2:
Comparison of Public Bills Only, Between 22nd Congress (1831-33) and
42nd Congress (1871-73)

(Not precisely to scale. Constituent
topic—national topic breakdown
for 42nd Congress is based on
estimate for House portion.)

Constituent
52.1%
(1,825)

Constituent
20% (112)
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41% (233)

National
47.9%
(1,675)

National
80% (450)

National
59%(334)

*
**

committee
90 % (567)

member
10% (66)

22nd Cong. Public Bills (633)
*
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**
national member bills 44% (29)

committee
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The theory set forth in Part IV shows how the dramatic shift in the power
and role of individual members from the early to late nineteenth century
may have played a crucial role in establishing the dynamic that drives the
correlation between bill and amendment revealed by the numerical
analysis.
c. Conclusions
In sum, the theory developed in the next part must acknowledge several
background conditions governing aggregate bill and amendment
introduction that have dramatically changed character relative to each other
between early and modern Congresses: (1) members of Congress were
generally motivated by careerism (as the political scientists suggest they
have been from early on), but the members’ focus shifted from an emphasis
on acquiring national stature to an emphasis on reelection;257 (2) member
legislation has generally been weighted towards constituency topics;258 but
(3) plausible amendment topics were generally national topics;259 (4) joint
resolutions, the vehicle for proposing amendments, initially differed
dramatically from bills in the ease of their introduction;260 and (5) the
proportion of total bills that were sponsored by members rose to over
ninety percent by the end of the century.261
III. FROM GENERAL THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR AND
HISTORIES OF PROCEDURE TO A SPECIFIC THEORY OF CORRELATION
BETWEEN BILL- AND AMENDMENT-SPONSORSHIP ACTIVITY
Building on the political-scientists’ understanding of Congress, this Part
(A) presents a general theory of congressional motivation as cause of
correlations between bill- and amendment-proposing rates and (B)
speculates on criteria for a “Zeitgeist of amendability in Congress.”
A. General Theory of Congressional Motivation as Cause of Correlation
Between Rates of General Bill and Amendment Proposing
Attuned to the history of motivations for and procedural constraints on
bill and amendment proposing, I now return to the question that started this
Article: Why might bill and amendment proposing rates be correlated to
some substantial and significant degree from Congress to Congress?

257. See Brady, supra note 246, at 490 (explaining the change in patterns of careerism
throughout the twentieth century and pointing to the wealth of political science literature
chronicling this change).
258. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 198.
259. Id. at 201.
260. See HOUSE RULES, supra note 240, § 397.
261. Cooper & Rydicki, supra note 192, at 199.
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First, I concede the threshold limitations of existing political-science
scholarship. It does not provide enough insight for my preliminary theory
of causation to be framed either with scientific precision or with a scope
that explains all of the relevant legislative activity. This analysis is
preliminary and too much data remains inaccessible or un-obtained thus
far. (The numerical correlation itself, in contrast with its cause, is
established with statistical accuracy in Part IV.) Therefore, I cannot
proceed in the traditional style of inquiry by stating a concrete theory that
would give rise to a particularized null hypothesis against it, which the
subsequent numerical analysis would or would not disprove (within a range
of statistical error). Instead, I outline two separate working models of
causation, each of which points to the same cause for the correlation. The
two models embody two alternatives for theorizing with incomplete
information: (1) direct generalization from established premises and (2)
reasoning back to a general outline of likely real conditions from extreme
cases where the analysis is simplified. The first approach, in chart form,
presents reasonable assumptions about the majority of the data and the
typical aggregate motivations, based on what we already know about
Congress. The second approach speculates on the effects were all
congresspersons to behave at each of two extremes. It then argues why the
aggregation of real activity most likely tend towards one of those extremes
more than towards the other. The strength of my preliminary theory of
causation is that both models point to the same conclusion: a varying
aggregate enthusiasm for careerism impacts both bill introduction and
amendment proposing.
1. First approach: general assumptions and typical cases
For the generalization approach, I begin by deconstructing my earlier
simplified idealized graph of the correlation phenomenon (Figure 1). First,
I assume that the total number of bills and proposed amendments for any
Congress are composites of (1) introductions caused by factors relatively
stable in aggregate intensity, and (2) introductions caused by less-stable
factors. Based on these assumptions, the otherwise-inexplicable correlation
between seemingly independent processes is a relationship between the
unstable factors in bill proposing and amendment proposing, illustrated as
follows.
FIGURE 3:
The Idealized Correlation Illustration Broken Down
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In Figure 3, I assume that neither bill introduction nor amendment
proposing is entirely erratic in intensity. Instead, each phenomenon has at
its core, activity that is relatively stable in intensity over time and not
related to the other. They are, however, similar in the aspect of their
relative stability. That is reasonable and consistent with the factors
inveighing against a relationship between bill and amendment proposing.
But on top of that core activity is a substantial amount of sponsorship in
both the normal and constitutional legislation spheres that is highly-
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variable and may share a cause or causes.
To assist the speculation on what may be the longitudinally-unstable and
common causes, the next three figures examine the motivations that drive
most of the sponsorship activity for member bills, committee bills, and
proposed amendments.
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FIGURE 4:
General model of an individual congressperson’s motivation for
introducing a particular bill.*

A member bill is introduced . . .

to achieve a
policy result for
its own sake . . .

on a national
topic suited to
legislation . . .

and/or

evaluated
generally.
and/or

on a
constituent
topic suited
to
legislation.

evaluated in
line with
constituency
perspective.

and/or

for
national
status.

to gain credit for
the introducer . . .

and/or

via a national
topic of
constituent
and/or
interest arguably
suited to
legislation.

for increased
reelection
chances . . .

via a local
constituency
topic arguably
suited to
legislation.

*The two paths that indicate the more common forms of motivation, and
underlie my theory, are indicated with bolder borders and arrows.
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FIGURE 5:
General model of the collective motivation of a majority of a congressional
committee that votes to introduce a bill.*

A committee bill is introduced . . .

to achieve a
policy result for
its own sake . . .

on a national
topic suited to
legislation . . .

and/or

evaluated
generally.
and/or

and/or

on a local issue
for a member’s
constituents
within committee jurisdiction and
suited to
legislation.

evaluated in line
with the
perspectives of
multiple
members’
constituencies.

to gain credit for
supporting
committee
members . . .

for
national
status.

for increased
reelection
chances . . .

via a national
topic of interest
to multiple
members’
constituencies
and arguably
suited to
legislation.

via a local issue
for a member’s
constituents
within committee jurisdiction and
suited to
legislation.

and/or

*The two paths that indicate the more common forms of motivation, and
underlie my theory, are shown with bolder borders and arrows.
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FIGURE 6:
General model of an individual congressperson’s motivation for proposing
an amendment
A constitutional amendment
is proposed via a joint resolution . . .

to achieve a policy
result for its own
sake . . .

and/or

on a national topic
suited to a
constitutional
amendment . . .

evaluated
generally.
and/or

evaluated in
line with
constituency
perspective.

to gain credit for
the introducer . . .

for
national
status.

and/or

for increased
reelection
chances . . .

via a national topic of
constituent interest
arguably suited to an
amendment.

*The two paths that indicate the more common forms of motivation, and
underlie my theory, are shown with bolder borders and arrows.

In the following table, I compare side-by-side the two most-likely
motivation types for member bills, committee bills, and proposed
amendments which I draw from the three previous figures. The table then
examines the likelihood that the aggregation of one or the other of those
motivation types would produce the bills–proposed amendments
correlation.

LATHAM OFFTOPRINTER

2/24/2006 1:32:14 PM

2005]

HISTORICAL AMENDABILITY

203

TABLE 1:
Speculative General Theory of Causes of Correlation between Bill and
Proposed Amendment (PA) Totals262
Bills
Member

Committee

Proposed
Amendments

263

Most member
bills are
introduced . . .

Most committee
bills are
introduced . . .

(factor 1) to
achieve a policy
result for its
own sake on a
national topic
suited to
legislation,
evaluated
generally,

(factor 1) to
achieve a policy
result for its own
sake on a
national topic
suited to
legislation,
evaluated
generally,

Most amendments
are proposed . . .
(factor 1) to
achieve a policy
result for its own
sake on a national
topic suited to a
constitutional
amendment,
evaluated
generally,
or

or
(factor 2) to
gain credit for
the introducer
for increased
reelection
chances via a
local
constituency
topic arguably
suited to
legislation.

Likelihood this motivation factor
caused per-congress bill totals to
correlate with PA totals over time.

Probability of correlation on factor 1:
It is improbable that the quantity of
independently valuable bills on
national topics suited to legislation
would track the quantity of
independently valuable proposed
amendments on national topics suited
to constitutional amendment to such a
degree and over a sufficient span of
congresses to produce a statistically
significant correlation.

or
(factor 2) to gain
credit for
supporting
committee
members for
increased
reelection
chances via a
national topic of
concern to
multiple
members’
constituencies
and arguably
suited to
legislation.

(factor 2) to gain
credit for the
introducer for
increased
reelection chances
via a national topic
of constituent
concern, arguably
suited to an
amendment.

Probability of correlation on factor 2:
It is more likely that what primarily
causes the substantial variances in the
magnitudes of sponsorship activity in
both general and constitutional
legislation to be similar to each other
is “promiscuous careerism”: a
varying aggregate enthusiasm for
careerism that impacts both bill and
PA introductions. That is, viewed in
the aggregate, increases or decreases
in enthusiasm for careerism
simultaneously translates to both bills
and PA introductions, though the
primary constituent concerns targeted
may be local topics in the former and
national topics in the latter case.

To summarize, Table 1 concludes that the substantial correlation
262. I simplify this analysis in the sense that it considers only the most-likely categories
of motivation for member bills, committee bills, and proposed amendments. It does not
contemplate the effect of mixed motivations and it is a general and not era-specific theory
(though introduction procedures and dynamics varied as they evolved through historical
eras).
263. Again, the contribution of committee bills to the bill totals diminishes substantially
by the end of the nineteenth century. That is reflected in my era-by-era analysis, set forth,
infra Part V.
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between bill and amendment proposing totals over a span of Congresses
signals that varying intensities of similar careerist motivations have
determined the intensities of both bill and amendment sponsorship. I call
this phenomenon “promiscuous careerism” and will discuss it further in
Part V.264
The following will demonstrate how this conclusion is reached by other
means and then will address the broader contours of this causation theory.
2. Alternative approach to causation with similar result: negative
implications of an analysis of extreme cases
I begin this alternative speculation on causes with simple, idealized
(extreme) conditions and then move to real-world assumptions. This
reasoning again leads to my tentative conclusion that the bill–amendment
proposing correlation is a strong indicator of a predominance of careerism
in aggregate amendment-proposing activity. The methodological theory
here is that by first examining the predictable results of absolute or extreme
types of congressional behavior under extreme or idealized political
conditions, the potential impacts of that type of behavior are easier to see.
Each of the factors are considered in the extreme case and actual conditions
are less extreme; therefore, the impacts are also likely present to a lesser
degree in reality.
a. Idealized, extreme conditions for initial speculation
I assume that the motivation of an individual congressperson in
introducing a particular bill, or joint resolution, in reality, ranges
somewhere between “pure careerist,” which roughly translates into credit
seeking or grandstanding, and “policy purist,” which represents an
orientation to achieving some policy end for the independent virtue of that
end. To begin developing a model, however, I start by considering the
simpler cases, either where every member of Congress is a pure careerist or
where every member is a policy purist. While not even the worst or the
best historical congressperson has likely reached the extremes of either
consistent pure careerism or consistent policy purism those archetypes at
least provide outer boundary conditions within which to speculate.265
The second factor I idealize to begin the analysis is the relationship
between the potential bills and the potential proposed amendments the
hypothetical congressperson might sponsor. I assume perfect “topic
264. See infra Part V.B.
265. See HANS VAN DEN DOEL & BEN VAN VELTHOVEN, DEMOCRACY AND WELFARE
ECONOMICS 103 (Brigid Biggins trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1993) (1979) (relating
the concept of careerists to American politics and the concept of paternalists (what I refer to
as “policy purists”) to European politics).
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overlap,” meaning that for every issue of constituent interest, there are both
potential general bills and potential proposed amendments, regardless of
how substantively appropriate or likely to succeed if introduced without
political repercussions to the congressperson (based on, for example, their
frivolous or otherwise unsuitable nature). I refer to those options as
“plausible” legislation.
b. Effects under the extreme conditions
The idealized circumstances where all congresspersons are pure
careerists and there is total topic overlap would produce strong, if not
perfect, correlation in the per-Congress rates of bill sponsorship and
amendment proposing as follows.266 The range of potential bills or
proposed amendments the pure careerist considers introducing in each
Congress would arise from the issues important either to local constituents
or national constituencies with whom the congressperson seeks to gain a
favorable reputation. While pleasing those constituencies most effectively
would require introducing legislation that becomes law, only a small
percentage of bills introduced get that far. So the primary opportunity for
claiming credit will lie in the ability to claim the mere introduction of
legislation.267 Now the congressperson can safely assume a low degree of
voter sophistication with regard to this practice, though he or she cannot
assume a complete absence of it. Hence, within the limits of what on its
face seems plausible—as all options are presumed to be under the perfect
topic overlap condition—I conclude that the pure careerist will introduce
both general legislation and amendment-proposing legislation on each topic
he or she finds politically important to address.
Under the pure-careerist conditions, perfect correlation arises when each
issue is always plausibly amenable to exactly the same number of general
bills and proposed amendments; then we would see exactly the same
number of both types of legislation in each Congress, and hence a perfect
correlation of bill and amendment proposing rates throughout history.
Introducing the reality that the magnitude of total general bills is always
so much greater than that of proposed amendments, however, would not
preclude at least a strong correlation under this model. Even with that
substantial disparity between the magnitudes of total bills and total
amendments in each Congress, strong correlation could easily exist in the
idealized circumstance of pure careerism. For instance, assuming still the
266. But see id. (explaining that a politician would need to have a monopoly position to
truly be purely policy-oriented and that the practical reality of maintaining political power
requires him to be a careerist).
267. See id. at 119 (highlighting that because voters are short-sighted, politicians must
focus on short-term measures such as bill introduction in order to be politically successful).
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premise that all issues are amenable to both types of legislation, it may be
the norm that one proposed amendment is thought to carry the punch of
multiple general bills. If that proposed amendment/general bills ratio were
constant across issues and Congresses, we would still get perfect
correlation in the rise and fall of rates for each Congress, though the
absolute numbers of proposed amendments and bills would be quite
different. While there is obviously not a constant ratio in reality, some
significant disparity between the number of proposed amendments and
general bills deemed amenable to a particular issue seems endemic. And
common sense supports the proposition that even pure credit seekers view a
proposed amendment as a less common act than a general bill.
On the other hand, while perfect correlation is theoretically possible
where the polar opposite motivation—policy purism—is present, the
further assumptions required for that are too artificial to exist to any degree
in reality. If all congresspersons were policy purists, perfect correlation
would have to occur in one of two ways. First, it could be that from
Congress to Congress, there is a fixed ratio of (1) topics seriously subject
to268 general bills to (2) topics seriously subject to proposed amendments.
What varies is the work load of members in the aggregate, causing a
variation in the amount of legislative activity. A second cause could be
that a rise or fall in the number of topics seriously subject to proposed
amendments just happens to also correspond to a rise or fall of the same
magnitude in topics seriously subject to general bills, throughout history.
Since both those potential causes of correlation in the policy purist model
likely do not exist to any degree, I will assume their absence and assume
that policy purism would lead to near-zero correlation.269
c. Implications under real-world conditions
To the extent that sufficient topic overlap is present, then, it is not a far
stretch from the above analysis to conclude that a substantial, albeit not
perfect, correlation in the rates over history must imply that some degree of
careerism has played a substantial role.
In sum, approaching the question from multiple directions, I conclude it
is very likely that some substantial degree of careerism is the necessary
cause of any significant degree of correlation between bill and amendment
totals.270
268. “Seriously subject to” is shorthand for the proposition that legislation in the topic
area could be offered to achieve desirable policy ends, as opposed to only provide a vehicle
for claiming credit in addressing the topic.
269. See VAN DER DOEL & VAN VELTHOVEN, supra note 265, at 103 (concluding that a
pure paternist, what I term a policy purist, cannot succeed in a two-party system unless he
has a monopoly position).
270. The degree and level of influence of careerism defies precise assessment because of
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B. Speculations Beyond Explaining the Correlation: Congressional
Attitude Towards the Amendment Process as Group Psychology—the
“Zeitgeist of Amendability in Congress”271
Each of Part V’s separate contextual analyses (of each of the seven eras)
ends with one additional speculation, beyond what has caused the degree of
correlation between the bill and amendment proposing tallies of the
particular era. In those concluding speculations, I characterize the general
congressional attitude towards the amendment process. And I frame that
characterization in terms relevant to the broader quest for understanding
Congress’s “responsiveness” to amendment need. Thus, it is an assessment
of an evolving congressional group psychology.
various difficult-to-track variables. For instance, the general theory raises the potential
effect of diminished topic overlap—that is, variability in the earlier assumption that every
issue of constituent interest is plausibly (though not necessarily seriously) amenable to both
general and constitutional legislation. Less than perfect or low topic overlap could have a
dampening affect on the correlation in the case of pure credit seekers. That is, the absence
of the option of a plausible bill on an issue amenable to a proposed amendment or vice versa
could defeat the correlation effect. However, to the extent the congressional action is also
influenced by an alternative credit seeking motivation, that may not occur. Specifically, it
could be that congresspersons are motivated to record a volume of legislative activity, of
any type, to a degree that varies from Congress to Congress. To the extent that motivation
is also at play the potential dampening affect of low topic overlap would be diminished.
Nonetheless, the era-by-era analysis of Part V must consider whether comparatively low
topic overlap is the culprit in eras of comparatively low or no correlation.
Consider the simple example of a congressperson motivated only by the desire to create a
record of action on topic X. The more topic X is at least arguably amenable to both general
and constitutional legislation, the more likely he or she may be to introduce both a general
bill and proposed amendment. For example, assume that today (1) anti-flag burning is a
policy position reasonably pursuable only through constitutional amendment and (2)
highway funding is pursuable only through general legislation, but (3) regulation of abortion
funding could be argued to be pursuable through both (to some degree). In this example,
abortion funding regulation exhibits high topic overlap while anti-flag burning and
highways are low overlap categories of potential legislation. To the extent legislation in the
aggregate tends toward the low topic overlap categories, the correlation effect I have
described above may be dampened.
The dampening dynamic can be easily seen if one considers how the above three
legislative topic examples would be addressed in a simple legislative setting. A
congressperson in an era where the only issue of interest to his or her constituents is flag
burning and who, through a careerist motivation, is interested only in doing something of
record regardless of its likelihood of success, will propose an amendment and not introduce
a bill. The sample congressperson likewise would introduce only general legislation in
response to highway issues. By contrast, that careerism-motivated congressperson in a
district where abortion funding is on the minds of constituents would propose both an
amendment and a bill (regardless of the likelihood of success), to maximize the careerist
benefits of doing something of record. Though all three situations involve only careerist
motivations, the effect on legislative activity is translated into a correlation in bill and
amendment proposing only in the last, where topic overlap is maximized. In the first two,
with zero topic overlap, the correlation effect of my Stage I Hypothesis above is completely
undercut. Zero topic overlap occurs only in my extremely simplified example and not, as
will be made plain in the analysis that follows, in the history of Congress.
271. My use of “Zeitgeist” does not invoke any technical sense intended by its coiner,
Hegel, or his followers but only its modern colloquial usage: the “general intellectual and
moral state or the trend of culture and taste characteristic of an era.” WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2657 (1993).
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I derive that “Zeitgeist” primarily from the interrelationship between (1)
the position of the era on the “promiscuous careerism”—“motivation
independence” continuum; (2) any evidence of limits on careerist activity
rooted in a prudential view of the Constitution or amendment process that
may predominate in that congressional era;272 and (3) the mass view of the
likelihood of success of proposed amendments for the era. Before
continuing the analysis, some terms bear repeating, redefinition, or
introduction: (1) “Careerism” generally denotes some sort of focus on
credit seeking.273 (2) “Promiscuous careerism” signifies a focus on credit
seeking that does not distinguish between normal and constitutional modes
of legislation. Hence, unless handicapped by procedural or other external
factors, promiscuous careerists will introduce both bills and proposed
amendments in order to seek credit on topics arguably suited to both modes
of legislation.274 (3) “Prudential careerists,” by contrast, for prudential or
other reasons, are less promiscuous and distinguish between normal and
constitutional modes of legislation. Hence, they might not always seek
credit through a proposed amendment every time one would plausibly suit
a topic also addressed by a bill. (4) “Motivation independence” is the
legislative philosophy that treats normal and constitutional legislation as
distinct, rarely-overlapping tools. I speculate that most holding this view
tend towards a non-careerist and policy-purist orientation. But this class
could include prudential careerists, to the extent they exist. (5) Finally
“policy purism,” again, signifies being purely oriented to achieving some
policy end solely for the virtue of that end, independent of personal benefit
to the legislator.
Policy purists introduce legislation, normal or
constitutional, only that is well-suited to achieving the particular policy end
and possesses a reasonable possibility of success. All policy purists are
motivation independent, though not necessarily vice-versa, since some
tending towards motivation independence might nonetheless possess a
degree of careerism in their psychologies.
To repeat from the preceding Part V.A, the core of each of the seven eraby-era analyses in Part V first characterizes the era as dominated by either
motivation independence or promiscuous careerism (or neither), depending
272. See supra Part V.A.1.
273. See also VAN DER DOEL & VAN VELTHOVEN, supra note 265, at 103 (defining a
careerist as one who “maximizes the number of votes given to himself, to his party or to his
regular coalition partners”).
274. Promiscuous careerism is closely related to but not necessarily synonymous with
“pure careerism.” See supra tbl.1. Most pure careerists probably are promiscuous in this
regard, though I admit the possibility of a purely self-promoting member of Congress who
nonetheless distinguishes between the modes of legislation for one reason or another. At the
same time, many promiscuous careerists utilizing both modes of legislation whenever
possible may not be at the extreme in their self-promotion and may have some policy
orientation in their psychology.
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on the numerical results (and contextual factors).
My first move beyond those characterizations, in the quest for
Congress’s “Zeitgeist of amendability” in each particular era, relates those
qualities to the perceived likelihood of success of proposed amendments. I
hypothesize the combination of (1) a particular mass perception of
likelihood of success and (2) a dominate character of careerism and its
relationship to legislation sponsorship in an era would have the following
effects on the aggregate level of amendment proposing:

Table 2:
Relationship between perceived likelihood of success of proposed
amendments and their introduction rate, depending on the nature of
careerism in the era
Low Perceived
Likelihood of Success

High Perceived Likelihood of
Success

Promiscuous-Careerism
Dominated Era

Likelihood of success is not likely to affect decision to
propose amendment.

Motivation-Independence
Dominated Era

Fewer proposals.

Higher proposal rate, unless
tempered by prudential view of
process.

The relationships identified in Table 2 potentially allow some simple
backward moves from hard data of proposal rates (available to fill the
interior of the table for each era) to the more elusive quality represented in
the horizontal axis, the perceived likelihood of proposed amendment
success. Those moves, in turn, lead to my looser speculations on the
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Zeitgeist of a particular congressional era with regard to the amendment
process.
For instance, to the extent the causation analysis leads to the conclusion
that a particular era was dominated by motivation independence, then
evidence of a relatively heightened rate of amendment proposing in that era
would, under Table 2, lead to the conclusion that at that time, the
generalized view was that the likelihood of success of proposed
amendments was relatively high. On the other hand, an era dominated by
motivation independence where there is other persuasive evidence of a
heightened view of the likelihood of success of amendment proposals, but
where the proposing rate is nonetheless relatively low, would be evidence
that a prudential view of the amendment process dominated in that era,
dampening the rate of amendment proposing.
In sum, in the more speculative final portions of each of the seven
subsections of Part V, I use the apparently-necessary relationships of Table
2 to predict the presence or absence of one of the qualities tracked in the
table when it is otherwise not known. Following that, I express the
Zeitgeist for each congressional era as the sum of three factors: (1) the
degree of tendency towards promiscuous careerism instead of motivation
independence, (2) the perceived likelihood of amendment proposal success,
and (3) the degree to which the amendment process is viewed prudentially
(e.g., tends toward prudential careerism).
Looking at the seven eras together, I tentatively conclude that Congress
has evolved to the modern era’s Zeitgeist of promiscuous, non-prudential,
amendability pessimism through a series of intervening, distinct Zeitgeists,
as detailed in Part V.275
IV. THE RAW DATA AND NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED
AMENDMENT AND BILL TOTALS
Part IV provides the structure and basis for the contextual analysis of the
numerical results that follows in Part V. To do this, I (1) identify the
specific sources of data and analytical methods used and (2) report the
numerical results of the correlation analysis. Since I have begun here with
a theory of potential causes of a correlation between bill and amendment
proposing rates, my later numerical confirmation of that correlation
bolsters the causal premises I have identified as necessary for the
275. Admittedly, the methodology of these additional speculations is even more
attenuated than what I use to investigate the cause of the bill–proposed amendment
correlations. Survey questions interrogating the thinking of a scientific sampling of
members of Congress on these issues would be more direct. But they are not available for
the historical periods. I am, however, occasionally able to compare my speculations with
the closest facsimile to psychological survey data that has come down to us—spontaneous,
contemporaneous testimonials.

LATHAM OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

2/24/2006 1:32:14 PM

HISTORICAL AMENDABILITY

211

correlation to exist.
A. Methodology and Sources
My analysis starts with two sets of numerical data: (1) the total numbers
of proposed amendments for each Congress (both houses) and (2) the total
general bills proposed (as an indicator of overall congressional activity). I
first look at trends in the proposed amendment numbers from Congress to
Congress and compare those trends with trends in the total numbers of bills
proposed for each Congress. Next, I compare my numerical conclusions
with the substantive categories of proposed amendments that predominated
in the seven historical eras delineated by the numerical analysis. Finally, I
compare this analysis with the other contemporary constitutional history,276
the intellectual history of amendment scholarship, and constitutional
theory, and the understanding of the legislative process developed in the
preceding section. For this study, I consulted numerous sources to compile
proposed amendment totals for the full life of the Constitution. Some
sources overlapped, some were slightly inconsistent, and some I consulted
merely for verification. Unlike the bill totals, all the proposed amendment
total sources are to some degree from secondary sources;277 at no point was
I compelled to physically count individual proposed amendments.
Nonetheless, the data are, in general, maddeningly dispersed in the
literature. This problem will not be magnified however, because
contemporaneous year-by-year amendment totals are now added to a single
Internet source.278
Bill totals involved more meticulous counting than did the proposed
amendments, especially in the earliest years.279 And like the proposed
276. For those prominent amendment topics and relevant contemporary history, I rely
extensively on VILE, supra note 55, at 540 app. D.
277. See infra app. B.
278. Congress’s website, thomas.loc.gov, provides full text searches of bills for each
Congress, currently going back to the 101st Congress. The proposed amendment data on
the 104th Congress, for example, come from http://thomas.loc.
gov/home/search.html, clicking on “Summary and Status Information about Bills and
Resolutions” within the Advanced Search function, selecting the 104th Congress, and
searching for proposed amendments. Specifically, on November 3, 2004, the search
“proposing amend constitution” in that database, with the options for (1) searching for word
variants, (2) in all bills, (3) from both houses, and (4) with the outside number of bills to be
retrieved at 1,000 selected, yielded a set of 166 proposed amendments (after factoring out a
few bills returned that were not proposed amendments by, for example, scrutinizing any
items that were not listed as either House or Senate joint resolutions).
279. The sources for bill totals are (1) 1st through 15th Congresses: Senate and House
Journals. Hand counting of bills and joint resolutions enumerated in indices at the end of
each volume. Since that count was taken for this article, these early journals have been
placed on Thomas in full-text format. (2) 16th through 40th Congresses: House Journal.
(3) 41st through 80th Congresses: Congressional Record, Appendices, Histories of Bills
and Resolutions. (4) 80th through 108th Congresses: Congressional Record, Daily Digest.
In the first issue of the Congressional Record for each new Congress, the “Daily Digest”
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amendment totals, recent bill totals are now available on the Internet.280
The table below shows my estimated proposed amendment and bill totals
through the One-Hundred-Eighth Congress.
TABLE 3:
Raw Data
Congress
(sui generis)

Founding

Bills

PAs

1st

1789-91

223

188

2nd

1791-93

139

7

3rd

1793-95

190

8

4th
5th
6th
7th
8th

1795-97
1797-99
1799-01
1801-03
1803-05

160
269
201
157
233

1
6
7
15
13

9th
10th
11th

1805-07
1807-09
1809-11

258
265
337

11
17
8

12th
13th
14th
15th
16th
17th
18th
19th
20th
21st
22nd

1811-13
1813-15
1815-17
1817-19
1819-21
1821-23
1823-25
1825-27
1827-29
1829-30
1831-32

386
474
537
537
496
508
568
728
678
1043
1139

6
39
18
25
12
27
18
39
16
10
19

PAs sent to states
by Congress
12 amendments
(including 27th)
sent.
Bill of Rights (10
amendments)
ratified.
11th Amendment
sent and ratified.

12th Amendment
sent and ratified.

Titles of nobility
amendment sent.

contains a “Resume of Congressional Activity of the [previous Congress].” That resume
contains numerous aggregate legislative statistics, including total numbers of bills
introduced. The Resumes of Congressional Activity have recently become available on the
Internet for Congresses since the 80th (1947-48) at http://thomas.loc.gov/.
280. The analysis in this article uses total numbers of bills without distinguishing
between public and private bills. While public bills would seem to be much more
interesting correlates to amendment proposing activities, many of the above sources do not
separate the public from the private bills in the aggregate totals they provide. For
convenience, this article relies on the totals provided in the above sources. A cursory
examination suggests that the private bill numbers are minimal in comparison with the
public bills and do not corrupt the analysis.
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23rd
24th
25th
26th
27th
28th
29th
30th
31st
32nd
33rd
34th
35th

1833-34
1835-36
1837-38
1839-40
1841-42
1843-44
1845-46
1847-48
1849-50
1851-52
1853-54
1855-56
1857-58

971
1265
1965
1406
1385
1127
1264
1435
1078
1076
1666
1606
1691

20
26
28
7
25
12
7
5
12
5
4
0
3
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36th
37th

1859-60
1861-62

1741
1665

191
10

38th
39th

1863-64
1865-66

1608
2357

66
162

40th

1867-68

3710

109

41st

1869-70

5314

15

42nd
43rd
44th
45th
46th
47th
48th
49th
50th
51st
52nd
53rd
54th
55th
56th
57th
58th
59th
60th
61st

1871-72
1873-74
1875-76
1877-78
1879-80
1881-82
1883-84
1885-86
1887-88
1889-90
1891-92
1893-94
1895-96
1897-98
1899-00
1901-02
1903-04
1905-06
1907-08
1909-10

5943
6434
6230
8735
10067
10704
11443
15002
17078
19630
5682
12226
14585
18463
20893
25460
26851
34879
38388
44363

35
31
39
41
47
49
60
53
48
51
64
46
46
47
70
64
32
46
63
62

62nd

1911-12

38032

93

63rd

1913-14

30053

118

64th
65th

1915-16
1917-18

30052
22594

97
92

66th

1919-20

21967

74

67th
68th

1921-22
1923-24

19889
17462

107
108

69th
70th
71st

1925-26
1927-28
1929-30

23801
23897
24453

54
66
73

[Vol. 55:145

Corwin
Amendment sent.
13th & 14th
Amendments sent.
13th ratified.
14th Amendment
ratified.
15th Amendment
sent and ratified.

16thAmendment
sent.
17th Amendment
sent.
16th and 17th
Amendments
ratified.
18th Amendment
sent.
18th Amend.
ratified. 19th sent
& ratified.
Child Labor
Amendment sent.
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72nd

1931-32

21382

172

73rd

1933-34

14370

75

74th
75th
76th
77th
78th
79th
80th

1935-36
1937-38
1939-40
1941-42
1943-44
1945-46
1947-48

18754
16156
16105
11334
8334
10330
10797

98
178
92
53
78
78
87

81st
82nd

1949-50
1951-52

14988
12730

75
104

83rd
84th
85th
86th

1953-54
1955-56
1957-58
1959-60

14952
17687
19112
18261

162
142
179
222

87th

1961-62

18376

395

88th

1963-64

17479

525

89th

1965-66

24003

499

90th

1967-68

26460

524

91st
92nd

1969-70
1971-72

26303
22969

773
524

93rd
94th
95th

1973-74
1975-76
1977-78

23396
21096
19387

382
326
373

96th
97th

1979-80
1981-82

12583
11490

291
221

98th
99th

1983-84
1985-86

10559
9885

161
130

100th
101st
102nd

1987-88
1989-90
1991-92

9588
10352
12016

118
184
151

103rd
104th
105th
106th

1993-94
1995-96
1997-98
1999-00

9824
6,808
7,532
8,968

156
166
129
80

Modern

215

20th Amendment
sent.
20th Amend.
ratified. 21st sent
& ratified.

22nd Amendment
sent.
22nd Amendment
ratified.

23rd Amendment
sent.
23rd Amendment
ratified. 24th sent.
24th Amendment
ratified.
25th Amendment
sent.
25th Amendment
ratified.
26th Amend. sent
& ratified. ERA
sent.

DC representation
amendment sent.
(Time for ERA
ratification
expires)
(Time for DC rep.
amend. expires.)

27th Amendment
ratified.
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107th
108th

Totals

2001-02
2003-04

8,956
8,468
1,200,902
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86
83
11,165

B. Raw Numerical Results
1. Data plots
First, I plotted the proposed amendment and bills introduced totals for
each Congress as a line graph over time. Because the total number of bills
is so much greater than amendments for each Congress, I could not record
the totals on the same graph and make any sort of comparison of their
trends. In order to compare the two graphs, I standardized each data set.
Thus each series was expressed in terms of the distance each data point
(total for a Congress) was in standard deviations (not absolute numbers)
from the mean for the whole series (set at zero on the graph).281
Line graphs produced from this data, first of amendments and then of
bills and amendments together, standardized for side by side comparison,
follow.

281. See RAND R. WILCOX, APPLYING CONTEMPORARY STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES 38
(2003) (describing the process by which to standardize a data set as subtracting the mean
and dividing by the standard deviation). The purpose of standardizing a data set is to force
the mean to be zero and the standard deviation to be one so that two different data sets can
be compared.
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Looking at the standardized plots together, I noticed not only what
visually appeared to be an overall correlation, but also what seemed to be
distinct eras of correlation, eras of no correlation, and eras of negative
correlation. Those visual observations lead to my numerical analysis to
determine correlation, which in turn produced the breakdown into seven
historical eras, as described below in Figures 7 and 8.
2. Correlation analysis
In looking for greater precision than what could be visually observed in
the line graphs, I first calculated the Pearson Correlation Coefficient282 for
the entire data set, finding a statistically significant correlation of 0.448.
Then I worked to define the seven distinct eras by trial and error. I looked
at correlations from the 3rd Congress to the 23rd Congress (sixty-six years)
forward from each Congress (in conjunction with graphs of the bill and
amendment distributions) to identify periods for testing.
I then
experimented with the end points to identify the following seven eras. The
boundaries of the eras are set to capture maximum significant correlations
in certain eras.
Table 4, below, summarizes this. The table includes the correlations for
each of the seven eras as well as the statistical significance of each
correlation value and the number of data pairs for each era (that is, the
number of Congresses covered for each era).283 Finally, for each era I also
checked for correlations between the number of bills proposed in one
Congress and the number of amendments proposed in the next, consecutive
Congress in order to determine whether amendment activity is a delayed
response to bill proposing activity. That is labeled “lag one.” The two
instances where the lag one correlations were more significant are also
noted in the table.

282. See GARY L. TIETJEN, A TOPICAL DICTIONARY OF STATISTICS 115 (1986) (defining
the Pearson’s correlation coefficient as “a measure of the linear relationship between x and
y”).
283. See WILCOX, supra note 281, at 142 (explaining that the level of significance is the
probability of a “Type I error”). A “Type I error” occurs when the hypothesis is rejected
under circumstances when in fact the hypothesis was correct. Id.
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As Table 4 records, the correlations shift—non-linearly between low,
moderate, and high, as well as between positive and negative, over the
seven eras I defined.
Those are the primary numerical characteristics for which I seek possible
explanations from the external historical context in the era-by-era analysis
that follows in Part IV. That analysis is also informed by two additional
quantitative measures: (1) the evolution in the general magnitude of total
bills and proposed amendments, on average, from era to era; and (2) the
per-Congress rate at which Congress had passed proposed amendments to
be sent on for states ratification, measured at the midpoint of each era.
Those quantities evolved over the seven eras as follows:
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TABLE 5
Additional Data and Calculations
Mean Bills284 Per:
Era

Mean PAs Per:

Bills/PA
Ratio

Amend. Passage
Rate
For
Historical
Era

Congres
s

Member

Congres
s

Membe
r

Founding
(1791–1812)

344

2.26

9

0.06

38.2

1.63285

1.18286

Antebellum
(1813–1858)
Civil War – Early
Recon.
(1859–
1868)

985

3.56

16

0.06

61.6

0.63287

0

2216

8

108

0.42

20.5

0.48288

0.6

Procedural Revolution: Member bills now relatively freely introduced; sharp increase in
introduction rates.
Latter Recon.–
Gilded Age
0.11
8875
23.7
41
0.11
216.5
0.4289
(1869–1886)
Populist–
Progressive (1887–
1916)

25,109

53.42

63

0.13

398.6

0.32290

0.13

284. Number of House members for each congress found in Charlie Rose, History of the
United States House of Representatives, 1789-1994 (1994), available at
http://www.clerkweb.house.gov/histrecs/househis/lists/divisionh.htm. Senate figures are
derived from the United States Senate website, Learning About the Senate, Senate Statistics,
at http://www.senate.gov/learning/.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2000).
285. By the midpoint of the first era, 1802, Congress was in its eighth incarnation and
had passed thirteen amendments: the Bill of Rights; the Twenty-Seventh Amendment
(addressing congressional pay, passed 1789 but not ratified until 1992); the Eleventh
Amendment (addressing states’ immunity, passed 1794, ratified 1798); and a Madisonian
proposal on legislative apportionment, passed in 1789 but never ratified.
286. For the amendment passage rate in the Founding era, I am including the activity of
the First Congress. And each era’s rate is for the entire era, not calculated at the midpoint.
287. By the 24th Congress in 1836, Congress had passed only two more amendments,
the Twelfth (election of president and vice president, passed 1803, ratified 1804) and an
amendment banning titles of nobility, passed 1810 but never ratified.
288. By the 38th Congress in 1864, Congress had passed just two more, the Corwin
Amendment, passed 1861and never ratified, and the Thirteen Amendment (passed 1864,
ratified 1865).
289. By the 45th Congress in 1878, Congress had passed two more amendments, the
Fourteenth (passed 1866, ratified 1868) and the Fifteenth (passed 1869, ratified 1870).
290. By the 57th Congress in 1902, Congress had not passed any more amendments.
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Suffrage–
Prohibition (1917–
1930)

22,009

41.45

82

0.15

268.4

0.34291

0.43

Modern
(1931–2004)

14,913

27.88

218

0.41

68.4

0.32292

0.24

Most striking in Table 5, besides the high numbers of proposed
amendments during the Congresses of the Civil War and Modern eras, is
the dramatic increase in general legislative bills during the PopulistProgressive era. That, now century-old, phenomenon persists as a peak in
legislative activity despite the continued procedural easing that occurred
after the peak of activity (where bill introduction that started off as a
burdensome task for individual congresspersons became progressively
easier) as well as subsequent increases in the size of Congress. Also
striking is that, by proportional comparison to general bills, proposed
amendments were by far the rarest in the Populist-Progressive era.
The ensuing analysis in this Article (1) compiles the qualitative history
of the most constitutionally-significant political events, the most pervasive
proposed amendment topics, the evolving character of the general
legislative process for each of the seven eras, and indicia of congressional
motivation and (2) suggests potential causes for the above-described
quantitative variations, era by era, that may be derived from these compiled
aspects of external conditions.
V. CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE NUMERICAL RESULTS ACROSS THE
SEVEN CONGRESSIONAL ERAS
To review, my general model suggests that what has caused the
substantial variances in the magnitudes of sponsorship activity in both
general and constitutional legislation to be similar to each other is a varying
degree of promiscuous careerism (aggregate enthusiasm for careerism that
impacts both bill and proposed amendment introductions). That dynamic is
at play even though the primary constituent concerns targeted by the
291. Congressional passage picked up with the Progressive era. By the 68th Congress in
1924, Congress had passed five more amendments: (1) the Sixteenth (authorizing income
tax, passed 1909, ratified 1913); (2) the Seventeenth (direct election of senators, passed
1911, ratified 1913); (3) the Eighteenth (Prohibition, passed 1917, ratified 1919); (4) the
Nineteenth (women’s suffrage, passed 1919, ratified 1920); and (5) an the child labor
amendment, passed in 1924 but not ratified.
292. By the 90th Congress in 1968, Congress had passed another six: (1) the Twentieth
(terms and succession, passed 1932, ratified 1933); (2) the Twenty-First (repealing
Prohibition, passed 1933, ratified 1933); (3) the Twenty-Second (limiting the president to
two terms, passed 1947, ratified 1951); (4) the Twenty-Third (governing electors from the
District of Columbia, passed 1960, ratified 1961); (5) the Twenty-Fourth (barring poll taxes,
passed 1962, ratified 1964); and (6) the Twenty-Fifth (presidential succession, passed 1965,
ratified 1967).
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careerist impulse may be local topics for bills, and national topics for
proposed amendments. Again, the correlation through the Congress ending
in the year 2004293 of 0.448 carries a statistical significance level of 0.001
that lends reliability to the conclusion that the correlation reflects a real
relationship294 over the full history of Congress. But looking at discrete
segments of congressional history also reveals the sporadic presence of a
countervailing tendency. That is, we sometimes see the converse of the
phenomenon where this promiscuous careerism holds sway to such a
degree as to produce a correlation. It reveals specific eras of relative
“motivation independence.”
The main work of this section is to take the causation speculation further
and consider the contextual reasons why either promiscuous careerism or
motivation independence would dominate in each of the eras. I looked for
those causes in the contemporary conditions of each era, including the
character of the major topics of proposed amendments, the nature of the
process of introducing legislation in general, constitutionally significant
external political events, and anecdotal evidence of the Zeitgeist of
amendability in Congress.
The question of whether context explains the dominance of promiscuous
careerism or motivation independence, or neither, is made additionally
complex for three of the eras. In those, I must also address the causes of
two further nuances in the relationship between bill and amendment
proposing revealed by the numerical analysis in part IV: (1) negative
correlations and (2) lagged correlations. Regarding negative correlations,
in the simple causation speculations described in part III, I had conceived
of promiscuous careerism as a causative third factor, independent of and
driving both bill introduction and amendment proposing in the eras where it
is present.
But a negative correlation also suggests a causal
interrelationship between just bill and amendment proposing, such as tradeoff in energy, resources, or motivation between the two spheres of
activity.295 Regarding lagged correlations, the numerical results also show
that the causal phenomenon sometimes first manifests in bill proposing.
That is, the correlation found to exist in some eras between bills in one
Congress and proposed amendments in the next Congress—suggesting that
bill proposing “leads” amendment proposing.
Putting those predicted and extraordinary numerical findings together,
the following era-by-era analysis considers that while the Modern era
shows a consistent, long-term positive correlation between levels of bill
293. Leaving out the sui generis 1st Congress.
294. Even stronger lag one correlation of 0.466, but less significant at 0.10.
295. In simple terms, a negative correlation between two variables indicates that when
one variable is high the other variable is low.
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and amendment proposing and the Latter Reconstruction-Gilded Age era
exhibits an even stronger correlation, the intervening era of SuffrageProhibition strangely shows a very strong negative correlation. The
correlation was negative in the Antebellum era as well. That may reflect a
time trade off in the Antebellum era due to the procedural difficulty of bill
introduction in that early part of congressional history. But in the SuffrageProhibition era, bill introduction had become free and easy, suggesting a
different cause, perhaps trade off in interest or energy. Moreover, I
speculate on that second peculiarity, that in the Antebellum and PopulistProgressive eras the only significant strong correlation is found not
between bills and proposed amendment totals in the same Congress but
between general bill totals in one Congress and proposed amendment totals
in the next Congress. In other words, bill proposing “leads” amendment
proposing in those eras. Why? Perhaps there is a longer “gelling period”
for amendment proposing in those eras. And because that lagged effect
dissipates between the Populist–Progressive and Suffrage–Prohibition eras
while most of the significant factors are similar, except for a diminution in
reverence for the Constitution, I conclude that reverence for the
Constitution was a likely cause of the gelling effect or the lag.
In sum, on the main question of causation for the correlation across all
the eras, I tentatively conclude that the independence of amendmentproposing activity from more general careerist motives (promiscuous
careerism) has diminished significantly since the late nineteenth century,
with some striking, though perhaps historically-explained, anomalies, and
has consistently remained very weak in the modern era beginning around
1930.
Similarly, the congressional Zeitgeist of amendability, as
summarized in Part I.B, also undergoes an interrupted decline across the
history of Congress. Those interruptions reflect varying reverence for the
amendment process and assessment of the likelihood of success of
proposed amendments.
A. First Era, Founding, 1791 to 1813296
To some extent, the Founding Era must be treated as sui generis. If my
theory of causation is correct, then the severe procedural constraints in the
House would have precluded a strong correlation at that time. With
member introductions so curtailed, the common forces theorized to cause
bill and proposed-amendment totals to correlate could not get sufficient
traction. That is, there was not sufficient freedom of action on the bill
296. Bills-Prop. Amends. Correlation: -0.087 (effectively zero). Significance: 0.799
(not significant). N: 11. Mean Bills Per Congress/Per Member: 344/2.26. Mean Proposed
Amendments/Per Member: 9/0.06. Amendment Passage Rate: Historical, 1.5; For Era 1.08.
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introduction side for the ebbing and flowing of careerist motivations to
match what careerism might have been translating to the pace of
amendment proposing. On that account, the absence of finding a strong
correlation here means my theory of what might cause a correlation
survives to be tested in subsequent eras.297
At the same time, though, the numerical result of no appreciable
correlation at all,298 not just the absence of a strong one, may say more than
just that my basic theory is not defeated. That is because, the potential
force of the careerism cause I have theorized is not eliminated by the
procedural constraints, only weakened. First, while member introduction
of bills in the House was barred, it was allowed and being practiced in the
Senate. True, that is not enough to facilitate the appearance of a careerismdriven correlation in the total numbers on its own, since, in this era, less
than ten percent of the total bill output of Congress came from members.299
So the more important contribution to careerism being able to drive bill
introduction at least to some degree is that House members could exert
their careerist motives through the committees. That is, though it is a lessdirect conduit for individual careerism than are individual bills, careerism
could impact aggregate numbers through committee bills in the way
indicated by the right-hand, primary path of Figure Five: “to gain credit for
supporting committing members for national status.”
Thus, since it seems that careerist motivations, to the extent they existed,
could have produced at least a moderate correlation in the Founding era,
the absence of any correlation at least supports the thesis that promiscuous
careerism had not arisen at all or at least was substantially outweighed by
motivation independence at this time.
Indeed, from the combination of (1) the absence of any correlation and
(2) the historical context, contemporary legislative and political conditions
and expressed views of the viability of the Article V process, set forth
below, I tentatively conclude that at least a moderate degree of motivation
independence, evidencing a serious-mindedness about constitutional
amendments, prevailed at this time.
First, the absence of correlation could not result merely from a lack of
issues to grandstand about. Rather, the Founding era saw numerous
297. Since the presence of a strong correlation would suggest a different cause than the
one I have hypothesized.
298. Specifically, since the negligible correlation coefficient of -0.087 is not statistically
significant, the correlation is effectively zero. That is not surprising given the small number
of Congresses examined (eleven).
299. See Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 187 (providing data in Table 10.2 that, as
late as 1831, when member bills were on the rise, they comprised only ten percent of the
total number of bills). That is a speculation warranted by Cooper & Rybicki’s data that, as
late as 1831, when member bills were on the rise, they comprised only ten percent of the
total.
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significant constitutional and political events in a short span. Those
include, for example, Chisolm v. Georgia;300 the Alien & Sedition Acts of
1798;301 congressional control passing from the Federalists to Jefferson’s
Democratic Republicans; Marbury v. Madison;302 Jefferson imposing an
embargo to avoid war;303 and the War of 1812 itself. Though the potential
for local-constituency-pleasing on some of those issues may be debatable,
its absence would not be determinative here; any careerist impulses at this
stage were, in the aggregate, directed more towards general and national
political positions than towards congressional reelection.
It is true that, instead of credit-seeking topics related to those ripe
political conditions, the major categories of proposed amendments
identified by Ames and Vile are exclusively constitutional subjects not
amenable to general legislation.304 Those significant categories of
proposed amendment interest included:
(1) judicial jurisdiction,
(2) legislative terms, (3) selection of the executive, and (4) titles of
nobility.305 Notably absent from the prominent proposed amendment
categories are proposals related to either the War of 1812 or the Alien and
Sedition Acts; both issues were primary focuses of general legislative
activity and seemingly ready targets for grandstanding constitutional
legislation.
Although we may consider the major categories of proposed amendment
topics for each era to be presumptive evidence of major categories of
amendment need, they only inform and do not determine the analysis. That
is, to the extent that the major categories of proposed amendment topics
were topics that would not fit well into normal legislation, the opportunity
for careerism to manifest in correlation between the aggregate bill and
proposed amendment numbers is obviously diminished. However, it does
not preclude that phenomenon from occurring. First, the accumulation of a
300. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (construing the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to hear
suits brought against states without the states’ consent), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
301. 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (“Alien Act”) (authorizing the President of the United States to
deport any illegal immigrant if the President considers the immigrant dangerous, even if the
country was in a time of peace); 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (“Sedition Act”) (making it a crime to
publish “false, scandalous, and malicious writing” regarding the government or government
officials).
302. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing judicial review of the constitutionality of
acts of other branches).
303. See Robert F. Turner, State Responsibility and the War on Terror: The Legacy of
Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 121, 126-27 (2003) (discussing
Jefferson’s belief that an embargo could be used to avoid war).
304. The Eleventh Amendment, overturning Chisholm, does not appear on the list of
frequent proposals probably because Congress passed it the very year after the offensive
Supreme Court decision.
305. See VILE, supra note 55, at 541-42 (listing, by year, the most frequent proposals
introduced in Congress).
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sufficient number of minor categories of amendment-need that, by contrast,
are also bill-amenable may be sufficient. Second, sufficient fodder for
promiscuous careerists may also exist among the categories of topics of
plausible normal legislation in the form of topics also amenable to
amendments. As noted above, that seems to hold for the Founding era.
While Kyvig speaks to this era, suggesting that the germ of
grandstanding was present in the latter part of the Founding era, his
evidence is weak. He observes:
The fairly even balance between Federalists and Jeffersonian
Republicans in Congress and state legislative majorities made it unlikely
that any meaningful amendment could be adopted. Yet to those people
who wanted to make the strongest possible declaration of public policy,
calling for alteration of the Constitution seemed an appropriate
gesture . . . .306

Kyvig’s evidence is that the eight amendments proposed by the
“Hartsfield Federalists” in 1812 to “restore national harmony” following
the declaration of war against Britain lacked a serious chance of success.307
But the Hartsfield Federalists’ own apprehension of their impoverished
chances of success is dubious, given the hubris with which this generation
had sought change at the Founding itself.308 And while Kyvig also notes
that the initial feeling at the Founding was that the Bill of Rights had taken
care of all the problems,309 the observation directly accounts only for the
low numbers of amendment proposals and does not necessarily establish
that those proposals had to have been for credit-seeking purposes only.
In sum, it seems likely that the great majority of both bills and proposed
amendments in the Founding era were proposed for policy purist ends and
not merely offered for personal credit, due to the difficulty of bill
introduction and a serious and optimistic attitude towards the amending
process. Though the credit claiming motivation may have begun
germinating at the outset, it appears to have been far too early in the history
of Congress for it to have blossomed. That is, it is likely that the era was
dominated by motivation independence.
Moreover, the nascent Zeitgeist of amendability likely was one of
optimistic reverence. In other words, a relatively high general sense of the
likelihood of success of amendments proposed along with a prudential
reverence towards the Constitutional and amendment process tempered the
306. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 119.
307. Id. at 120-21.
308. See id. at 8 (elaborating on the debates taking place around the time of the
Founding).
309. Id. at 85-88 (noting the perception that the Bill of Rights was an example of how the
amendability of the Constitution provided a method to define, empower and control
republican government).
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frequency of amendment proposing. The extreme cynicism towards
likelihood of success in the constitutional amendment process that
Jefferson later expressed310 had not taken hold (though it likely began to
seep in towards the end of the era). Rather, the Bill of Rights and two
additional proposed amendments cleared the congressional hurdle by 1794,
one of which had been ratified by the states in 1798. Perhaps the first germ
of cynicism about the process as a whole had been planted by the failure of
the states to ratify Congress’s 1789 proposal that would later become the
Twenty-seventh Amendment.311 But that failure likely would have been
attributed more to the peculiar substance of the proposed amendment rather
than the insurmountabilty of the congressional gate-keeping stage. Given
that relative optimism about the likelihood of success, then, the relatively
low level of proposed amendments offered, nine per Congress and 0.06 per
member per Congress (the lowest of all seven eras), suggests, under the
dynamic I posit in Table 2, a prudential reverence towards the exceptional
character of the amendment process.
B. Second Era, Antebellum, 1813 to 1858312
In contrast to the Founding, the next era, Antebellum (1813 to 1858), did
yield a substantial, significant correlation, albeit a negative one. Moreover,
the negative correlation was even stronger and more significant at lag one
(between bill totals in one Congress and proposed amendment totals in the
next Congress).313
While there are no obvious reasons, a hypothesis for the correlation
being negative is that (1) there was no force tending towards positive
correlation because promiscuous careerism, minimal at best in the
Founding era, still had not attained prominence in this Antebellum era; and
(2) the negative aspect of the correlation arose because the energy or
political capital required for bill introduction by members of Congress
made focusing on general legislation versus amendment proposing an
either/or activity.
First, the absence of a positive correlation is consistent with the character
310. See Letter to George Hay, supra note 2 (speculating that the increase in the number
of states in the Union will curtail future success of constitutional amendments).
311. See KYVIG, supra note 41, at 461 (discussing the Twenty-Seventh Amendment’s
original proposal in 1789 and its subsequent history and ratification).
312. Bills-Prop. Amends. Correlation:
-0.464 (moderate). Significance:
0.026
(significant). N: 23. Mean Bills Per Congress/Per Member: 985/3.56. Mean Proposed
Amendments/Per Member: 16/0.06. Amendment Passage Rate: Historical, 0.58; For Era,
0. Moreover, the lag one correlation is a strong -.591, with a significance level of 0.003.
313. Because the period encompassed twenty-three Congresses, the greater statistical
significance over the Founding era, which was much shorter, is not surprising. What holds
some surprise, however, are both that the correlation is negative and that it is an even higher
negative correlation of 0.591 at lag one.
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of the major categories of proposed amendments in this era. None of the
major categories of proposed amendments seem very susceptible to
contemporaneous non-constitutional legislation efforts. The Antebellum
era roughly corresponds to Ames’s second period which featured:
“General Alterations,” featuring proposals directed to the election,
competence, terms, and duties of the members of the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches, abolition, war powers, and executive powers.314
Ames finds very little individual-rights proposals because the Bill of
Rights, as Kyvig agrees, had allayed recent concerns.315
More importantly, evidence that the absence of a correlation corresponds
to a lack of dominant promiscuous careerism may be found in the series of
constitutionally significant historical events that frame this era: (1)
McCulloch v. Maryland,316 upholding congressional power to create U.S.
banks through a broad interpretation of Congress’s Necessary and Proper
Powers while finding a corresponding substantial limit on the states’ power
to interfere with such federal endeavors (through taxation, in that case); (2)
the Missouri Compromise of 1820317, establishing Maine as a free and
Missouri as a slave state and setting the 36’30” parallel as the demarcation
for the slave status of future states; (3) the emergence of the Monroe
Doctrine;318 (4) Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,319 holding
that the Bill of Rights did not apply to states; (5) Luther v. Borden,320
holding the resolution of a military struggle for control of Rhode Island to
be a political question outside the competence of judicial review; (6) the
Compromise of 1850,321 a series of five bills admitting California as free,
314. See HERMAN V. AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES DURING THE FIRST CENTURY OF ITS HISTORY 19-22 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1897) (describing the proposed amendments to the
Constitution between 1804 and 1860).
315. Though Ames emphasized that this era, more than the other three in the
Constitution’s first hundred years, was marked by conflict between broad constuctionists
and strict constuctionists in Constitutional interpretation. AMES, supra note 314, at 20, 22.
316. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
317. See 3 Stat. 545 (1820) (admitting Missouri into the Union as a slave state, admitting
Maine into the Union as a non-slave state, and prohibiting slavery in certain territories); see
also Robert J. Kaczorowski, Popular Constitutionalism Versus Justice in Plaincloths:
Reflections From History, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1415, 1425 n.93 (2005) (noting that the
Missouri Compromise was repealed by Congress and declared unconstitutional in Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)).
318. 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 12-24 (1823) (providing President Monroe’s annual address
to Congress which outlined the United State’s interest in the Western Hemisphere and
warned European nations to stop colonizing in the area). This policy later became known as
the Monroe Doctrine.
319. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
320. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
321. See W. Sherman Rogers, The Black Quest for Economic Liberty: Legal, Historical,
and Related Considerations, 48 HOW. L.J. 1, 33 (2004) (“The Compromise of 1850
provided that the United States would fulfill the following requests: admit California as a
free state; organize the rest of the territories without restrictions on slavery; outlaw the slave
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establishing the rest of the Mexican session as territories of Utah and New
Mexico without restrictions on slavery status, settling a border dispute
between Texas and New Mexico, abolishing slavery in the District of
Columbia, and adding teeth to the Fugitive Slave Act;322 (7) the KansasNebraska Act of 1854,323 allowing Kansas and Nebraska to each decide the
slavery question for itself; and (8) Dred Scott v. Sandford,324 declaring
blacks to be barred from national citizenship and finding the Missouri
Compromise to be unconstitutional. Most of these events provided a
sufficient base for at least plausible legislation in both normal and
constitutional spheres.
The second factor contributing to the negative correlation was the high
costs of individual legislation rising from the continuing difficulty and
confusion surrounding the bill introduction process. While senators had
achieved free introduction, the House was still in the latter half of Cooper
and Young’s Stage I (which ends in 1821),325 with little to no bill
introduction by members of Congress, and then in Stage II’s “Conflict and
Confusion over the Introduction of Business.”326 How the difficulty of
normal legislation related to the activity level for the comparatively
unencumbered joint resolution process for amendments, of course, is not
clear. I speculate that the marshalling of resources to bring general
legislation was so burdensome that the degree to which it was employed
produced a deficit in the general resources of motivation predicate to
initiate legislation in the constitutional arena.327
trade in the Capitol Washington, D.C. (but not slavery itself); and enact a tougher Fugitive
Slave Act.”).
322. See Kaczorowski, supra note 317, at 1426 (explaining that the Fugitive Slave Act of
1793 was enacted to enforce the constitutional right of slave-owners to recover their
runaway slaves). The Fugitive Slave Act was strengthened in 1850 after Congress received
pressure from southerners. The Fugitive Slave Acts were later repealed by Congress during
the Civil War. Id. at 1428.
323. See 10 Stat. 277 (1854) (organizing the territories of Nebraska and Kansas and
allowing territories west of the Missouri to make their own determination regarding the
legality of slavery).
324. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). This case is commonly referred to as the “Dred
Scott” case.
325. Cooper & Young, supra note 195, at 69.
326. Specifically, the Antebellum period encompasses the first two phases in Stage II—
Phase One (1821-1837)—and most of Phase Two (1837-1861). Id. at 71, 75. Cooper and
Young note that Stage I saw a slow transition from an exclusive committee of the whole
method of bill introduction to introduction by standing committees as well. Id. at 69-71.
They then label Phase One of Stage II as “Conflict and Confusion over the Introduction of
Business” because the committee referral process and committee system were not well
settled and confusion and discord reigned. Id. at 71-72. Phase Two, beginning in 1937,
offered hope for clarity, with the rule changes that made individual member’s introduction
of bills on leave a realistic option. Id. at 75-76. However, “by the late 1850s the conduct of
business in the House had become chaotic and a source of severe frustrations for members.”
Id. at 78.
327. A more-detailed study, separating Senate bill and amendment totals from House bill
and amendment totals, however, might prove otherwise.
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More surprising and mysterious than the negative correlation, though, is
that the negative correlation is stronger and more significant at lag one.
Why does there appear to be a stronger relationship between the number of
bills proposed in one Congress and the number of amendments proposed in
the next Congress?
This lagged relationship may provide a more specific understanding of
the dynamics around what I just hypothesized to be the cause of the
negative correlation. Bill activity preceding amendment activity suggests
that if there is a causal relationship between the two, causation runs from
bill proposing to amendment proposing, and not vice versa. It may be that
the one-congress delay is caused by a larger run up time or “gelling period”
for amendment proposing. That is, if bill proposing saps energy away from
amendment proposing to produce the negative correlation, the effect is
more strongly seen in the subsequent Congress. Another cause might be
reverence for the Constitution and amendment process.
Finally, regarding the Zeitgeist of amendability, if this era truly falls in
the bottom sector of Table 2, due to it truly being dominated by motivation
independence, as the correlation analysis seems to suggest, and if the
perceived likelihood of amendment success is lower in this era than in the
Founding era, then we might expect to see fewer amendment proposals
here. But we do not. Rather, the mean proposed amendments per member
remain the same as that in the Founding (0.6), and the mean proposed
amendments per Congress nearly double (from nine to sixteen).328 That
suggests a combination of two things: (1) at least the germ of promiscuous
careerism is present (which, though still not strong enough to manifest in
the correlation analysis, at least is more prominent than in the Founding)
and (2) on a broad aggregate level, the view of the likelihood of
amendment success is not quite as dim as anecdotal evidence suggests. To
the extent there remains an aggregate view that success is still reasonably
likely, then, by Table 2, a prudential view of the process tempering the
number of proposals does not dominate to the same extent present in the
Founding era. (On the other hand, the lagged relationship in the negative
correlation does suggest some reverence.) In short, compared to the
Founding era, the Zeitgeist in the Antebellum seems to have become
somewhat less optimistic and somewhat less reverent.
A concluding caveat on causation: the analysis for this era must
recognize that the closer we moved towards the Civil War, the deeper the
sectional divisions grew and the more pervasive sectional differences
became in the dominant political issues of the day.329 Under those
328. Tbl.5, supra Part IV.B.2.
329. See Lincoln L. Davies, Lessons For an Endangered Movement: What a Historical
Juxtaposition of the Legal Response to Civil Rights and Environmentalism Has to Teach
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circumstances, especially with the carefully maintained near fifty-fifty split
in the Senate between slave and free states, one would assume the real
likelihood of success on any amendment proposal to be increasingly low.
That is, in fact, reflected in the near vanishing of amendment proposing
activity in the last decade before the Civil War.330 The 32nd to 35th
Congresses, 1851-1858, introduced just twelve amendment proposals. That
contrasts starkly with the 36th Congress, which is the beginning of the next
era, and had 191 proposed constitutional amendments.
C. Third Era, Civil War–Early Reconstruction, 1859 to 1868331
With this era’s short duration and disrupted Congress, its lack of
correlation may be sui generis. It is either so unique a political era that
amendability patterns are suspended or so short an era that the small
sample size cannot yield a meaningful statistic.
In contrast to the ambiguity of this era within the history of
amendability, one definite and enduring feature of congressional activity
emerges at this time: the bill-proposing process is finally clarified at the
beginning of Cooper and Young’s Phase Three in 1861.332 The newly
clarified bill-proposing process inaugurates a steady rise in bill-proposing
all the way through the extreme jump in activity at the end of the
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries that defines the
Populist–Progressive era.
For the amendment-proposing ledger, there is a sharp increase in
amendment proposing activity just before, during, and just after the Civil
War. Ames recognizes that, in this historical era marked by the last days of
slavery, extreme North-South conflict and concern with state sovereignty,
federalism, and nationhood, the civil war, emancipation, and the beginning
of reconstruction, the once-ignored legal status of individuals became
extremely important.333 Accordingly, amendment proposals during this era
were dominated by issues of slavery, the executive, apportionment,
suffrage, and equal rights—culminating with the first two Civil War
amendments (Thirteenth Amendment, proposed 1864, ratified 1865;
Environmentalists Today, 31 ENVTL. L. 229, 251 (2001) (noting the increase in tension and
division among the country as the Union moved closer to the Civil War).
330. See KYVIG, supra note 41, at 134 (“Amendment declined during the antebellum era
because most other problems could be dealt with by the lesser means of ordinary legislation,
executive determination, or judicial review; the truly monumental constitutional problem of
the age could be settled only by revolution.”).
331. Bills-Prop. Amends. Correlation: 0.191 (effectively zero). Significance: 0.759
(not significant). N: 5. Mean Bills Per Congress/Per Member: 2216/8. Mean Proposed
Amendments/Per Member: 108/0.42. Amendment Passage Rate: Historical, 0.42; For Era,
0.8.
332. Cooper & Young, supra note 195, at 83-91.
333. See AMES, supra note 314, at 23 (noting that after 1864 Congress’s focus shifted
from war measures to the amendability of the Constitution).
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Fourteenth Amendment, proposed 1866, ratified 1868).334
Given the volatility of Congress as a functioning institution at this time
and the short duration marked by this episode in the numerical results, only
the roughest speculations about amendability can be made. On one hand,
the falling of procedural impediments to grandstanding and the absence of
a correlation between the numbers of proposed amendments and nonconstitutional bills might lead to the conclusion that motivation
independence continued to dominate in this era over any tendency towards
promiscuous careerism. On the other hand, the lack of correlation may
simply be a result of the small sample size.
The exceptionalism of the era also obscures the speculations on the
Zeitgeist of amendability. For instance, Kyvig notes that at least one
historian has asserted that the 191 proposal increase in the 36th Congress
represented grandstanding rather than serious attempts to amend,335 and has
concluded that there was a near impossibility of amendment during that
timeframe.336 Kyvig, on the other hand, disputes that assessment by
pointing to the fact that, during the Articles of Confederation era, all but
one state had allowed amendments to the Constitution in order to rescue the
Union.337 The central impediment to understanding the era lies in
distinguishing the North-South divide from the general amendability
Zeitgeist. But it makes sense to do so since, as set forth below, with the
close of Reconstruction, Congress as an institution reverts at least partially
to the pre-war evolutionary path of the character of the legislative process.
D. Fourth Era, Latter Reconstruction–Gilded Age, 1869 to 1886338
The numbers for the Latter Reconstruction–Gilded Age era show a
substantial shift from those of the Civil War–Early Reconstruction and
prior eras. A very strong and statistically significant 0.826 correlation
establishes the relationship between bill and amendment proposing that,
according to my working model, shows that promiscuous careerism
predominated. In sum, the dissipation of the conflict of the era that
preceded the Civil War and streamlining of procedures combined to usher
334. See VILE, supra note 55, at 544-45 (providing a list of the most frequent proposals
introduced in Congress).
335. See KYVIG, supra note 41, at 152 (presenting the argument that supporters of
constitutional reform “were simply going through motions they knew to be hopeless”).
336. Id.; see also DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 547 (1978) (explaining the many hurdles that would have to
be overcome in order for a constitutional amendment to take hold).
337. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 152. Thus, even if the success of a constitutional
amendment would require near unanimity among the states, that level of agreement had
been reached in the past and could potentially be reached again.
338. Bills-Prop. Amends. Correlation: 0.826 (high). Significance: 0.006 (significant).
N: 9. Mean Bills Per Congress/Per Member: 8875/23.7. Mean Proposed Amendments/Per
Member: 41/0.11. Amendment Passage Rate: Historical, 0.4; For Era, 0.
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in an era where congresspersons were free to engage in credit seeking
through both bill introduction and amendment proposing. The fact that
levels of activity in each of these categories rose and fell in such substantial
accord strongly suggests that credit-seeking, rather than conviction, now
predominated in the proposing of amendments.
Promiscuous careerism’s first significant appearance in this Latter
Reconstruction–Gilded Age era is consistent with two factors external to
the numerical analysis. First, the impediments to bill introduction are
finally cleared339 and congressional activity has moved sufficiently beyond
the immediate institutional anomaly of the Civil War period. Second, the
primary categories of proposed amendments in the Latter Reconstruction–
Gilded Age era appear to exhibit a high degree of topic overlap, making
ideal conditions in which promiscuous careerism may operate. Ames
characterized roughly this same time span, 1870-1889, as comprising two
classes (1) form of government and (2) governmental powers.340 More
specific is Vile’s list of the most frequent categories of amendment
proposals during this time, which included: (1) suffrage; (2) executive
eligibility, terms, choice; (3) legislative compensation; (4) direct election of
senators; (5) war claims prohibition; (6) Prohibition; and (7) the item
veto.341 Of paramount significance is that most of the topics easily could
have been subject to normal legislation as well. All but two of the general
areas embraced by those topics (presidential and senatorial elections)
invoked constituent interests or policy goals also amenable to bills.
Unlike the prior three periods, the numerical results for this era do not
require clarification from the historical context.
The reasonable
assumptions underlying my working model do not lead to any likely causes
for a substantial correlation other than promiscuous careerism. That is not
to say, however, that in eras that lack the correlation, such as the prior
three, the converse is proven. I do not presume the absence of promiscuous
careerism from the absence of the correlation. While such is one
possibility, another hypothesis was that promiscuous careerism dominated
but its representation in the numerical analysis was dampened by other
factors. That was a primary issue for which I examined contextual factors
339. This era spans the majority of Cooper and Young’s Phase Three of bill introduction
with its improved clarity, and the first half of Phase Four, where member bills dominated.
Cooper & Young, supra note 195, at 75, 83. Rule changes in 1867 and 1872 led to
improved clarity and member bills on leave increased substantially. Id. at 83-86. In fact
“[b]y the late 1870s the granting of leave had long been automatic and the requirement for
notice generally ignored.” Id. at 87. Then with Phase Four, beginning in 1881, “the
dominance of member bills was further consolidated” and “the modern procedure for bill
introduction” emerged. Id. at 91.
340. AMES, supra note 45, at 24.
341. See VILE, supra note 55, at 545-46 (listing the most frequently proposed
constitutional amendments).
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in the prior three eras.
In the present era, where there is the correlation, I test the promiscuous
careerism conclusion against the contextual data only for any reason to
disbelieve it. Here, there is none. The prominent events in constitutional
history included:
Johnson’s impeachment in 1868,342 the end of
Reconstruction in 1877,343 the emergence of the National American
Woman Suffrage Association,344 the emergence of the national Prohibition
party,345 the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) and Civil Rights Cases (1883),346
and the emergence of the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union.347 Those
events, independently or together, are not sufficiently skewed towards only
constitutional or legislative action to preclude promiscuous careerism from
dominating the flow of legislative activity.
Also, an expansion of the perceived scope of normal legislation paved
the way for unrestricted promiscuous careerism to manifest through
correlation in bill and proposed amendment totals. As Kyvig notes, the
Civil War initiated a change in prevailing constitutionalism.348 Instead of
whether the Constitution specifically authorized an action, the question
became whether its implied powers were sufficiently broad to condone it.349
342. See generally CHESTER G. HEARN, THE IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON (2000)
(providing background information on the circumstances surrounding Johnson’s
impeachment).
343. ROBERT M. GOLDMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND BLACK SUFFRAGE: LOSING THE VOTE
IN REESE AND CRUIKSHANK 117 (2001).
344. See JANE HANNAM, MITZI AUCHTERLONIE & KATHERINE HOLDEN, INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE 200-01 (2000) (explaining the formation of the
Association in 1890 via the merger of the National Woman Suffrage Association and the
American Woman Suffrage Association).
345. See ERNEST H. CHERRINGTON, THE EVOLUTION OF PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: A CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF THE LIQUOR PROBLEM AND THE
TEMPERANCE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE EARLIEST SETTLEMENTS TO THE
CONSUMMATION OF NATIONAL PROHIBITION 167 (Patterson Smith 1969) (1920) (noting that
the national Prohibition party “pioneered the path of political activity for the Prohibition
movement” and laid the foundation for the eventual passage of the Prohibition
Amendment). But see DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 46 (2000)
(arguing that the Anti-Saloon League was a more effective advocate than the Prohibition
Party).
346. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not grant Congress the ability to prohibit racial discrimination by private
entities, only state and local actors); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (interpreting
the Fourteenth Amendment narrowly so that its provisions could not be held to extend to
further limit states’ rights to legislate its citizens beyond the prohibition of slavery).
347. See RUTH BORDIN, WOMAN AND TEMPERANCE: THE QUEST FOR POWER AND
LIBERTY, 1873-1900 10-11 (1981) (discussing several factors contributing to the
development of the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union including: the emergence of an
upper and middle-class in America, the progress of industrialization leading to middle-class
women devoting themselves to homemaking as a full-time endeavor, the fall of the birthrate
in the nineteenth century leading to the increase of leisure time for women to devote to
activism, the influx of immigrants to provide childcare and other domestic services, and the
increase in educated women).
348. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 154.
349. Id.
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In addition to being continuing grist for the proposed amendment mill,
many government legislative objects previously thought to be beyond
constitutional powers and thus requiring amendment could now be seen as
potentially subject to general legislation within the broadly construed
implied powers granted by the Constitution.350 At the same time, Kyvig
muses that while Antebellum amendment proposing mostly focused on
limiting the federal government, the Civil War initiated a shift toward
amendment proposals that sought to broaden federal power.351
Turning to the Zeitgeist of amendability, considering all the relevant
indicators together confirms a lack of reverence for the process (axiomatic
to an era truly dominated by promiscuous careerism) and pessimism
towards the likelihood of success of proposed amendments. If this era truly
ushers in strong dominance of promiscuous careerism in Congress, then a
perceived low likelihood of success would not have seriously deterred
amendment proposing. Indeed, compared to the Antebellum period, the
mean proposed amendments per Congress for this era increased by 256%
and the rate per member nearly doubled.352 That, despite Ames’s
observation that the proposal faced a “prospect of almost certain failure”353
(which Kyvig agrees the politicians believed though he disputes whether it
was true). The amendment introduction process, Ames notes, merely
reflected “waves of popular feeling” in the same manner as general
legislation.354
E. Fifth Era, Populist–Progressive, 1887 to 1916355
The prior era, Latter Reconstruction-Gilded Age, appears to have seen
the emergence of promiscuous careerism as a major factor driving
amendment proposing rates. For the Populist-Progressive era, however, a
substantial shift in the numerical analysis suggests a suspension of the
prominence of promiscuous careerism as a motivation underlying
amendment proposing.
Here, the numbers reflect an insignificant
(effectively zero) 0.345 direct correlation and a significant negative
correlation of 0.638 at lag one.
The analysis of whether promiscuous careerism has gone into remission
must begin with the huge spike in the Populist-Progressive era of the

350. Id. at 154-55.
351. Id.
352. Tbl. 5, supra Part IV.B.2.
353. AMES, supra note 45, at 25.
354. Id.
355. Bills-Prop. Amends. Correlation: 0.345 (effectively zero). Significance: 0.207 (not
significant). N: 15. Mean Bills Per Congress/Per Member: 25,109/53.42. Mean Proposed
Amendments/Per Member: 63/0.13. Amendment Passage Rate: Historical, 0.32; For Era,
0.13. Moreover, the lag 1 correlation is a high -0.638, with a significance level of 0.001.
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numbers of bills being proposed: 25,109 per Congress (53.42 per member)
on average. Even factoring in the addition of new members of Congress,
that is more than two and a half times the rate of the prior era, Latter
Reconstruction-Gilded Age, and twenty-times the rate in the Antebellum
Era.
That raises the question of why, with such a dramatic increase in the
volume of legislative activity, the strong and significant correlation
demonstrated in the Latter Reconstruction-Gilded Age Era disappears.
Moreover, why is it instead replaced by a significant negative correlation at
lag one?
The potential cause I suggested for the negative correlation at lag one in
the Antebellum era seems explicative of only half the story in this era.
While there may also be a “gelling time” for amendments to explain the
lag,356 the explanation for the negative aspect of the correlation in the
Antebellum era, time, energy, or political capital trade off primarily due to
the procedural difficulties faced by individual legislators, does not hold in
this new era of unfettered bill introduction.357
But while there may no longer have been impediments to introducing
legislation in general, it may be that the focus of legislative energy was
again an either/or proposition in the Populist–Progressive era. The nature
of the amendment proposing interest at this time supports that hypothesis.
Of the six main categories of significant proposals Vile358 lists—direct
election of senators, income tax, presidential term length and limits,
uniform laws for marriage and divorce, women’s suffrage, and dates of
congressional sessions—four are susceptible only to constitutional, rather
than general, legislation.359 It suggests that motivation independence
dominated over promiscuous careerism.
In addition to the subject matter of the amendment proposals themselves,
the major historical events of this period suggests a cause for independent
attention to constitutional legislation: the Centennial of Constitution; the
Populist and Progressive movements; the Pollock decision in 1895360
outlawing income tax; the Spanish-American War; the proposal of what
would become the Sixteenth Amendment in 1909 and its ratification in

356. But even if that explanation were so, it only raises the question of why that delay
only appears in the Antebellum and Populist-Progressive eras.
357. There also is a small possibility that this phenomenon is a fluke: the significance
level of our negative correlation (0.011) is not nearly as good as in the prior error (0.006), so
we cannot be as confident that -0.638 gestures at a true relationship. At minimum, it is clear
that there has been shift away from the very strong positive correlation we saw in that Latter
Reconstruction era.
358. Now in the second century of the Constitution, we are beyond Ames.
359. VILE, supra, note 55, at 546-49.
360. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
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1913,361 reinstating the income tax; and the Seventeenth Amendment,362
bringing direct election of senators, also ratified in 1913.363
Turning to the amendability Zeitgeist, those factors arguing for seriousmindedness of congressional amendment proposing must be reconciled
with Kyvig’s assessment that the era exhibited an unprecedented pessimism
in popular perception of amendability. Kyvig cites the turn of the century
as the high-point in amendability pessimism, noting one scholar’s assertion
that “[a] constitutional amendment is so remote a possibility as scarcely to
be worth consideration.”364 This is not a surprising sentiment given that a
constitutional amendment had not occurred by the normal process since
1804. That feeling continued into the second decade of the twentieth
century when, in 1912, the Progressive Party’s platform called for an
Article V change to approve amendments by a popular majority of the
states.365 Not until 1913, with amendments authorizing the income tax
(Sixteenth)366 and direct election of senators (Seventeenth),367 did
perceptions begin to change. In fact, the Sixteenth Amendment was
proposed by wealthy, conservative Senate Republican leader Nelson
Aldrich (as part of a strategy for achieving other legislative ends) because
he was so sure that it could not be ratified.368
My group-psychological model of Table 2369 dictates that if (1) I am
correct to conclude the era is dominated by motivation independence with
regard to the relationship between the intensities of normal and
constitutional legislation and (2) Kyvig is correct that the perception of
likelihood of success reached its lowest, then there should be a relatively
low number of amendments proposed at this time. In fact, the data bear
that conclusion out. Despite the three-fold spike in bill introduction that
marks the era, amendment proposing increases only by eighteen percent per
member, allowing the proposed amendments-to-bills ratio to reach its
lowest by far in the history of the U.S. Congress.370
While my Table 2 model does not completely determine the Zeitgeist
361. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
362. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
363. Id.
364. Arthur W. Machen, Jr., The Elasticity of the Constitution, 14 HARV. L. REV. 200,
209 (1900).
365. See KYVIG, supra note 41, at 193 (pointing out that the Progressive Party platform
offered a more simplistic solution to Article V reform than those proposed by various
congressmen).
366. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
367. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
368. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 202.
369. Tbl.2, supra Section III.B.
370. See tbl. 5, supra Section IV.B.2. The Bills/PA Ratio was 398.6. The second closest
in size, Suffrage–Prohibition, era is 268.4. Those numbers are striking compared to those
for the four eras that preceded this one, 38.2, 61.6, 20.5, and 216.5, respectively, and for the
Modern era 67.4.
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when motivation independence dominates and likelihood of success is low,
Kyvig offers external evidence that enhances the picture. He argues that, at
least during times spanning the first half of my Populist–Progressive era,
there was a substantial constitutional reverence stemming both from the
feeling that the Civil War Amendments had fixed what was wrong and
from accolades for the Constitution associated with its centennial.371 It is
consistent with that assessment that proposed amendments were indeed rare
when compared with bill proposing rates, which outnumbered proposed
amendments nearly four hundred to one; a ratio radically higher than in all
other eras.372 Also consistent with that is the one-Congress lag for the
negative correlation.
In sum, it seems this era was marked by an intensely pessimistic view of
success but reverential view of the process, independence, and seriousmindedness of legislative action.
F. Sixth Era, Suffrage–Prohibition, 1917 to 1930373
In the preceding Populist–Progressive era, a slip in the strength of a
positive correlation (from its predecessor era) suggested an increase in
motivation independence and, by extension, a subsiding of promiscuous
careerism;374 the Suffrage-Prohibition Era, from 1917 to 1930, seems to
mark an even stronger shift in that direction.
The Suffrage-Prohibition era exhibits stronger, less ambiguous
quantitative indicators: a very strong negative correlation of 0.850 appears
and, unlike the Populist-Progressive era, there is no corresponding
significant lagged correlation. One conclusion to draw from the diminution
of the lag factor is that the amendment-proposing “gelling time” I posited
for the lagged correlations in the Antebellum and Populist-Progressive eras
has diminished. And this may have been caused by a diminution in
reverence for the amendment process.375
Moreover, the negative correlation is nearly twice as strong as the
negative correlation that characterized the Antebellum era and 33.2 %
stronger than the negative correlation of 0.638 at lag one of the PopulistProgressive era. Why so strong a negative correlation? Perhaps the tradeoff between general legislative and amendment proposing energy of the last
371. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 188.
372. Table 5, supra Part IV.B.2.
373. Bills-Prop. Amends. Correlation: -0.850 (high). Significance: 0.015 (significant).
N:
7. Mean Bills Per Congress/Per Member:
22,009/41.45. Mean Proposed
Amendments/Per Member: 82/0.15. Amendment Passage Rate: Historical, 0.34; For Era,
0.71.
374. Without taking into account the lag factor.
375. Cf. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 214-15 (relating the post-Antebellum era’s increase in
amendment activity to the fact that the issues were no longer critical to the survival of the
nation, but those of modernizing the government to suit the progressive era).
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era continues to this era, but is even more prominent. And maybe it is
stronger due to an increased emphasis on amendment proposing—an
emphasis that plays out in the increased passage rate of seventy-one percent
for this era.
That trade-off explanation is consistent with a cursory glance at the
significant categories of amendment proposals for this time: women’s
suffrage; treaty ratification; presidential disability; amendment ratification
procedure (associated with Prohibition’s passage and repeal); child labor;
income tax; and the dates and terms of the office of presidents and
members of Congress.376
Almost all are exclusively the province of constitutional, rather than
normal, legislation.
That focus conforms to the maintenance of
amendment-proposing levels while normal legislative activity dropped
significantly from that of the prior era.
The above makes clear the one characteristic of the congressional
dynamic relevant both to the broader path of the general–constitutional
legislation relationship across congressional history and to speculations on
the Amendability Zeitgeist: motivation independence may dominate a
congressional era even after the historical emergence of promiscuous
careerisms as a pervasive motivating force and after the freeing of members
to act on their motivations without procedural restraints.
Finally, additional evidence of congressional attitude during this era
suggests a new development in the congressional Zeigeist of amendability.
Kyvig notes a resuscitation of the perception of likelihood of amendment
success ignited by the ratifications of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Amendments and a corresponding spike in amendment proposing.377
Indeed, he observes that 1920 “marked a high point of progressive
enthusiasm about achieving fundamental change through explicit and
authentic acts of constitutional amendment.”378
Now, the masspsychological model of Table 2 suggests that a higher perceived likelihood
of success in a motivation-independent era should produce higher levels of
amendment proposing—unless the motivation for more amendment
proposals is dampened by a prudential views of the process. Here, the
increase in proposals suggests the absence of any dampening affect from a
prudential view of the process. That conclusion may be related to the
376. See generally KYVIG, supra note 41, at 62, 324-26, 367, 460-61, 469-70, 548-51
(correlating the proposed amendment categories to the major historical events of the era,
including World War I (suffrage, treaty ratification, income tax), President Wilson’s stroke
(presidential disability, date and term limits), Wilson’s inability to get the Senate to ratify
the Treaty of Versailles (treaty ratification), Prohibition (amendment ratification, child
labor), Suffrage, and Congress’s proposal of a child labor amendment in 1924).
377. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 214.
378. Id. at 239.
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change in the nature of the causation from the prior era to this one, namely
the demise of the one-Congress lag, or “gelling period,” for the energy
trade-off in bill proposing to affect amendment proposing as a negative
correlation. To repeat, the “gelling period” may have arisen in two prior
eras (Antebellum and Populist-Progressive) from a more reverential view
of the amendment process in those eras, which translated to the longer runup time to propose an amendment. It seems that, in turn, that run-up time
disappears in the Suffrage–Prohibition era as reverence for the process
diminishes as well.
In sum, while Congress remained generally serious-minded about
proposing amendments independent of general legislation, and optimism
about the likelihood of success of those amendments peaked, reverence for
the amendment process diminished as compared to the prior PopulistProgressive Era.
A final caveat to this era: the amendment exuberance that marked the
era diminished as we approached the Modern Era in 1931: “In retrospect,
it would become evident that 1920 did not represent an incoming flood tide
of constitutional change but the crest of a wave soon to dissipate.”379 That
is, Kyvig notes, enthusiasm for further amendment soured as unhappiness
with national prohibition grew.380
G. The Modern Era, 1931 to Present (2004)381
Two possible explanations come to mind for the mimicry between
proposed amendment and bill totals in the Modern Era, which begins
around 1931 with a strong, significant 0.755 correlation.
First, the conclusion dictated by my working model suggests that the
correlation indicates the dominance of promiscuous careerism. That is, the
anomalies characterizing the two prior eras—serious-mindedness towards
legislation in general; a heightened view of the likelihood of success of
proposed amendments; a high, though diminishing, prudential reverence
for the amendment process—ceased in the Modern Era. Therefore, the
promiscuous careerism pattern first established in the Latter Reconstruction
Era could reassert itself.
The second is that the sustained correlation is not a sign that careerism is
significantly more robust, but only that normal legislative activity has
moved into spheres previously considered the province of only

379. Id.
380. Id. at 261.
381. Bills-Prop. Amends. Correlation: 0.755 (high). Significance: 0.000 (significant).
N: 33. Mean Bills Per Congress/Per Member: 15,693/29.42. Mean Proposed
Amendments/Per Member: 233/0.44. Amendment Passage Rate: Historical, 0.32; For Era,
0.21.
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constitutional legislation. That is, more policy topics are legitimately,
independently amenable to separate legislation in the constitutional and
non-constitutional spheres. That explanation would allow for amendment
totals’ mimicry of bill tallies to have arisen from serious policy pursuits
rather than shallow reelectioneering. A potential cause for that dynamic
would be the Supreme Court’s expanded interpretation of the Commerce
Clause power in 1937, just after the beginning of the modern era.382
That alternative hypothesis does not, however, seem supported in a
cursory review of the substantive history of amendment proposing in the
Modern Era. The comparative length of the Modern Era demands more
than a quick consideration of a handful of categories that comprise the
major subjects of proposed amendments. In this seventy-four year span,
the major categories vary from sub-period to sub-period and generally
repeat all the significant categories of proposals from the prior eras (except
those where an amendment has already been passed). But I can extract a
general sense of the most prominent, repeating amendment subjects from
Vile’s analysis, as follows:
TABLE 6:
Prominent Modern Era Legislation (through 2002)

382. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (determining if
Congress has the power to regulate commercial activity by looking at the activity’s effect
upon commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (furthering the development
of a broad definition of interstate commerce by holding that Congress can regulate labor
conditions because they effect the overall competitiveness of businesses in different states);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (broadening congressional power to regulate
commerce even more by deciding that Congress can regulate small, local activities if the
aggregate effect will affect interstate commerce). The post-United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995) partial retrenchment in Commerc Clause doctrine is both too limited and too
recent to affect this part of the analysis.
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Years
Prominent

21 (1974–02)

Also
Amendable to
General
Legislation?
No

n/a

Equal Rights
Amendment
Electoral College

17 (1945–82)

Yes

Yes

17 (1949–02)

No

n/a

Abortion
(“Right to Life”)
Prayer in Schools
or Public Places
Presidential Term
Limits
Congress Tenure
and Term Limits
Taxation

10 (1973–87)

No

n/a

10 (1962–84)

No

n/a

6 (1940–47)

No

n/a

6 (1976–97)

No

n/a

7 (1933–98)

Yes

No

School Busing

4 (1970–73)

Yes

Yes

Treaties

6 (1945–57)

Yes

No

ANALYSIS:
Amenable to general legislation
—Due to expanded Commerce Clause
Not amenable to general legislation

34
21
70

[Vol. 55:145

If So, Does Legislative
Power Come from Expanded
Commerce Clause?

31.7%
20.1%
67.3%

Table 6383 suggests that the Supreme Court’s expansion of the subjects
that fall under Congress’s competence, through interpretative expansion of
the Commerce Clause power, may explain only a portion of the correlation.
(And, of course, even that Commerce Clause-enabled mimicry may contain
some careerism.) Hence, the strong 0.755 correlation likely shows the
dominance of promiscuous careerism.
That conclusion is consistent with other external conditions, such as the
major historical events of the Modern Era: the Great Depression, the New
Deal and the rise of the administrative state, World War II, the Civil Rights
Movement, the Cold War, and all the other significant events of the past
seventy-four years. Modern Congresses cannot be said simply to have
lacked grist for the mills of serious and independent constitutional
legislative activity.
Those observations challenge Kyvig’s critique of FDR’s judgment not to
pursue constitutionally enshrining the New Deal. Kyvig first notes that
383. VILE, supra note 55, app. at 550-58. “Appendix D: Most Popular Amending
Proposals by Year & Key Events and Publications Related to Constitutional Amendments”
provides the source for the “Years Prominent” column.
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while the first third of the twentieth century taught that the amendment
process could be highly unpredictable and volatile, six amendments were
added and another endorsed by Congress.384 The New Deal then presented
a constitutional crisis similar to the Founding and Civil War.
Kyvig argues that with Roosevelt’s huge 1936 landslide, including
majorities of three hundred thirty-one to one hundred-two in the House and
seventy-six to twenty in the Senate, he had the power to formally enshrine
in the written Constitution: “the notion of collective responsibility for the
social welfare of the individual [that had been raised to] a higher level than
ever before reached in the United States . . . [and constituted] as close to a
consensus as the American electorate achieved in the twentieth century.”385
Kyvig laments that the changes brought by the transformative (to use
Ackerman’s term)386 opinions of the Supreme Court altered the nature of
American government at the time, but “lacked the clarity and specificity of
constitutional amendments.”387 Hence, “[d]ebate over the nature of federal
responsibility for domestic social conditions would continue, almost
unabated, and serve as a focus of political contention over the subsequent
half century.”388
Kyvig’s conclusion, that Roosevelt was wrong to perceive “the
amending process as impossibly difficult and amendment itself as
unnecessary,”389 may itself be undercut by the change in congressional
gatekeeping that my numerical data suggest may have been manifest as
early as 1931. Perhaps, instead, FDR was right about the chances for
approval of the type of amendments he needed. Consistent with that view,
in the twenty years following Roosevelt’s 1937 Court Packing Plan,
amendment proposals shifted to restrictions on federal power and the
presidency, though they neither overturned nor confirmed the New Deal.390
“Instead, the unsettled nature of American policies regarding government
revealed itself.”391 And that certainly presented a broad platform from
which New Deal opponents and supporters, and their political successors,
could grandstand.
384. See KYVIG, supra note 41, at 288 (noting that after the flurry of activity both
conservatives and reformers regarded the amendment process with suspicion).
385. Id. at 313-14.
386. See id. at 476 (referencing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
(1991)).
387. Id. at 289.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 290.
390. See VILE, supra note 55, at 122 (affirming the view that the Court Packing Plan
caused significant constitutional ripples). The proposed amendments in the decade
following the Court Packing Plan included proposed presidential term limits, changes to the
method of treaty ratification, judiciary reform, and alterations to the means of amending the
Constitution. Id. app. at 550-51.
391. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 316.
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That the amendability ennui which seems emergent in the New Deal era
was not transformed by the 1960s four amendment ratifications is likely
because they fell into familiar patterns. Three dealt with suffrage and to
varying degrees responded to Supreme Court decisions in Brown v. Board
of Education392 and voting rights cases: the Twenty-Third Amendment
(presidential electors for D.C.); the Twenty-Fourth Amendment (abolishing
poll taxes); and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment (right to vote for eighteen
year olds). The fourth, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,393 dealt with the
highly topical concern of presidential succession in the wake of Kennedy’s
assassination.
Moreover, unlike the possible effect of the Sixteenth Amendment on the
dynamic of the Prohibition–Suffrage Era, congressional expectations on the
level of support for ratification were probably unaltered by the rapid
ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in the 1960s.394 The scope
and effect of that amendment were narrow and it was soon followed by the
failure to ratify the ERA in the 1970s.395 With the ERA, Kyvig concludes
that the “liberal view lingered longer in Congress than in state legislatures,”
which harbored relatively conservative views on gender, as well as race
issues (explaining also the defeat of Congress’s proposal for D.C.
congressional representation).396
Finally, since the conservative ascendancy of the 1980s, amendments
were frequently proposed; a balanced budget amendment was the most
widely discussed reform of the 1980s and early 1990s.397 Kyvig notes that
political conditions mirrored those of the end of the nineteenth century in
that the contending parties were closely balanced but that, “[u]nlike a
century earlier, however, when the view prevailed that the Constitution
neared perfection, toward the end of the twentieth century discontent
festered and serious reform schemes proliferated.”398
392. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
393. See Dellinger, Legitimacy, supra note 118 (suggesting that these four amendments
were adopted not because the amendment process is simple, but because they were
uncontroversial measures which had already been more or less enacted, be it through
legislation or Supreme Court decisions).
394. But see KYVIG, supra note 41, at 409 (discussing expectations for an easy
ratification of the ERA). Kyvig explains that congressional leaders’ experiences with the
easy ratification process of the Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth amendments accustomed
them to think of the congressional approval process as difficult, but that once that hurdle had
been overcome, the states would easily fall in line. Id.
395. See id. at 409-25 (outlining the bitter battles waged over the ratification of the ERA,
finally culminating in its defeat).
396. Id. at 425.
397. VILE, supra note 55, app. at 555-56. According to Vile, from 1980 to 1994, a
balanced budget amendment was proposed eight times. Other popular amendments during
the conservative ascendancy were amendments on right to life and congressional term
limits. Id.
398. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 426.
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In sum, this analysis of the Modern Era suggests that the relationship
between the levels of congressional bill and amendment proposing activity
over this sustained and uninterrupted period signals that promiscuous
careerism has become cemented as the major determinant of amendment
proposing.399 As Kyvig observes, “Article V requirements [have] made it
quite likely that no amendment of any sort could be adopted in a
contentious political climate of balanced power.”400 And though he does
not address the issue systematically throughout the narrative, Kyvig seems
to agree with the entrenchment of grandstanding in the Modern Era. That
is, at least since the 1980s, “amendments, designed as much to articulate a
position as to achieve adoption, [have] flourish[ed]” and “striking a
constitutional posture [has] bec[o]me a popular means of dealing with
besetting problems of government.”401
The Zeitgeist analysis here is informed by the observation with which I
began this Article, that we all already have a general sense of the character
of contemporary amendability, as contemporary American citizens in
general and as students of the American legal and political systems in
particular. Drawing on this shared knowledge, I simply claim that the
current perceived likelihood of success of proposed amendments in
Congress is relatively low and that there is no sweeping prudential
reverence for the amendment process pervading Congress. If that first
observation is, in fact, correct, then as per my Table 2 model, we truly are
in an era dominated by promiscuous careerism. For if not, then we would
see a relatively low number of proposed amendments per Congress rather
then the historically-high rate of 233 mean proposed amendments per
Congress and 0.44 per member that have characterized the modern era.
VI. TENTATIVE INFERENCES FROM THE PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS:
DECLINE OF MOTIVATION INDEPENDENCE THROUGH THE SEVEN ERAS
The following table summarizes the findings and inferences of the
preceding part, from which some additional speculations can be made.

399. If so, we may next ask whether the loss of independence in amendment proposing
activity is a sign of rational acceptance of or psychological resignation to the general
unamendability of the Constitution in modern times.
400. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 425.
401. Id.
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TABLE 7:
Summary of Analysis and Inferences
Era

Correlation/
Significance

Special
Conditions

Tentative Conclusions

Founding
(1791-1812)

Effectively
Zero402

Bill
introduction
difficulty.

Serious proposals, optimism about
amendment success, and prudential
reverence for the process.

Antebellum
(1813-1858)

-0.464/0.026

Bill
introduction
difficulty.

at lag 1

-0.591/0.003

Negative correlation due to trade-off
from difficulty; lagged due to gelling
time, cause by reverence. But both
reverence and optimism are
somewhat diminished.

Civil WarEarly Recon.

Effectively
Zero403

Civil War.

Sui generis due to Civil War. But
doesn’t destroy existing patterns of
development in dynamics of
congressional legislation.

Strongest
Positive

Introduction
difficulty
gone.

Grandstanding takes hold.
Pessimism towards success and low
reverence (until the centennial
enthusiasm takes effect).

Legislative
explosion.

Negative trade-off despite no
introduction difficulty; lagged
relationship corresponds to increased
reverence, though there is extreme
pessimism about amendment success.

(1859-1868)
Latter
Recon.–
Gilded Age
(1869-1886)
Populist-Progressive

0.826/0.006
0.345/0.207

(1887-1916)
at lag 1

-0.638/0.011

Suffrage–
Prohibition

Very Strong
Neg.
0.850/0.015

Recent and
contemporane
ous
amendment
success.

Gelling time disappears, energy
trade-off stronger; increased focus on
amendments. Peak optimism, but
reverence diminishes.

Strong Positive
0.755/0.000

Expansion of
Commerce
Clause power.

Credit seeking dominates, though
some correlation may be due to
expansion of scope of legislation.
Zeitgeist is pessimistic irreverence.

(1917-1930)

Modern
(1931-2004)

In its first half century, Congress appears to have viewed the amendment
402. -0.087/0.799.
403. 0.191/0.759.
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process with serious optimism. At that time, probably because introducing
a bill was difficult, amendment proposing had not yet become a semiserious activity wedded to motivations underlying other legislative activity.
But, beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, an extreme
difficulty in passing amendments emerged concurrently with Congress’s
clarification of the general legislative process, which was designed to make
it more accessible to individual members. At that time, independent
amendment proposing began its decline toward the Modern Era attitude of
relative amendment impotence, pessimism about amendment success, and
lack of reverence for the process.
However, a few major political events temporarily interrupted that
decline. Foremost among those were the Civil War, the centennial of the
Constitution, the Populist and Progressive responses to urbanization and
modernization, the 1913 twin amendment successes of income tax and
direct election of Senators, and Prohibition’s adoption and repeal.
Amendability’s demise is reflected not only in the careerism-dependent
character of amendment proposing activity, but also in the decline in
number of already proposed amendments making it out of Congress to be
ratified by the states: the amendment-passing rate during the Constitution’s
first eighty years was dramatically higher than the rate for the last 136.
Between 1789 and 1869 there were sixteen amendments for an amendment
rate of 0.2 per year, or one amendment every five years.404 Between 1869
and 2005, there have been only eleven amendments405 (one of which was
the repeal of another) for an amendment rate of 0.08, or one amendment
every twelve years.406 And those eleven amendments do not mirror the
breadth of scope of the first sixteen but, rather, are comprised of: three
relating to the franchise (extending it to women and young adults and
eliminating poll taxes), one enacting and one repealing prohibition, one
relating to income tax, and the remainder relating to presidential
succession, direct election of senators, and presidential and congressional
terms.
404. But Congress passed two proposed amendments that were never ratified in this era:
(1) an amendment related to titles of nobility (passed in 1810) and (2) the Corwin
amendment (passed in 1861). VILE, supra note 55, app. at 541, 544.
405. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (general suffrage); U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (income
tax); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (direct election of Senators); U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII
(prohibition); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (women’s suffrage); U.S. CONST. amend. XX (lame
duck reduction and order of succession); U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repeal of prohibition);
U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (presidential term limits); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII (District of
Columbia representation in electoral college); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (prohibition of
poll taxes); U.S. CONST. amend. XXV (presidential disability); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI
(set the voting age at eighteen); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (time limits for congressional
pay raises).
406. Congress passed three proposed amendments that were never ratified in this era:
(1) child labor (1924), (2) the ERA (1972), and (3) D.C. representation (1978).
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VII. AREAS FOR FURTHER EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT

[Vol. 55:145
AND

The history of motivation independence versus promiscuous careerism
and the Zeitgeist of amendability in Congress outlined here is merely a
rough roadmap for further inquiry into congressional responsiveness to
amendment need. Again, it is initially counterintuitive to have begun by
looking at a congressional response without having first defined to what
Congress has been responding. But this approach makes sense as a matter
of practical empirical methodology. In order to identify what congressional
activity has been in reaction to, looking at the readily accessible (though
voluminous) congressional activity is a helpful starting point. Of course, in
that inquiry we must not forget that what Congress has not reacted to will
be equally important in the responsiveness calculus.
So, before going into too much detail examining congressional
amendment-proposing activity, it is probably best to use some initial
observations to develop a theory and empirically examine amendment
need, the operationalization of which will require a thoughtful and
searching analysis. Only after doing that and then taking the congressional
responsiveness inquiry to a more specific, substantive level can we begin to
assess amendability.
A. Operationalizing Amendment Need
Strauss’s irrelevance argument seems to start with the outer boundary of
amendment need, over the course of our constitutional history, at no more
than the thirty-three amendments that Congress offered up to the states for
ratification.407 He then proceeds to whittle that down to zero actual
amendment need, or close to it. But it cannot be that simple. A broader
conception of amendment need is dictated by both simple Article V
arithmetic and political theory. And that broader conception of amendment
need requires an inquiry that steps beyond the universe of the thirty-three,
ratified or rejected, congressionally-proposed amendments.
The arithmetic argument relates the quantum of support for an
amendment on a particular topic among voters in state legislatures, or
would-be state conventions, to the quantum of support in Congress. The
narrow view, that limits amendment need to only the thirty-three
congressionally-passed amendments, seems to presume the following:
whenever there has been support for a proposed amendment among

407. See Strauss, supra note 131, at 1463-64 (arguing that only when three conditions
are present will an amendment be significant: when legislative or judicial means of change
are unavailable, when society comes around to thinking or believing in line with the change
brought by amendment, when it establishes “a precise rule” rather than “a vague norm”).
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majorities of voters in three-fourths of the state legislatures, or would-be
conventions, then there has also been support of two-thirds majorities in
both the House and Senate (since two-thirds is less than three-fourths). But
that is not necessarily so.
To see the flaw in the narrow conception of amendment need, consider
the possible level of support in the Senate in the following scenario: On
some particular proposed amendment topic there is majority legislative
support in a bare three-fourths majority of states (thirty-eight). Suppose
further that across the minority of twelve opposing states, the majorities
opposing the amendment are so strong and vehement that no senator from
one of those states would vote for it. (That could be caused by some
combination of careerism and—to the extent a senator’s genuine policy
views reflect those of the vehement majority in his or her state on the
topic—policy purism.) Then, to pass the congressional gate and be
proposed to the states for ratification, the amendment would need the votes
of sixty-seven of the seventy-six senators from the supporting states. That
is, ten senators—just thirteen percent of the senators from the supporting
states—could block the amendment. And given congressional self-interest,
possible policy-purist views, reverence for the amendment process,
staggered senatorial tenures, et cetera, it is possible to imagine particular
amendment topics and circumstances that would produce that quantum of
opposition. The consequence is that the arithmetic is not as simple as three
fourths being greater than two thirds.
In addition, political theory must interrogate Congress’s role with regard
to amendment need. Should it really be only passive and responsive? Or,
instead, should Congress, at times, lead ahead of a solidified supermajority
of political will in the states? That is, does amendment need sometimes
need to be discovered by Congress, whose action in proposing an
amendment to the states becomes the genesis of a popular movement for
political support? The six unratified amendments408 are a minor example of
such affirmative action by Congress failing, which Strauss uses to support
his thesis. But that seems to overlook the spectacular success of something
arguably analogous to a pro-active Congress: the Philadelphia Convention

408. See VILE, supra note 55, at 183 (describing the six failed amendments: the first, in
1789, was included in the original Bill of Rights and dealt with the size of Congress in
proportion to the population; the second, introduced in 1810 and known as the Reed
Amendment or the Phantom Amendment, would have removed U.S. citizenship from
individuals who accepted titles of nobility; the Corwin Amendment, the third failed
amendment was passed by Congress in 1861, and would have barred future amendments
that limited the practice of slavery; the fourth was the Child Labor Amendment, introduced
in 1924; the fifth was the ERA, passed by Congress in 1972; lastly, in 1978, Congress
passed an amendment to treat the District of Columbia as a state for certain voting-related
purposes).
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of 1787.409 Did that hyper-creative, proactive, opinion-leading body really
bequeath a national deliberative assembly utterly devoid of a role in
constitutional leadership?
It seems then, that additional evidence of amendment need, beyond that
which produced the thirty-three amendments Congress proposed to the
states, may be gleaned from the historical record. It may be found either in
issues that garnered supermajority popular support in the states but flunked
the Article V arithmetic in Congress or in issues that were ripe for popular
support but lacked congressional leadership. Engaging this type of inquiry,
Stephen Griffin has suggested that the historical inquiry will reveal there
was little need for change in the nineteenth century:
[T]he most important reason the Constitution did not experience
significant change in the nineteenth century was that little was expected
of the national government. The Civil War Amendments were approved
under special circumstances and their potential for expansion of national
authority was quickly nullified by the profound localism and
antigovernment attitudes typical of nineteenth-century politics. The
weight of the enormous social and economic changes of the late
nineteenth century was borne by state governments . . . .410

But though localism and anti-government attitudes may have been strong
forces, they were not uniform across the entire century, and the amendment
need calculus should attempt a more-detailed parsing.
If such additional evidence of actual or potential popular support for
amendments is discovered, then the last question is whether to deem that
evidence of amendment need. It is a question of normative constitutional
theory about which I remain agnostic in this article. The best starting point
for speculation on criteria is probably the familiar, including the thirtythree proposals from Congress and the prominent constitutional crises
examined by Strauss and others. Did the forces that led to the Eighteenth
Amendment (instituting Prohibition) constitute amendment need? What
about the forces leading to the Corwin amendment? Or do we just say a
need was present but the Corwin amendment was the wrong response?
And how about the New Deal? The theoretical task, already engaged and
partially completed by a variety of scholars—albeit indirectly, would seem
409. See JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787: A COMPREHENSIVE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING 181-83 (2005) (explaining that in the late
eighteenth century, it was common practice for state legislatures to write and pass
constitutions). Therefore, the very gathering of the Constitutional Convention was as novel
an idea as its final output. Id. While the Constitutional Convention’s original purpose was
simply to adjust the Articles of Confederation, the production of an entirely new
Constitution was justified on the grounds that it was a mere proposal to the states. Id.
410. Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States: From Theory to
Practice, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY & PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT 37, 50 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
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to be to first answer the question whether those and similar examples
should constitute amendment need and then identify the more generalizable
criteria that lead to those answers.
Something like this has already been attempted, though only for
prospective purposes to evaluate current and future amendment proposals.
In 1999, a group called Citizens for Constitutional Change published a
report entitled “Great and Extraordinary Occasions:
Developing
Guidelines for Constitutional Change,” which sets forth eight “Guidelines
for Constitutional Amendment.”411 Prepared in the wake of Republicans
taking control of Congress in the 1990s and increased interest in
amendments on topics such as a balanced budget,412 school prayer,413 and
flag burning,414 the guidelines preach restraint. Thus, they caution that
amendments should: focus on topics also important to subsequent
generations, enhance political responsiveness or individual rights, only be
used as a last resort, be “consistent with related constitutional doctrine,” not
be purely aspirational, contemplate consequences for other constitutional
principles, be fully and fairly debated, and have a nonextendable deadline
for ratification to ensure a contemporaneous consensus.415 While lauding
all the guidelines in general, Chemerinsky has noted the practical difficulty
a current generation faces in judging the enduring importance of a proposed
amendment to future generations.416
While all the Guidelines seem generally suited to the historical inquiry as
well, one in particular raises a final theoretical issue for amendment need.
411. CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 180.
412. See id. at 2 (explaining the amendment passed in the House of Representatives and
twice failed in the Senate by only one vote).
413. See id. (arguing that, if passed, the proposals on religion would substantially alter
the present understanding of our system of religious liberty).
414. See id. (listing the flag burning amendment with the balanced budget amendment,
as passing in the House and only narrowly failing the Senate by one vote). In his 1998
review of Kyvig’s book, Chemerinsky comments on an almost verbatim draft of the same
principles that Citizens for Constitutional Change had circulated in 1997. Chemerinsky,
supra note 41, at 1572-75.
415. CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 180, at 7. In full, the “Guidelines for
Constitutional Amendments” ask: (1) Does the proposed amendment address matters that
are of more than immediate concern and that are likely to be recognized as of abiding
importance by subsequent generations? (2) Does the proposed amendment make our system
more politically responsive or protect individual rights? (3) Are there significant practical
or legal obstacles to the achievement of the objectives of the proposed amendment by other
means? (4) Is the proposed amendment consistent with related constitutional doctrine that
the amendment leaves intact? (5) Does the proposed amendment embody enforceable, and
not purely aspirational, standards? (6) Have proponents of the proposed amendment
attempted to think through and articulate the consequences of their proposal, including the
ways in which the amendment would interact with other constitutional provisions and
principles? (7) Has there been full and fair debate on the merits of the proposed
amendment? (8) Has Congress provided for a nonextendable deadline for ratification by the
states so as to ensure that there is a contemporaneous consensus by Congress and the states
that the proposed amendment is desirable?
416. Chemerinksy, supra note 41, at 1574.
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Guideline Three asks, “[a]re there significant practical or legal obstacles to
the achievement of the objectives of the proposed amendment by other
means?”417 The commentary to Guideline Three explicitly equates the
other means with those available in the “political realm.”418 Hence, it asks
whether the objective of the proposed amendment could instead be
achieved through “federal or state legislation or state constitutional
amendment.”419 Examples of proposals that have first exhausted those
particular means are given. The commentary studiously avoids, however,
any explicit reference to the judicial recognition of informal constitutional
change. But the implication is there. It notes that after the Supreme Court
invalidated a state flag-desecration statute, “Congress responded by
attempting to draft a federal statute that proscribed desecration without
violating the Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment.”420
Accordingly, “[n]ow that the Supreme Court has invalidated the federal
statute,” an amendment would comport with Guideline Three unless a
different statute could pass the Court’s test.421
In sum, in addition to the necessary empirical inquiries I have described,
there also remains the theoretical problem of determining the extent to
which a need for constitutional change constitutes “amendment need”
within my framework.
B. Micro-Analysis of Congressional Responsiveness
The data from Modern, Founding, and Antebellum eras at least roughly
match our general expectations; the Civil War Era is sui generis and
difficult to pin down and the Latter Reconstruction-Gilded Age fits neatly
into the general model by exhibiting the emergence of promiscuous
careerism.422 That leaves the anomalous Populist-Progressive (1887-1916)
and Suffrage-Prohibition (1917-1930) eras as the best first candidates for
closer scrutiny. The anomalies, again, are a strong, negative, lagged
correlation in the Populist-Progressive era and a strong negative correlation
in the Suffrage-Prohibition era.423
417. CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 180, at 7.
418. Id. at 14.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 16.
421. Id.
422. Tbl. 5, supra Part IV.B.2.
423. The first approach might challenge the validity of the numerical analysis directly.
For instance, are the amendment “totals” for each Congress unreliable because of the
frequent repetition of the same topic in many separate amendment-proposing resolutions in
the same Congress? See, e.g., Long, supra note 83, at 578 (explaining that while there have
been around two thousand proposed amendments to the Constitution, the proposals cover
relatively few topics). Probably not, because my general assumption is that the repetition
phenomenon is distributed across all the eras. And it is difficult to understand how it only
could contribute to either a positive or negative correlation. At most, it would dampen the
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In Part V, I have theorized the causes of the anomalies based on some
additional, contextual historical data. For the Populist-Progressive era the
bills to proposed amendments relationship is negative because of a tradeoff in political energy and lagged due to a longer “gelling time” for the
amendment proposals, perhaps due to greater reverence for the amendment
process. For the Suffrage-Prohibition era, I speculate that the negative
aspect of the relationship continues based on the same cause and that the
lagged aspect disappears with a diminution in reverence.
It is difficult to assess the validity of my causal speculations when they
are based mostly on psychological factors, and all the subjects are now
dead. Worse still, these eras predate the boom in the collection both of
social science survey data in general and compilation of “vital statistics”
and other studies of Congress in particular. But as with any American
historical era, there must at least be eclectic accumulations of relevant
contemporaneous writings.
A reasonable plan of research for either of the two anomalous eras might
begin by selecting a subset of the Congresses spanning the era and then
selecting a sample of proposed amendments from each Congress. That
should, of course, be done such that it would be reasonable to infer that the
average accumulated characteristics of the sample are likely to match those
of the whole population. That may be difficult to structure given the
potentially divergent relevant characteristics of topic categories of
proposed amendments and their likely lack of normal or other statistically
reliable distribution across the congressional record.
But assuming a reasonable sample is amassed, the next step would be to
closely investigate the characteristics of each proposed amendment in it.
That would, at minimum include examining all that was said and written
about the proposal in committee or on the floor. Further, any particular
statements or general characteristics of the sponsors might be considered.
Data on any committee or floor votes on the proposed amendment should
also be accumulated.
Finally, the congressional analysis for the era should be compared
against a more searching inquiry into potential amendment need (or at least
the need felt for constitutional change), as I have described in section A
above.
CONCLUSION
It seems the character of amendment proposal has changed significantly
since the Founding.
We appear to have moved from generally
strength of a correlation. But, in any case, the degree to which the repetition phenomenon is
equally distributed across all my eras is worth investigating.
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independently-motivated amendment proposing to the stagnant modern era
of promiscuous careerism. Or in broader terms, I tentatively conclude that
Congress has evolved to the Modern Era’s Zeitgeist of promiscuous, nonprudential, irreverent amendability pessimism through the series of
intervening, distinct Zeitgeists detailed in Part V. That shift is just the
beginning of the inquiry. Further questions for constitutional history and
theory are whether and to what degree that shift corresponded to a change
from relative amendability to relative unamendability, at what stages our
history that occurred, and its relevance to constitutional theory. That
analysis requires moving from the macro-level framework presented here
to historical analyses of discrete amendment topics and their relationship to
other events and causes. Moreover, the core of interest for constitutional
theory would seem to be the shift into, then between, and then away from
the anomalous Populist-Progressive (1887-1916) and Suffrage-Prohibition
(1917-1930) eras.
APPENDIX A:
The Thirty-Three Amendments Proposed by Congress for Ratification424
Proposal
Congressional Representation (to control growth of size of
House)(this and next were first two of 12 amendments
proposed as a bill of rights)
Twenty-Seven Amendment (congressional compensation)
First through Tenth Amendments (Bill of Rights)
Eleventh Amendment (state sovereign immunity)
Twelfth Amendment (election of President and V.P.)
Titles of Nobility (to strip citizenship from those accepting
foreign titles)
Corwin Amendment (to protect institution of slavery)
Thirteenth Amendment (banning slavery)
Fourteenth Amendment (various rights against state
infringement, etc.)
Fifteenth Amendment (right to vote)
Sixteenth Amendment (income tax)
Seventeenth Amendment (direct election of Senators)
Eighteenth Amendment (Prohibition)
Nineteenth Amendment (women’s suffrage)
Child Labor Amendment (to give Congress power to regulate
child labor)
Twentieth Amendment (reducing “lame duck” period post
federal election)
Twenty-First Amendment (repealing Prohibition)
Twenty-Second Amendment (presidential term limit)

Proposed
1789

Ratified

1789
1789
1794
1803
1810

1992
1791
1795
1804

1861
1865
1866

1865
1868

1869
1909
1912
1917
1919
1924

1870
1913
1913
1919
1920

1932

1933

1933
1947

1933
1951

424. Compiled from PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 9, at li, 1718-19.
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Twenty-Third Amendment (D.C. presidential voting)
Twenty-Fourth Amendment (banning poll taxes)
Twenty-Fifth Amendment (succession to office of President
and V.P.)
Twenty-Sixth Amendment (18-year-olds’ right to vote)
Equal Rights Amendment (to ban discrimination on account of
sex)
D.C. Representation in Congress

257
1960
1962
1965

1961
1964
1967

1971
1972

1971

1978

APPENDIX B:
Sources Consulted for Proposed Amendment Totals
(1) For 1789-1889: Herman V. Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States During the First Century of Its History
(1896), reprinted in PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
1787-2001, at 1 (John Vile ed., The Lawbook Exchange) (2003). There
were 1,300 amendments proposed between 1787 and 2001. Ames
chronicles all the amendment proposals during the first 100 years of
Congress that he was able to discover. The amendments are numbered
consecutively, but with some lettered additions between numbers. The list
actually begins prior to the 1st Congress and covers amendments proposed
during the Constitutional Convention. The list also includes a few later
amendments proposed by states directly instead of by bill. Around 1,750
amendments were proposed during this period when including the
amendments proposed during the Constitutional Convention. For the
annual amendment totals spanning 1789 to 1889, I have drawn from
Ames’s list of proposals actually introduced in Congress and excluded the
few, anomalous, state proposals.
(2) For 1889 to 1926: CHARLES C. TANSILL, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES INTRODUCED IN CONGRESS
FROM DECEMBER 4, 1889, TO JULY 2, 1926, (arranged by Tansill) Senate
Documents, No. 93, 69th Congress, 1st Session, 1926. (Cited in S. Prt. 9987, Appendix C) (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1969) (providing a chronological enumeration of the proposed
amendments, including date, sponsor, and subject).
(3) For 1889 to 1928: M.A. MUSMANNO, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION: A MONOGRAPH ON THE RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED
IN CONGRESS PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (WASHINGTON: U.S. GOVERNMENT
PRINTING OFFICE) (1929) (illustrating that another 1,300 Constitutional
Amendments were proposed during this thirty-nine year period).
(4) For 1947 to 1953: EVERETT S. BROWN, (80th through 82nd
Congresses) Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States
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of America, Introduced in Congress from the 69th Congress, 2d. Session
through the 87th Congress, 2d Session, December 6, 1926, to January 3,
1963 (Cited in S.Prt. 99-87, Appendix C) (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1963).
(5) For 1969 to 1984: RICHARD A. DAVIS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES INTRODUCED IN CONGRESS
FROM THE 91ST CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION, THROUGH THE 98TH CONGRESS,
2ND SESSION, JANUARY 1969-DECEMBER 1984 (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service) (1985) (Congressional Research Service
Report No. 85-36 GOV).
(6) For All Congresses:
JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND
AMENDING ISSUES, 1789-2002 at Appendix D (2003).
(7) For current congresses: See Thomas website, supra note 278.

